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ABSTRACT 
 
What practical issues can arise when doing business 
in Vietnam? How is Vietnam adapting to the demands 
of the market economy? In particular, how does a 
knowledge of Vietnamese business culture, and 
history, help to clear up misunderstandings – 
especially involving relations between foreign 
business people and representatives from Vietnamese 
business and government? Does the Vietnamese 
experience have a broader value in the Asian region, 
where numerous different societies have been seeking 
a way to engage vigorously in international 
commerce – yet without losing touch with their own 
ethical foundations? 
 
As we examine frustrations with joint-venture 
partnerships, disputes over the need for forward 
planning, demands for paternalistic generosity on the 
part of employers and persistent and sometimes 
disorienting interference by the State in commercial 
affairs, it becomes clear that three types of context 
need to be carefully analysed. First, there is the 
culture of poverty – in some ways as influential as the 
reality of material deprivation; secondly, in Vietnam 
the family has been a vitally important institution, 
partly as a model for business associations; thirdly, 
the Vietnamese state has a special history, influenced 
by Chinese tradition and by the traumatic experience 
of foreign invasion, and this history can lead to 
unusual (by international standards) demands being 
placed on commercial initiatives.  
 
Understanding these cultural and historical contexts 
can help to reduce confusion and tension – and it has 
the capacity at the same time to provide a basis for a 
project that appears to be of critical importance for 
Vietnam itself. In Vietnam and in many other counties 
there is a desire to modify the impact of the market 
economy. The aspiration is to develop a local ethical 
framework for business activity – and it can be 
argued that for this to be an authentic framework it 
necessarily needs to be grounded in the ethical and 
value system that is generally influential in the 
country. The research reported in this monograph – 
the research on business experience and also on 
foundational values - is a step toward creating such a 
framework. 
 
This volume presents case study material relating to 
business in Vietnam. It outlines real issues and 
problems that have arisen – and then seeks to provide 
a cultural and historical context in which to 
 School of Management, Marketing, and International Business                                                                                                                      [2] 
Working Paper Series, Volume 2, Number 2, 2007. 
understand them, and perhaps even solve them. The 
research was undertaken in a cooperative project 
between Australian National University researchers 
and the St. James Ethics Centre, and received funding 
from the Australian Research Council. The St. James 
Ethics Centre helped to establish both the directions 
of the Project and a most valuable cooperative 
arrangement with the Vietnamese Ministry of Trade 
in Hanoi. The study owes much to the initial research 
of Dr. Greg Lockhart, who undertook case studies, 
interviews and surveys. Further valuable research 
was undertaken by Dr. Thien Do. 
 
In these case studies we have not given the real 
names of companies and key personnel. Also, 
footnotes have been kept to a minimum. More 
detailed notes may be obtained from the authors. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Vietnam today is thriving.  Vietnam has a GDP 
growth in 2007 of some 8.5%. - a milestone achieved 
in part by a substantial boost in exports to the USA, 
thanks to the US-Vietnam Bilateral Agreement which 
came into effect in December 2001. Other major 
export destinations are Japan and China; Australia is 
fourth with about 8% of the total. As The Australian 
Financial Review of 11 January 2008 observes, 
investors now "flock to Vietnam", with the 
government approving some USD20 billion in 
foreign direct investment over the last year. As an 
investor in Vietnam Australia is well behind in 18th 
place, but the investment is growing and the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
is urging companies to “assess the long-term 
commercial attractions against current difficulties in 
entering the market”. What is the context in which 
such companies might develop businesses in 
Vietnam?    
 
Much of Vietnam’s current success can be traced 
back to a watershed moment in its history when the 
Vietnamese Communist Party and state began to shift 
from centralised planning to a free-market economy. 
In the socialist command economy before 1986, 
Vietnam had followed a Soviet-style economic 
model. The state had control of all industrial and most 
agricultural enterprises and managed all significant 
procurement and distribution activities – including 
foreign trade. But between 1986 and 1989 poverty 
and the cessation of subsidies from the Soviet Union 
forced the government to liberalise the economy. The 
Vietnamese government introduced its ‘renovation’ 
(doi moi) policy in 1986. Under this policy, 
agricultural collectives began to be disbanded and 
plans for the privatisation of state owned enterprises 
were announced. A Foreign Investment Law was 
promulgated, opening the market to foreign direct 
investment. Official policy began to stress a mixture 
of import substitution policies in industries such as 
steel and construction, and export strategies in 
textiles, footwear and primary products, especially 
rice.  
 
The government began to develop new industrial 
zones and foreign-state joint ventures. The state-
owned enterprises remained dominant, but the market 
was now influenced by consumer demand rather than 
just state-managed procurement policies and 
production targets as before. Together these reforms 
resulted in an enormously expanded service sector 
and a rapid increase in the influx of foreign 
investment. Real GDP growth was just over 8% in 
1992, and 9.5% in 1995, resulting in sweeping social 
and economic changes. Vietnam’s economy took off, 
contributing to a reduction in poverty and an 
improvement in living standards and a building 
boom, mainly in the cities. By 1995 Hanoi had been 
transformed from a sleepy Southeast Asian capital 
into one that hosted the head offices of 450 foreign 
companies. 
 
This monograph explores aspects of the Vietnamese 
business culture that has grown with this expanding 
economy, especially its ethics. It does not explore that 
culture as an abstract system, but rather business 
values and ethics as they were lived out and recorded 
in case study and surveys. Eleven businessmen and 
women working in Vietnam in the late 1990s were 
observed and interviewed in depth.  A survey of a 
hundred Vietnamese business managers was also 
undertaken with the cooperation of the Vietnam 
Ministry of Trade in Hanoi – a survey that asked 
Vietnamese business managers how they did their 
business and what they thought was important in 
achieving success. In the first instance, therefore, this 
monograph is a study of ethics in action – a 
descriptive study.  In the final chapter, however, after 
completing an investigation into the cultural contexts 
of business ethics, we conclude with a discussion of 
the basis on which a new ethical framework might be 
built to suit the current business climate.   
 
This monograph is not, of course, the first to talk 
about business in Vietnam in ethical terms.  Some 
Western commentators have been highly critical of 
Vietnamese business practices.  Others have been 
positive. Much of the success which Vietnam 
experienced with the implementation of the doi moi 
agenda in the late 1980s and early 90s, for example, 
was talked about in ways that related Vietnam’s post-
1986 growth to particular virtues or ethical attitudes.  
For example, an American guide to Vietnam, 
published in 1995, recommended investment in the 
country because of particular virtues in its people: 
 
“Vietnam’s people are imbued with a culture 
that emphasises sacrifice, hard work and 
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education. Although the decades of war have left 
Vietnam very poor, the country has an 
abundance of natural resources and a large and 
potentially industrious work force.  In this 
sense… the nation’s untapped riches are within 
the grasp of foreign investors” (Quinlan, 1995: 
6).  
 
During the economic boom enjoyed by most Asian 
countries in the early 1990s, some influential Asians 
not surprisingly were even more inclined than 
Westerners to describe their economic success in 
ways that hinted at a larger ethical framework.  
Perhaps best known was the article Ten Values that 
help East Asia’s Economic Progress, written by a 
former Singaporean ambassador and director of that 
country’s Institute of Policy Studies, Tommy Koh. It 
described Asian values in ways that had ethical 
overtones. It spoke of an Asian lack of individualism, 
adding: “East Asians believe that whatever they do or 
say, they must keep in mind the interests of others.  
Unlike Western society, where an individual puts his 
interests above all others…” The Asian belief in 
strong families, the article explained, means “Divorce 
rates are much lower than those in the West, and 
Asians do not, as a rule, abandon their aged parents”.  
Koh went on to list other values in highly moral 
tones: “East Asians believe in the virtues of saving 
and frugality…East Asians consider hard work a 
virtue…” (International Herald Tribune 14 Dec 
1993). 
 
Such confidence faltered with the onset of the Asian 
Economic Crisis in July 1997, a development that 
was especially damaging to Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and South Korea, and also saw Vietnam’s 
rate of growth decelerate.  Many foreign investment 
projects were cancelled, and exports fell sharply. In 
1997 there were at least seventy closures of foreign 
companies operating in Vietnam; in 1998 there were 
another one hundred and twenty closures. The highest 
unemployment in a decade (11 %) was recorded as 
the garment, leather, textiles and footwear sectors 
retrenched 30% of their workforce and foreign-
invested companies laid off 15% of their workers 
because of falling demand for exports (Nathan, 1999: 
356). Profound regional disparities also began to 
appear. Where improved living standards and 
industrialisation occurred they did so in the urban 
areas, especially on the area around Ho Chi Minh 
City in the south. About 57% of people in rural areas 
lived in poverty compared to 26% in urban areas.  
 
Further afield a moralising of a different type now 
emerged.  Just as the boom in the early 1990s had 
elicited observations of particular Asian ethical 
qualities, so too did the economic crisis of the late 
1990s. But now Asian business practices and ethics 
tended to be seen (especially by Westerners) not as 
the key to their economic success, but rather as the 
cause of their downfall.  As one Western World Bank 
economist who was working in East Asia at the time 
recalled: 
 
“When the crisis broke out, I was surprised at 
how strongly the IMF and the US Treasury 
seemed to criticise the countries – according to 
the IMF, the Asian nations’ institutions were 
rotten, their governments corrupt, and wholesale 
reform was needed” (Stiglitz 2002: 90). 
 
In influential World Bank, IMF and US Federal 
Reserve critiques of the crisis ‘good governance’ was 
identified as the solution, along with the elimination 
of ‘crony capitalism’ - especially in the Asian 
countries where the economic crisis hit hardest.  What 
these critiques meant by ‘crony capitalism’ was 
capitalism based on links between government and 
business that colluded against the emergence of 
Western-style free markets. And the good governance 
medicine prescribed was institutional reform leading 
to more ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’ and ‘the rule 
of law’. 
 
The Asian Economic Crisis and its aftermath inspired 
soul searching in Vietnam as elsewhere. Old 
questions about Vietnam were dredged up in business 
studies literature – for instance why, if they share 
with the Chinese many cultural features and 
Confucian values, have the Vietnamese not turned out 
to be as good business entrepreneurs and capitalists as 
Chinese (Abrami, 2002; Chan et.al., 1999). In their 
own self-critical appraisals, Vietnamese examined 
their attitudes and behaviour, such as the particular 
emphasis on ‘feeling’ or ‘sentiment’ (tinh cam) in 
transactions, and their weaker cooperative spirit 
compared to the Japanese.   
 
The Vietnamese government was also self-critical. A 
1998 essay on “The Influence of the Asian Financial 
Crisis on Vietnamese Investment and Trade” by an 
official in the Ministry of Trade urged analysis of the 
crisis, so that “we can examine ourselves, apprehend 
our weaknesses and strengths” (Ministry of Trade, 
1998: 191). In this he was following the renovation 
agenda (doi moi), implying regeneration of all aspects 
of society and economy leading to a general renewal 
of Vietnam’s quest for modernisation, development 
and a better life. This government essay assumed that 
integration into the regional and world economies 
should be the goal of renovation policies and that rule 
of law, transparency and accountability would be 
necessary to do this: 
 
“Regular changes in the policy and law-making 
systems will be unavoidable in a process of 
transforming the structure of the economy so as 
to perfect it. But [policy and laws] must 
guarantee the principles of systematic public 
disclosure and transparency (cong khai, minh 
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bach) and be able increasingly to engage with 
regional and world standards” (Ministry of 
Trade, 1998: 192). 
 
In some ways this Ministry of Trade document 
responded to the Asian economic crisis in the same 
way as the World Bank. It acknowledged that “policy 
and laws” that “guarantee systematic public 
disclosure and transparency” are important. However 
it went on to diverge from the usual global 
prescriptions. In this Vietnamese document, even 
more important is the ‘education and training’ of 
government officials, managers and planners, and 
indeed the entire work force of the country, in a vast 
national program. For without this, the essay claims, 
the policy and legal systems will be ‘deformed’ by 
the shortcomings of individuals. The World Bank’s 
‘good governance’ entailed an impersonal 
methodology concerning the way in which people are 
governed. But the Vietnamese notion of ‘government’ 
outlined in this government document is very people-
oriented, or personal. It argues for renewal in all 
aspects of government, including renewal of the 
people actually doing the governing. 
 
Following Vietnam’s recovery from the Asian 
Economic Crisis and subsequent growth, ethical 
issues have continued to be a concern – both for 
foreigners who seek to engage in business in Vietnam 
and for Vietnamese themselves. The ongoing 
campaign of doi moi by the Vietnamese government 
has continued to portray ethical issues as important in 
the task of facilitating the country’s economic 
success, including attracting foreign investment. In 
part, this is recognition of the fact that market 
economies ultimately depend for their effectiveness 
on the maintenance of an ethical framework that 
proscribes lying, cheating, the oppressive use of 
power and other factors that create distort the 
operation of otherwise efficient markets.  
 
The development of ethical prescriptions is generally 
acknowledged to be vital; but it can be argued that 
this can only be achieved effectively if it is grounded 
in an understanding of actual practice, and of the 
ethical foundations of that practice.  For Vietnamese 
as well as for foreigners planning business futures in 
Vietnam, it is necessary to know about the everyday 
practices, values and attitudes of the Vietnamese 
people, not only when they engage in business 
activities and relations amongst themselves, but also 
when they deal with foreign business people who 
work in their country. It is these practices and values, 
and their cultural and historical contexts that this 
monograph explores in the next chapters. We 
commence by outlining a series of case studies.  
 
 
 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
One problem with looking at business in any country 
in the Asian region is that, aside from Singapore and 
Japan, the availability of reliable statistics and 
forensic information on business is usually limited 
(Lasserr and Schutte, 1999: 143). For this reason this 
monograph is based on case studies of Vietnamese 
business culture.  They are presented with comment 
on the historical, cultural, and political contexts, and 
are supported by a survey undertaken of one hundred 
Vietnamese business managers.  
 
The survey was conducted as Vietnam was emerging 
from the Asian economic crisis in 1998. Its aim was 
to identify conceptions of business and business 
practice across a wide cross section of Vietnamese 
companies, especially those likely to be involved in 
foreign trade. Such companies were most likely to be 
state owned enterprises, which dominated the 
economy in the late 1990s, when there were some 
640 in Hanoi and 738 in Ho Chi Minh City. In this 
survey of business culture, weight was also given to 
the private sector. At the time private companies were 
generally smaller but more numerous. Sixty of the 
one hundred enterprises surveyed were from the state 
sector and forty were from the private sector. They 
were evenly divided between the two largest 
Vietnamese cities, with fifty companies selected from 
Hanoi and fifty companies from Ho Minh Chi City. 
Of all these enterprises, 75% said they were involved 
with import/export.   
 
For the case studies, three Australian-owned, four 
Vietnamese-owned and four Singaporean-owned 
enterprises (mostly established in the late 1980s) were 
selected.  
 
Vietnamese-run enterprises 
The four case studies of Vietnamese-run businesses 
are based on interviews conducted with the 
owners/directors of medium to large-scale private 
enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Each 
person interviewed headed a private enterprise which 
employed substantial numbers of people. The first 
two enterprises employed between one hundred and 
one hundred and fifty people, the third about 400, and 
the fourth over one thousand.   
 
The Vietnamese interviewees were: Mr A, the 
managing director of a medium-sized garment factory 
in Ho Chi Minh city; Mr B, the director of BB Water, 
a medium sized plant in Ho Chi Minh city; Mrs C, the 
vice-director of CC Embroideries of Hanoi; and Mr 
D, the son of Madam D, the founder and director of a 
large ceramics company (employing over one 
thousand people) in the village of Bat Trang, some 
fifteen kilometres from the centre of Hanoi.  
 
 School of Management, Marketing, and International Business                                                                                                                      [5] 
Working Paper Series, Volume 2, Number 2, 2007. 
In these four Vietnamese case studies ‘family’ soon 
emerged as a recurring theme. Three of the 
interviewees built their narratives around family 
stories, while the fourth, who stressed his own 
individual efforts, still said the family provided the 
capital he needed to go into business. A further theme 
involves political connections – knowing people in 
government and knowing how to utilise the 
association for the benefit of one’s business. 
 
Cao AA - private garment enterprise 
Mr A described his garment factory as a private 
enterprise, despite the fact that the army occupied one 
half of the building in which his factory is housed.  
He followed his father into the garment trade after 
growing up working in the family business. His father 
was a renowned tailor who was selected to make 
clothes for high-ranking cadres of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party and received a state ‘Award for the 
Garment Industry’. The name of his company is ‘cao 
AA’. The second syllable was capitalised to 
emphasise the importance of his father’s name ‘AA’ 
which he combined with the Vietnamese word ‘cao’ 
(meaning ‘high’), which is left in lower case in the 
company logo.  
 
Mr A expanded the business in 1991 with USD20 000 
from his family and USD70 000 worth of machinery, 
material and thread from Japan.  Mr A then went to 
Japan for three months of training, which he said 
introduced him to international standards in the 
garment industry and discipline in management. 
These international standards included getting rid of 
oil and chalk marks from the garment before it is 
sold. In Vietnam it is common to wash new garments 
before you wear them for the first time. However Mr 
A learnt from his time in Japan, and also from the 
reaction of his international customers, that other 
cultures wear newly-bought clothes straight away. 
 
Despite the influence of the Japanese on his work, Mr 
A still saw his father - who had died - as central to his 
business. Mr A took pains to explain his business 
card and company’s name ‘cao AA’. The way his 
father’s name was combined with ‘cao’ (‘high’), he 
said, suggested the ascendant spiritual presence of his 
father. In the interview he said that the two mountains 
shown on his business card referred to his ‘father’s 
influence” which “has been like a mountain in my 
soul’. 
 
BB Water 
Mr B was the director of BB Water. Like Mr A, he 
started his business with capital borrowed from 
members of his family.  Thereafter, however, Mr B’s 
family had very limited involvement in the business.  
Mr B emerged as the most individualistic of the four 
Vietnamese case study participants. He seemed to 
have sole control of his business.  For example, after 
describing how he set up the bottling plant and 
negotiated with government officials to get the 
necessary papers, he said:  
 
“I also had to do almost everything myself. At 
the beginning I bought the land, designed the 
buildings and supervised the construction. I had 
to interview and train each person. Also I had to 
discipline people.” 
 
He explained that he could not delegate discipline 
because workers would ‘react’ if they were 
admonished by “anyone but the boss, the owner of 
the company”. His exercise of authority extended to 
having to tell a typist how to type a letter and fax it to 
a foreign company, checking for mistakes constantly, 
aware (he claimed) that a Vietnamese secretary would 
“put the letter aside when work finishes at 4:30” 
unlike a non-Vietnamese secretary who would 
“simply work until she completes the task”.  
 
Mr B outlined his schemes to keep employers at his 
factory. After he trained them he gave them a share in 
the business, so that if profits went up that year they 
would be shared across the company. He also offered 
annual bonuses and a retirement scheme that gave out 
larger payouts the longer the workers stayed at the 
factory. All this he explained was in addition to the 
workers’ social benefit and medical benefits which he 
was legally required to pay. Despite all these loyalty 
schemes, however, many of his workers 
supplemented their income with money from what he 
called ‘odd jobs’, or moonlighting. This outside work, 
he explained, “is partly why they (were) not devoted” 
to his enterprise. 
 
In the interview Mr B complained that “Vietnamese 
don’t think for themselves” - although this may also 
have been a result of his belief that “you almost have 
to take their hands and do it for them step by step”. 
Because of his ‘hands-on’ approach in introducing 
these foreign standards, Mr B proudly asserted 
“People think BB Water is a foreign company 
because of the organisation”.  
 
Mr B’s complaints about his staff not taking 
individual responsibility may show that he has had a 
more individualistic attitude than them. This attitude, 
he suggested, had been picked up on his trips to 
France, Japan and other countries in Southeast Asia. 
However, it may also be symptomatic of a more 
general individualisation of Vietnamese culture in 
recent years due to increasing urbanisation and 
industrialisation.  
 
CC Embroideries - garments and silk for 
export 
The third interviewee was Mrs C, the vice director of 
CC Embroideries. Her drapery shop is situated in 
Drum Street, Hanoi – a street which has been home to 
 School of Management, Marketing, and International Business                                                                                                                      [6] 
Working Paper Series, Volume 2, Number 2, 2007. 
embroidery shops run by families from the Quat 
Dong region since the nineteenth century. 
 
Mrs C set up her company in 1988 as a private (non-
state) enterprise with her husband, mother and twenty 
workers. At the time she was interviewed her mother 
was director, and she and her husband vice-directors, 
with four hundred workers spread over three factories 
and one showroom.  Her husband was in charge of 
production, while she was in charge of the company’s 
exports.  This role in exports stemmed in part from 
the fact she went to the University of Foreign Trade, 
but mostly from the ‘experience and contacts’ she 
gained when she worked for the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade.   
 
These contacts in the state bureaucracy obviously 
helped her business. Although she described her 
business as ‘100% private’, CC Embroideries was 
still officially well-connected.  Mrs C’s contacts from 
her bureaucratic background continued to serve her 
well. Advantageous tax concessions were available to 
the company and orders were handed on from state 
companies. When, despite these official connections, 
export orders dropped off during the Asian economic 
crisis, she said they used the time to reorganise the 
workshop and enhance the skills of workers. 
 
Mrs C explained that her workforce members were 
productive because she looked after them. They 
worked eight hours a day and, like Mr B’s employees, 
received ‘social insurance’ and medical benefits. 
Most of her workers were women, and Mrs C 
explained that when they got pregnant they did not 
work as fast - but she would tell factory managers and 
customers to “not be too hard on them”. She herself 
used politeness or respect to encourage them.   
 
Mrs C indicated in the interview that there were 
tensions between herself and her husband over family 
duties which had to be fitted in around the business. 
Nevertheless, as long as business remained relatively 
modest, it was the family enterprise and efficiency of 
CC Embroideries that enabled the company to handle 
such orders and give an international profile to a 
business that has flourished in Drum Street for 
centuries. 
 
DD Ceramics  
The fourth interviewee was Mr D, the son of Madam 
D, the founder and director of DD Ceramics 
company. Madam D was not present but her presence 
loomed large in the discussions.  Something of a local 
celebrity, Madam D was the only woman heading a 
Bat Trang company which exports ceramics around 
the world. Bat Trang is a village some fifteen 
kilometres from Hanoi centre which has been famed 
for its ceramics for centuries. 
 
An article in the Vietnamese Economic Times (21 
August 1999) had described Madam D as ‘very much 
a girl of her village trade’. After training under the 
master artisans in village potteries as a girl, she went 
to work in the exports section of Bat Trang ceramics 
state cooperative, trading mainly to the old Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. Armed with the contacts 
that she had made in this state cooperative, she set up 
her own private family business in 1989. She 
consulted lecturers from the Hanoi University of Fine 
Arts on the creation of new pottery and porcelain 
designs - and then expanded into other provinces and 
beyond Vietnam, getting handicraft export businesses 
to order from her catalogue, taking samples to Ho Chi 
Minh City and sending samples overseas with 
Vietnamese Trade Attaches. She also went to China 
to study ceramics at Kiangxi (Giang Tay), the capital 
of the Chinese ceramics trade. She said she intended 
to send a son to China to learn the language, and then 
to Kiangxi to learn the trade.   
 
Again the idea of ‘family’ is very much at the 
forefront of her son’s explanations for the success of 
his family’s business. He explained that the firm had 
sub-contracted work to about one hundred families in 
the area, contracts being made with the family unit. In 
part this approach was adopted because it is “easy to 
trust the families”. Mr D’s own family is passionate 
about the business. “The whole family has one aim”, 
declared Mr. D, “perfecting our trade and building a 
long-term investment”. This idea of the company as a 
long-term investment is another reason he gave for 
the success of his family’s business. Other 
Vietnamese companies in the area, he said, are 
“interested in the short term and do not have long 
term strategies and don’t have the strength and 
capacity to invest in the long term”.  
 
These four Vietnamese case studies share the 
common thread of family. The Vietnamese 
entrepreneurs all began with help from their families 
– whether in the form of capital, or as joint 
enterprises involving members of the family. It is 
notable that the two women were running ‘family’ 
businesses with husbands, children and parents taking 
up various executive positions within the family.  
 
There was also the common thread of personal 
contacts with government. The majority of these 
Vietnamese entrepreneurs had contacts with the 
government through earlier work in government 
institutions – or, in the case of Mr B (the director of 
the water plant), this contact was through his father. 
The entrepreneurs mentioned only in passing how 
these official contacts helped their businesses – 
suggesting they expected this help virtually as a 
matter of course.  
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Singaporean-Vietnamese joint ventures 
The case study in the next group were based on 
interviews with four Singaporean businessmen who 
set up and ran joint-venture businesses in Vietnam, in 
collaboration with Vietnamese business partners. 
Two of the Singaporean interviewees said 
independently that they thought Vietnam was “forty 
or fifty years behind Singapore” and thought this was 
not entirely bad. The majority of the Singaporean 
directors enjoyed their work in Vietnam, particularly 
its social aspect, including celebrating festivals of a 
type that has diminished in importance in Singapore. 
Their nostalgic enjoyment of Vietnamese culture, 
however, was mixed with a certain amount of 
paternalism. With one exemption, all the Singaporean 
directors interviewed felt that they should be 
responsible for the most important business matters 
rather than leaving them in Vietnamese hands.   
 
EE Hotel 
The first Singaporean ran a hotel in Vietnam for four 
years beginning in 1995. After one year working in 
Cambodia, Mr E was appointed by his Singaporean 
company, an independent firm, to be the general 
managing director of the four-star EE Hotel at Ha 
Long Bay.  It took several months for the project to 
be approved by Vietnam’s State Committee for 
Cooperation and Investment (SCCI). The final 
twenty-five-year contract was signed - with 
provisions for training Vietnamese staff, for formal 
replacement of skilled foreign nationals with 
Vietnamese staff, and for preference to be given to 
Vietnamese domestic producers in the procurement of 
inputs.   
 
The hotel was launched as a joint venture with a 
Vietnamese vice-director, who mainly dealt with 
Vietnamese authorities, and a deputy-director, who 
dealt with Vietnamese personnel.  The chairperson of 
the board of management of the joint venture was 
also a Vietnamese executive. 
 
Although Mr E sought a Vietnamese partner who had 
good political and social contacts as well as access to 
marketing networks, he did not devolve much power 
to his Vietnamese partner. They agreed that the 
Vietnamese partner would mostly recruit lower level 
employees.  With thirty years experience in hotel 
management, Mr E insisted on complete control of 
staff recruitment and most personnel management.  
Believing that conditions in present-day Vietnam are 
like those of Singapore forty years ago, he felt certain 
that the battle against corruption and nepotism would 
not be won unless he took executive control of his 
finances. He stopped unaccountable loans being 
authorised by his Vietnamese executive, particularly 
the Vietnamese manager on the board of 
management.   
 
Mr E maintained Vietnamese culture was very similar 
to Chinese culture.  He believed that respect should 
never be demanded, but must be shown by 
management to workers if management expects it to 
be returned.  He regarded his staff as members of a 
family, and regularly treated them to feasts at other 
luxury hotels’ restaurants, where he joined the staff 
party as one of the revellers.  When a female staff 
member - whom he considered to be like his own 
daughter - got married, he organised her wedding 
reception, enthralling the Vietnamese guests with 
novel features that were the latest fashion at 
Singaporean weddings. 
 
Mr E put a great deal of time and energy into training 
his staff.  Being an experienced cook himself, he 
showed his hotel’s staff how to include Japanese, 
Malay, Western and regional Vietnamese dishes in 
the menu, making good use of his library of sixty or 
so cookbooks.  More importantly, he thought that it 
was imperative to “change the Vietnamese way of 
thinking” in carrying out their professional duties in 
the new hospitality trade.  He regularly sent staff to 
Singapore for training, with generous travel 
allowances. He was proud of the fact that his staff 
always topped the class and became group leaders to 
trainees from other hotels. He taught staff how to 
handle difficult customers. He paid high salaries to 
staff who proved their competence.  Returnees from 
overseas refugee camps were preferred employees, as 
he thought they had been exposed to the world and 
therefore could readily understand his point of view 
and rationale for his conduct of the enterprise. 
 
FF Complex 
The next case study features a project that was not so 
successful.  The FF Complex was a quasi-
governmental joint venture between a Singaporean 
state subsidiary of the Housing Development Board, 
and Vietnamese officials.  Together they planned to 
build a ‘town’ on 150 hectares near Ho Chi Minh 
City at the cost of USD700 million.  Two years were 
spent by the Singapore company imparting ideas 
about government involvement in city planning and 
urban development to Vietnamese officials.  During 
that time, the Singapore company invited officials 
from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to Singapore to 
visit the State Housing Development Board projects 
and to participate in organised tours on urban 
planning. The general manager of FF Complex, Mr F, 
personally fetched Vietnamese architects and 
engineers from their hotels for a visit to the 
Singaporean Urban Authority headquarters before 
taking them on to the Singapore seminar.   
 
The USD700 million project, however, never 
eventuated. Negotiations were protracted and 
difficult. By 1994, the managing director asked Mr F 
to look for a smaller project in Hanoi, to use it as a 
standby until a licence for the large project could be 
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obtained.  This smaller project was the only project to 
be realised. Approval was obtained after eighteen 
months for the construction of the FF Complex joint 
venture complex in a district south of Hanoi, with an 
outlay of USD5 -7 million and a contract length of 
thirty-six years.   
 
Mr F made a considerable saving on the cost of the 
foundation for this project by procuring consultancy 
services from the National University of Hanoi’s 
department of Civil Engineering through personal 
contacts. The chief consultant engineer became his 
close friend and took a continuing personal interest in 
the development of the complex.  With 70% overseas 
shareholding, FF Complex grew to approximately 
sixty-six accommodation units (apartments), shops 
and restaurants - with the major restaurant 
specialising in seafood, developed and operated by 
Mr F. 
 
One of the reasons the initial larger development near 
Ho Chi Minh City never eventuated was 
disagreement between the various levels of 
Vietnamese bureaucracy. The master plan for the 
development was approved by the Ho Chi Minh City 
people’s committee.  The Hanoi central government 
was the final arbiter, however, because the project 
was classed as a ‘group A investment’ due to the 
large amounts of money involved.  In 1994 plans for 
the larger project were brought to Hanoi for approval, 
which could not be obtained because of a lack of 
agreement between the major players within 
government – the Party Politburo, the council of 
ministers and the Army.  Finally, the licence for the 
larger project was only to be given on such different 
conditions that it had to be dropped.  Many people 
who had bought land when it was first announced in 
the newspapers lost money. 
 
In hindsight, Mr F feels that research for the larger 
initial project should have been carried out 
beforehand. The Singaporean partners realised too 
late, for example, that the Vietnamese government 
only allowed foreigners to buy property in Vietnam 
when the investment is worth less than USD10-20 
million. It was also found that the Vietnamese 
government understood the property market in a 
different way. For example, the government 
stipulated that the deadline for the completion and 
final selling up of the property must be ten years. The 
Singaporeans believed variable market conditions 
would not favour such time limits and the property 
might need to be sold in more or less than ten years. 
The Vietnamese government, however - used to a 
controlled, rather than free property market - believed 
that the sale would not result in a loss. In general, Mr 
F found Vietnamese officials like Chinese officials, 
afraid of accountability and focused on short-term 
development, which he said translated into a “take 
what you can get now and not wait for what you 
really want to come through” attitude.  
 
In Mr F’s opinion, lack of knowledge of possible 
difficulties with the government was the main reason 
the larger project never got off the ground. In the 
smaller, Hanoi-region complex which did get 
established in the Cau Giay district, Mr F seemed to 
feel his status as the sole bearer of Singaporean 
business culture was a problem. As foreign staff 
salaries were considered the highest cost, he was the 
only Singaporean member in the FF Complex. The 
deputy manager and the rest of the staff were all 
Vietnamese. This was in contrast to the joint 
venture’s board of management which had a ratio of 
three Singaporeans to two Vietnamese executives in 
its composition, including a Singaporean chairman. 
The board of management, however, only met once a 
year and did not help Mr F run the complex on a day-
to-day basis. Mr F found that Vietnamese workers 
tended to cover for each other, and accused 
‘whistleblowers’ of being unpatriotic. He also spoke 
of the Vietnamese failure to back up verbal bravado 
displayed at meetings, and felt he was thrust into the 
role of sole disciplinarian and sole instigator of a 
‘different sense of fair pay for fair work’. 
 
Despite these problems, however, Mr F found the 
venture personally rewarding. He made deeply 
satisfying friendships through working relationships, 
such as the one with FF Complex’s chief engineer. 
He admitted that the firm’s objective - to construct 
and manage a whole town-complex - was not 
realised. But he still felt that the same principle which 
had helped the firm get as far as it did - mutual trust - 
was correct, and remains absolutely necessary for all 
realistic profit-sharing relationships.    
 
Hanoi GG Textile Group 
The third Joint Singaporean-Vietnamese venture in 
Hanoi travelled a smoother road. The GG Textile 
Group was incorporated in 1992 under a licence 
issued by the Ministry of Production and Industry as a 
Joint venture, with shareholders from Singapore and 
Malaysia in an 80-20 ratio. The GG Group had a paid 
up capital of USD4.5 million and annual turnover 
about USD3 million in 1999. Its two divisions 
specialised in woven and knitted garments aimed at 
the overseas international market. Major products 
included jackets, twill pants, shorts, denim pants, polo 
shirts and sweatshirts. Its exports have mainly gone to 
the European Union and Canada. 
 
The driving force behind the GG Textile Group was 
Singaporean Mr G, with years of worldwide 
experience in setting up garment factories where 
labour costs are favourable. He came to Vietnam in 
1989 with the idea of setting up a factory to sew 
clothes for export with the latest technology, during 
the difficult early period of changeover from a 
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centrally planned regime to an open market economy.  
He met the then Foreign Minister and developed a 
close friendship.  He said they were “like brothers”. 
 
He was asked to take over an old State-owned-
Enterprise garment factory site not far from Hanoi 
City, which he gutted and refurbished from scratch 
with imported plant and equipment. He invited 
officials from the Hanoi People’s Committee, and 
various Ministers, to visit ASEAN countries and tour 
factories there. There were no skilled sewing-machine 
operators or experienced business managers, so he 
sent employees to Singapore and Malaysia for 
training. He also invited experts from overseas to 
come and train his staff, in addition to the in-service 
training run by his Singaporean staff.   
 
Starting with one hundred employees, his factories 
grew to one thousand employees. Like his fellow 
Singaporean, Mr E, Mr G claimed Vietnam was like 
Singapore forty or fifty years ago. Like Mr E, he felt 
he was good at discerning and accommodating the 
different attitudes of the groups involved - 
government officials, Party committee members, 
office staff and factory hands. 
 
HH Steel  
Mr E’s and Mr G’s juggling of state and Party 
factions is repeated in the last Singaporean – 
Vietnamese joint venture case study. In this case, 
however, the ‘juggling’ act was not so successful. In 
this case study the Singaporean General Manager 
departed early because of frustrations with the 
Vietnamese partners and was replaced by an 
American of Vietnamese descent. The expatriate 
executives interviewed were extremely frank about 
the role the Vietnamese government played in HH 
Steel’s business affairs.  So frank were they that they 
explicitly asked that they not be named. 
 
HH Steel was set up by a wealthy Singaporean 
conglomerate with interests in property, hotels, 
manufacturing, finance and Chinese language media 
in Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and China. Its initial 
foray into Vietnam was, in part, at the behest of the 
Singaporean government. Many Singaporean joint 
enterprises were established in Vietnam from the 
early 1990s, in part to support the emergence of a 
market economy there.  In 1994 HH Steel joined with 
a Ho Chi Minh City construction company (run by 
the City’s Peoples Committee) to set up a medium-
sized factory making steel tanks – gas containers, 
pressurised cylinders – for industrial and domestic 
purposes in Ho Chi Minh City. However, like many 
foreign businesses in Vietnam, it was doing little 
more than surviving in the late 1990s. From a 
commercial perspective, HH Steel’s decision to 
produce steel tanks was promoted by its existing 
capacity in this field in China and Malaysia. A new 
Vietnamese market had opened for gas in the early 
1990s and no other manufacturer in the country was 
producing containers for it. 
 
From the Vietnamese perspective, the idea of 
importing the capital, technology, and skills to set up 
a local capacity to manufacture steel tanks was 
attractive, as it fitted with its import substitution 
policies for steel products. The government agreed to 
provide the necessary protective tariffs to assist in the 
establishment of the industry. HH Steel proceeded 
with the investment in plant and equipment from the 
United States and Germany. With approval for a joint 
venture obtained from the Vietnamese authorities in 
1993, production began in 1994.   
 
The enterprise, which employed some 160 workers 
by 1999, was seventy percent owned by the 
Singaporean partner and thirty percent owned by the 
Vietnamese one, the Ho Chi Minh City Construction 
Company. HH Steel provided the capital and plant, 
and the Vietnamese partner provided a sun-baked site 
and a run-down building.  The board of directors was 
established with five Singaporean members elected 
by the shareholders and responsible to HH Steel. The 
two Vietnamese directors were responsible to the Ho 
Chi Minh City People’s Committee – which ran the 
Construction Company.   
 
Beneath the board of directors was the Singaporean-
appointed general manager.  The factory opened with 
this Singaporean general manager and a deputy 
general manager, who was a Vietnamese national and 
a relatively high-ranking member of the Communist 
Party.  
 
HH Steel operations in 1995 produced a profit.  In 
1996, however, the business experienced a major 
downturn. This bottomed in 1997 when the first 
general manager left in frustration, and the board of 
directors’ meetings were characterised by what one 
informant described as ‘misunderstandings and 
differences’. The Singaporean general manager was 
replaced by an overseas Vietnamese from the United 
States. He had been born in Vietnam and was a native 
speaker of Vietnamese. In America, his professional 
qualifications and background were in mechanical 
engineering. He had also worked for HH Steel in 
other parts of Asia. He felt some initial shock at 
things such as surveillance by the government - 
including his telephone conversations being listened 
to - but was laid-back enough to accept this as part of 
doing business in Vietnam.  
 
The problems HH Steel experienced in 1996 were not 
only the fault of the departing Singaporean general 
manager or misunderstandings at board meetings. 
There were external financial pressures as well. The 
Vietnamese government did not give HH Steel the 
tariff protection it had promised, and in 1996 cheaper 
Thai products flooded the market.  This was due to an 
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oversight by the Vietnamese government which had a 
import tax on components needed to make steel tanks 
but virtually no import tax on manufactured tanks. 
HH Steel could not compete with large Thai 
companies which would deliberately drop prices to 
destroy local competition, and afterwards raise their 
prices. The situation became catastrophic when the 
Thai Baht lost half its value after the Asian Economic 
Crisis erupted in July 1997, and even cheaper Thai 
products flooded the market. HH Steel was forced to 
close its factory for some months, as the Singaporean 
partner lobbied the government for tariff reform. This 
lobbying took eighteen months because government 
officials were unwilling to take responsibility for 
making the decision to raise tariffs on completed 
cylinders. During this period, HH Steel employees 
continued to receive seventy percent of their pay, as 
required by law. HH Steel did consider closing their 
factory in Vietnam permanently - but a large 
conglomerate like HH Steel had the capacity to 
subsidise its Vietnamese investment from revenues 
elsewhere in its global empire. HH Steel eventually 
won the promised tariff protection when one senior 
official, with considerable experience of the outside 
world, comprehended the problem and undertook to 
increase tariffs on completed cylinders. The factory 
resumed operation.   
 
The difficulties HH Steel experienced illustrate 
several issues which emerge also in the other case 
studies in which foreigners have been dealing with 
the Vietnamese government. Firstly, the Vietnamese 
government promised tariff protection to attract 
foreign investment to the country. Secondly if the 
government sometimes failed to live up to contractual 
promises such as those regarding tariffs, it was often 
an indication of oversight or disorganisation rather 
than a deliberate act. Thirdly the government 
protected Vietnamese workers through laws with 
requirements such as the continuation of seventy 
percent of their pay even when their workplace is shut 
down. Lastly, getting the government to fix an 
oversight took a long time because many bureaucrats 
failed to take personal responsibility for decisions. 
This last theme may be thought to be universal: most 
countries complain about buck-passing by 
bureaucrats. In many of our case studies, however, a 
diminished sense of personal responsibility seems to 
have emerged both outside and inside the public 
service. The Vietnamese businessman, Mr B, as we 
saw, complained about it in his staff.     
 
In the case of HH Steel, another problem arose when 
the factory building was subject to break-ins and 
pilfering. When a burglar was caught, the police “did 
nothing” because they felt “a big foreign company 
could easily afford such a thing”. This ‘Robin Hood 
patriotism’ - stealing which is acceptable because one 
is taking from the rich foreigners to give to one’s 
poor fellow countrymen and women – arose in 
several case studies. As a theme it links individual 
and governmental ethics in our case studies. In 
several of our case studies Singaporean and 
Australian business people felt that Vietnamese 
government officials expressed sympathy for wealth 
transfer of almost any type from richer foreigners to 
poorer Vietnamese.    
 
To summarise, these three Singaporean-Vietnamese 
case studies contain several common threads. For 
example, the HH Steel case study was marked by the 
same sort of misunderstanding between the 
Vietnamese government and Singaporean business 
executives which we also saw in the FF Complex 
case-study. In both these Singaporean-Vietnamese 
joint ventures, the Vietnamese government seemed to 
jeopardise the attainment of its own desires: it wanted 
a large housing complex for visiting businessmen and 
to attract foreign investment, and it wanted gas 
cylinders built. Yet it didn’t support gas cylinders 
with its tariff arrangements and it could not agree 
amongst its own levels of bureaucracy about the first 
large FF Complex. In these cases the Vietnamese 
government seemed to fit the FF Complex’s 
Singaporean manager’s description of having a short-
term approach – that is, of holding the view of “take 
what you can get now and not wait for what you 
really want to come through”.  
 
We also saw that in some cases misunderstandings 
with the government were overcome by personal 
relationships with individual officials. 
Misunderstandings were avoided by ‘becoming like 
brothers’, as the Singaporean Mr G of the GG Textile 
Group achieved so successfully with a Vietnamese 
Minister. On the other hand, we also saw that 
generally the Singaporeans (including Mr G) were 
more paternalistic in their personal relationships with 
the Vietnamese than brotherly.  
 
The Singaporeans in these case studies regarded the 
Vietnamese as being as new in the 1990s to 
capitalism as Singapore had been forty or fifty years 
previously. The avuncular concern for the 
inexperienced capitalists of the ‘less mature’ 
Vietnamese economy emerged as a further common 
feature connecting these Singaporean-Vietnamese 
joint ventures.  
 
Australian-Vietnamese joint ventures 
A roofing company, a hospital and a sand-mining 
company were the diverse businesses chosen as 
Australian-Vietnamese case studies. The Australians 
involved in these joint ventures all acknowledged that 
in Vietnam they were working in a very different 
business culture from their own. Two of the three 
Australian-Vietnamese joint ventures suffered as a 
result of local political power struggles and were 
eventually sold off or closed, while the third was a 
cultural and business success.  
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YY Roofing 
In our research the YY Roofinng was the most 
successful Australian-Vietnamese joint venture.  The 
Australian Mr Y had been a partner for many years in 
a roofing materials business in Australia.  After a 
suggestion from an associate, he began to consider 
taking his business to Vietnam. After a number of 
trips there, he sold his share of his Australian 
business and committed every cent he owned to a 
joint venture between his company and a Vietnamese 
company, whose director was Mr J.  This joint 
venture company, called YY Roofing, began 
producing in November 1992. By 1997 YY Roofing 
was one of Hanoi’s greatest small business successes. 
Mr Y sold his flourishing business in that year, after 
which YY Roofing continued to lead the market in 
roofing materials and sought to diversify its products.  
 
With Mr Y as General Manager, and his wife and son 
also involved, the company prided itself on being a 
family firm. Mrs Y was involved in the general 
oversight of the company’s affairs and their son 
became the Operations Manager. This family aspect, 
it might be argued, meshed well with Vietnamese 
tradition. But more than just his own immediate 
family, Mr Y expanded his concept of ‘the family’ to 
include everyone who worked for him. When 
interviewed about his Vietnam business Mr Y said he 
felt “proud saying that YY Roofing is a big family”. 
He explained that it was a very egalitarian ‘family’ 
that spent a lot of time together, not only at work but 
also “going to picnics, to football games, organising 
parties” together. He went on to explain that this led 
to “internal solidarity” which he felt was a major 
reason for the growth of YY Roofing and its success.  
 
The happy conjunction of the Y family firm and 
Vietnamese family values was also helped by Mr Y’s 
contributing to Vietnam through public lectures, and 
by his respecting their customs. Mr Y, a former 
English teacher, taught English to Vietnamese 
professionals on a weekly basis. This activity was so 
helpful in enhancing Mr Y’s reputation that it was 
still being mentioned on Vietnamese television years 
later.  In 1993 and 1994 he was also a regular guest 
lecturer to Vietnamese people studying Western 
business ethics.  At the same time, he considered that 
observing Vietnamese traditions – such as the all 
important “tea time and talk” routine before homing 
in on the point of the meeting – was an important 
component in achieving objectives. The fact that his 
son’s wife was Vietnamese also helped to promote 
the family image of the company. For example, in 
1994, the cover story of Vietnam Economic News - 
entitled “A big commitment to Vietnam” - contained 
an interview with Mr Y’s son and featured a wedding 
photo of him and his Vietnamese wife.  
 
YY Roofing’s General Manager was sent to study 
business management in Singapore partly at YY 
Roofing’s expense. In Hanoi ‘YY’ became a 
household name.  Apart from articles in the 
Vietnamese language press, which actually discussed 
the ‘family’ style of the YY venture as well as its 
motivation and product, by the late 1990s the term 
had become something of a generic term.  One could 
sometimes hear on television references to things or 
objects that are “as straight as a YY roof.” 
 
As we shall see however, the YY Roofing 
phenomena, was not all smooth sailing. Mr Y was 
shocked at the frequency with which government 
agents and other middle men asked for bribes, or 
‘commissions’ as under-the-table payments were 
called. From the outset he refused to pay 
‘commissions’. There were also clashes of values. Mr 
J, the Vietnamese partner in the venture, seemed at 
times to be fraudulently taking advantage of the YY 
Roofing, despite his part share in it. When Mr Y 
complained about Mr J’s activities to the Vietnamese 
government, differences with them also became 
apparent as police and other officials refused to act or 
saw the alleged crime quite differently from Mr Y. 
Difficulties also arose with the Vietnamese emphasis 
on a cash economy, with people taking up both time 
and expense to pay debts in cash and in person.  The 
limited development of the banking system in 
Vietnam was a further frustration.  How the family of 
Mr Y overcame these obstacles while remaining true 
to their own ethical framework is instructive for 
anyone considering how to conduct oneself in a 
cross-cultural joint-venture.  
 
The LL Hospital 
The second Australian-Vietnamese joint venture is 
the case of the LL Hospital, begun in 1993 when a 
Western Australian Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
Delegation from Perth visited Vietnam. During this 
visit one of the members of the delegation, a Perth 
surgeon, Dr L, had discussions with the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Health over a possible joint venture with 
Hanoi’s MM Hospital. The Western Australian 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce hastily formed the 
Indochina Medical Company as a basis for 
negotiations, but it was not until 1995 that the 
company was capitalised and a successful bid 
launched to win Vietnamese government approval for 
a joint venture with Hanoi’s MM Hospital. After 
constructing a small but state-of-the-art hospital in 
Hanoi, the LL Hospital opened on 22 October 1997.  
  
Patient admissions to this hospital unfortunately 
never lived up to the forecasted needs of a rapidly 
modernising market. It was an international standard 
hospital with a comprehensive range of services and 
specialisations, yet no more than twenty of its fifty-
six beds were ever occupied. Despite this the hospital 
was well-managed culminating in a rationalisation of 
its services and downsizing in July 1999. Its accounts 
finally broke even in October 1999. But just as the 
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hospital seemed to be adapting its operations to the 
local market, it was sold to a French company which 
continued running it as a hospital in its scaled-down 
form.  
 
A large part of the hospital’s problems stemmed from 
overly optimistic forecasts of the growth of the 
Vietnamese economy proven wrong by the Asian 
economic crisis. It had been set up primarily for 
expatriates living in Vietnam, wealthy foreign tourists 
and wealthy Vietnamese who could afford to pay its 
high (by Vietnamese standards) medical fees. Both 
expatriate and Vietnamese pools of potential patients 
dried up with the Asian economic crisis: expatriates 
left as foreign companies in Vietnam closed down, 
and the already small proportion of rich Vietnamese 
grew even smaller. It was also found that wealthy 
Vietnamese would not book into a private hospital for 
fear that such an ostentatious display would lead to 
jealousy, especially on the part of bureaucrats who 
could make their lives difficult.   
 
As well as the Asian economic crisis, the complexity 
of transplanting expensive medical care into a 
socialist and almost uniformly poor society was not 
foreseen. Dr L was the chairman of the board of the 
LL Hospital and a Professor M from MM Hospital 
was its vice-chairman. Dr L originally performed 
sophisticated keyhole surgery on two peasant women 
in an effort to get his team’s bid approved by the 
government. He entered into a joint venture with an 
under-equipped and desperately crowded hospital, the 
MM Hospital in which patients slept two or three to a 
bed. The relationship between the hospital and the 
local economy was never resolved, but interesting 
ethical dilemmas were raised by the obligations of a 
comparatively wealthy institution in the midst of 
widespread poverty.  
 
NN Mining 
The third and final Australian-Vietnamese joint 
venture, NN Mining, ended in a complete breakdown 
of the business partnership between an Australian 
mining company and its Vietnamese partners.  This 
failure, however, contains valuable lessons about 
Vietnamese business ethics in a cross-cultural 
encounter.  Late in 1992, PP Ltd of Australia, one of 
the largest black sand mining companies in the world, 
embarked on a joint venture with various Vietnamese 
companies to mine and process mineral sands in the 
central Vietnamese province of Ha Tinh. The 
Vietnamese side of the joint venture was made up of 
two Vietnamese companies: a mining company which 
was subordinate to the national Ministry of Heavy 
Industry based in Hanoi, and another company 
subordinate to the People’s Committee of Ha Tinh 
Province. Together these three companies formed a 
joint venture company called ‘NN’ to mine mineral 
sands, primarily ilmenite (black sand), used in the 
production of paint and pigments for export to Japan. 
The heavy mineral deposits in Ha Tinh province were 
already being exploited, but in a primitive fashion by 
1,800 miners working with shovels, wheelbarrows 
and sluices for processing in twenty-three state-
owned separation plants.   
 
After speedy negotiations with a single Vietnamese 
representative of both the Vietnamese companies - 
who stayed in Perth for only a month - details of an 
agreement were drawn up between the two 
Vietnamese companies and PP Ltd. Happy with the 
results of its negotiations, PP Ltd overlooked legal 
and other advice from consultants and concluded a 
relatively rapid deal. Little attention was given to the 
problem of translation, especially with regard to 
Vietnamese government regulations, as it seemed 
unthinkable to PP Ltd that the Vietnamese would not 
understand the basic concepts of the agreement they 
had in mind. 
 
The joint venture was licensed in December 1992 - 
with the aim of exploring for, mining and processing 
mineral sands. The Vietnamese government’s long-
term aim to modernise mineral processing in the area 
was reflected in the stipulation in the investment 
license that from the fifth year onwards, the company 
would commence building an artificial rutin plant 
and, from the ninth year, a titan pigments 
manufacturing plant. The Australian partner, PP Ltd, 
contributed 60% of the capital and promised to 
commit expertise, technology and USD2.9 million to 
modernise the project and establish NN Mining as a 
competitive exporter to world markets. A member of 
the provincial People’s Committee, Mr P, was 
appointed general director of the board of 
management. The company went into official 
operation in 1993.   
 
Almost as soon as it began operating in Vietnam, the 
Australian partner, PP Ltd, ran into problems in the 
joint venture relationship. In the first year of its 
operations (1993) there were disagreements over the 
role of the Vietnamese general director of the board 
of management. The Vietnamese side argued that the 
opening of the company’s bank account, the 
nomination of the account owner and the consequent 
approval of expenditures did not conform to 
legislation.  Furthermore, the company stipulated that 
any bank withdrawals required the signatures of two 
members of the board of management, one of whom 
must be an expatriate. The Vietnamese believed that 
this arrangement created a loophole for the foreign 
party to withdraw money without the consent of the 
Vietnamese parties, a situation PP Ltd did not believe 
to have arisen.  
 
At the same time controversy over the downturn in 
the local economy caused by the company’s 
reorganisation of mining operations and 
redeployment of labour began almost immediately. 
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The large number of workers who had formerly been 
involved in local mining – between 1,200 and 1,800 – 
was an issue for PP Ltd, especially as it tended to pay 
premium wages,  
 
In 1994 a fortuitous visit by a senior politician from 
the government of Western Australia, the Australian 
home state of the company, temporarily soothed the 
troubled joint venture to the point where, at a meeting 
in Hanoi in November 1994, the NN Mining board of 
management agreed to expand and modernise NN 
Mining’s ilmenite exploration, with a loan of USD4.5 
million from the ANZ Bank. NN Mining’s chairman 
described this as “bringing modern equipment [to Ha 
Tinh] to ease the mining and separation process”. A 
dispute followed, however, between PP Ltd and the 
local Ha Tinh Provincial government - because the 
imported machinery was likely to cause 
unemployment. The Vietnamese partners said that the 
current employees “must be recognised as permanent 
staff of NN Mining”, and be re-assigned to 
maintenance work.  
 
At the time NN Mining’s board decided to import this 
labour-saving machinery, the Vietnamese government 
perhaps coincidentally decided to investigate NN 
Mining’s activities. The inter-ministerial investigation 
team set up by the State Commission for Cooperation 
and Investment (SCCI) released its findings in 1995 - 
just as a dispute with the general director of the NN 
Mining board, Mr P, culminated in the allegation by 
PP that Mr P was involved in an illegal sale of 
ilmenite to Japan.  
 
The Vietnamese government team made a series of 
allegations against PP Ltd personnel. Their findings 
included: the lack of progress towards the first 
objective stated in the investment license, the 
building of a rutin plant; the conduct of mining 
without an approved plan; a defective accounting 
system; the absence of the general director’s signature 
on labour contracts; the failure to separate NN 
Mining and PP Ltd expenses and the company’s 
failure to pay for the Ministry of Heavy Industry 
geological documents. Between 7 December, 1994 
and the first quarter of 1995 the SCCI sent four 
official letters to NN Mining requesting that they 
solve the above problems.  
 
In response to the SCCI’s requirement that the 
general director’s role be adjusted in accordance with 
current law, the chairman of the board of 
management (Mr N) took over Mr P’s role of general 
director. This seemed, however, to intensify the 
discord within the board of management. Also, a 
hold-up at Hai Phong Port of forty-two containers 
bound for NN Mining in 1995 could not be resolved 
in the Australian company’s favour. 
 
The problem of the containers on the docks arose 
from a lack of coordination in the first half of 1995 
between the board of management, Mr P, the general 
director, in executing the Company’s export policy, 
the Ministry of Trade and the SCCI. In February 
1995, PP Ltd sent Mr P a list of the selected 
machinery and equipment with costs. In March Mr P 
signed a letter requesting the Ministry of Trade 
approve the 1995 import plan. In April the Anti-
smuggling division at Hai Phong Port sent a letter 
requesting that NN Mining’s general director (Mr P) 
go to Hai Phong to claim the goods.  This could not 
be done because the SCCI report charged that PP Ltd 
unilaterally brought the goods into the country before 
all the necessary procedures had been completed, pre-
empting approval by the Ministry to Trade. Nor did 
the company have the necessary shipment licence 
from the Ministry of Trade based on the approved 
annual import plan. By July 1995 the forty-two 
containers were reportedly branded ‘illegally 
imported goods’ despite the declaration by the 
General Department of Customs that the goods were 
in conformity with the list approved by the Ministry 
of Trade itself.  
 
Efforts to resolve the dispute failed, resulting in a 
complete shut down of operations. Meanwhile the 
local authorities advised PP Ltd that the equipment 
containers impounded at Hai Phong had been 
confiscated and advertised for sale. Meetings between 
the SCCI, the Ministry of Heavy Industry and local 
Ha Tinh authorities decided that, as well as dealing 
with the containers, a new board of management and 
board of directors would have to be appointed from 
among people of good will with a good grasp of 
Vietnamese law. These talks resulted in NN Mining 
paying workers their salaries for a period when PP 
Ltd had suspended operation in accordance with the 
Vietnamese practice of continuing salaries during a 
period of shut down. 
 
Mining operations limped on for almost another year 
but NN Mining’s problems would not go away. PP 
Ltd believed that the Vietnamese partners sought to 
take control of the joint venture‘s revenue and 
ultimately the enterprise itself by cooperating with 
bureaucrats to harass the Australian parent company 
and the Australian expatriates. Provincial officials 
imposed restrictions on Australian expatriate 
personnel in Vietnam, and some were even arrested 
by the local People’s Committee for allegedly failing 
to have obtained visas in the proper manner. 
However, it was the more formal government 
grievances with Westralian’s choice of auditing 
company, delay in attending to problems raised and 
failure to build the promised rutin and pigment plants 
which eventually led to the break-up of NN Mining in 
1996.  
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Relationships with the ruling Vietnamese Communist 
Party - as we concluded at the end of the overview of 
the Singaporean case studies - were important to the 
success of a joint venture. However, NN Mining was 
a joint venture thick with ‘cadres’. A member of the 
local People’s Committee was on the board and, as 
we have already noted, the two Vietnamese 
companies that were party to the joint venture were 
quasi-governmental: one was linked to the central 
government and the other to the provincial 
government. But despite these solid government 
connections problems still arose. It may be that some 
of the difficulties in this joint venture arose, in part, 
out of conflict between the central and local levels of 
government – a conflict transmitted into the relations 
between the Vietnamese joint partners. Permission or 
authority given at one level of government might 
have been opposed by the other level. It has not been 
possible to question Vietnamese officials in a way 
that would allow us to know if this was the case.  
 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that 
some officials worked for both the national 
government based in Hanoi and the local, provincial 
government simultaneously. Ha Tinh is well known 
as an economically depressed region with a long 
history of revolutionary resistance dating from the 
colonial period. As a result it has tended to produce a 
disproportionate number of powerful politicians, 
including many in the central government based in 
Hanoi. When negotiations began, therefore, a number 
of officials from one of the Vietnamese partner 
companies - who held positions not only in the 
national Ministry of Heavy Industry but also in the 
central provinces of Vietnam - were involved.  
 
The stories of these three Australian-Vietnamese joint 
ventures range from the undoubted success of YY 
Roofing company to NN Mining’s succession of 
problems, ending in the final withdrawal of the 
Australian partner from the venture and from 
Vietnam. The LL Hospital is somewhere in between 
these two extremes - with initial problems, which 
were mainly financial, being finally surmounted.  
 
It is interesting that all three enterprises in these 
Australian case studies, including YY Roofing, were 
sold or closed down. The Australian managers and 
staff appear to have returned home, unlike most of 
our Singaporean managers who, at the time of the 
case study, seemed to be enjoying Vietnam so much 
that they had settled there for good. With the 
exception of Mr Y (and presumably his son who 
married a Vietnamese), the Australian managers and 
staff in the case study did not stress the importance of 
friendships with Vietnamese or their enjoyment of 
Vietnamese customs. Of course it may be that they 
just did not talk about them. These Australians may 
well have enjoyed friendships with many Vietnamese 
and loved their customs, but they did not feel it was 
relevant to a narrative about their businesses. They 
may have been imbued with the traditional ‘Western’ 
idea that one’s working life and personal or social life 
are separate - if so, this points to a significant 
difference between these Australian managers and 
their Singaporean counterparts.  
 
The Singaporean managers (and Mr Y) talked about 
their socialising with their Vietnamese staff as very 
important. The Singaporean managers may have 
perceived a difference between their home country 
and Vietnam when they said it was like Singapore 
forty or fifty years ago, but even this comment points 
to a shared cultural inheritance - a Chinese-influenced 
cultural heritage, including the legacy of a Confucian 
respect for hierarchy in family and work situations.  
Australians, from this perspective, have further to go 
when adjusting to Vietnamese culture compared to 
their Singaporean counterparts. No Australian made 
the comment that “Vietnam is just like Australia forty 
or fifty years ago”, and such a comment would have 
been nonsensical. Modern Australia with its 
predominantly British legal, educational and 
employment institutions is even further removed 
culturally from Vietnam than is modern Singapore. 
This observation is supported by a finding of the 
survey done for this monograph. When the one 
hundred Vietnamese business managers were asked 
“is it easier to do business with other Asian investors 
than with Western or Australian ones?” the biggest 
proportion of them agreed that it was: 42% answered 
“yes” compared to 35% who answered “no”.   
 
Overview  
It assists in reflecting more clearly on the business 
ethics presented in this multitude of case studies if we 
sort them according to the different points of 
reference. There are business ethics, for instance, in 
which the individual is the referent. We look at the 
private ethical beliefs and attitudes held by each 
person in the case studies, particularly when the 
personality or attitude of one person seems important 
to the success of a business, as in the case of the 
Vietnamese Mr B or the Australian Mr Y. Then there 
is a second category in which the referent is a small 
institution such as the family or village. In business 
this might mean the ethics of dealing with family 
units, such as the contracts DD Ceramics made with 
other potting families in Bat Trang village, or perhaps 
the ethics of how to juggle family life with one’s 
business as Mrs C (in the garment business) chose to 
do. The third major point of reference to emerge from 
the case studies is the state - the business ethics of the 
government bureaucracy and its many officials. For 
example, in the two Australian-Vietnamese joint 
ventures, YY Roofing company and NN Mining 
company, the ethical question of whether or not the 
state is a fair and impartial arbiter in business disputes 
arose.  
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As well as the contexts which straddle these eleven 
case studies, certain themes are also shared between 
them. The issue which is central to this monograph, 
the differences between Vietnamese and non-
Vietnamese business cultures is prevalent in the 
Australian case study. For example, we see the 
‘individualistic’ ethics supposedly unique to the 
West, displayed by Mr Y in the YY Roofing case 
study. Mr Y, with his strong personal ethics based in 
the Christian tradition, found the prevalence of bribes 
or, as they were also called, ‘commissions’, the most 
confronting part of doing business in Vietnam. Many 
Australian and Singaporean businessmen also 
expressed an aversion to bribery which they saw as 
entrenched in the Vietnamese business culture. They 
put it down to a lack of ethics on the part of 
individual Vietnamese or perhaps the widespread 
poverty in Vietnam. However other case studies show 
that an aversion to bribery is not just confined to 
Westerners, but is widely shared by Vietnamese as 
well. As Mr A said when he described how his 
garment business sidestepped overly complicated 
customs procedures,  
 
“…you have to use bribery.  The enterprises 
have complained to the government about 
bribery and the newspapers have written many 
reports about it, but it hasn’t had any effect.”  
 
Furthermore, this individualism is also practised (and 
preached) in the case study of the Vietnamese 
businessman, Mr B. In the next chapter, Mr B is 
reported as explaining his attachment to notions of 
individual responsibility as the result of his travel 
overseas. But we also explore the possibility that it 
might be the result of a new individualism emerging 
in Vietnam as the influence of the clan and village 
wane. The change in Vietnamese business culture and 
ethics due to increasing urbanisation and 
industrialisation emerges in many of the case studies.  
 
Poverty is another theme which runs through the case 
studies. In the late 1990s Singaporean and Australian 
businessmen were doing business with a Vietnam 
which was undeniably poorer than their home 
countries. The Australians in the LL Hospital, for 
example, realised many of their expectations were 
dependent upon a certain standard of living and 
adjusted their expectations in the face of the harsh 
material poverty of their Vietnamese patients and 
colleagues.  
 
A related theme to emerge from the case studies is the 
fact that poverty has cultural effects in Vietnam, as 
well as material ones. Certain attitudes borne of 
poverty have become engrained in the culture, such as 
short-term thinking in business. As Madam D’s son 
pointed out in the DD Ceramics case study, most 
Vietnamese companies “don’t have the strength and 
capacity to invest in the long term”. Attitudes borne 
of poverty persist, even in people no longer poor. For 
example, a short-sighted business attitude was 
exhibited by Mr Y’s Vietnamese business partner, Mr 
J, who was a well-paid co-director of Vietnam’s most 
successful roofing company. Despite this Mr J could 
not rise above the old windfall mentality of ‘take 
what you can, when you can’ and committed 
fraudulent acts. His countrymen, including the 
authorities to whom Mr Y complained, accepted this 
matter-of-factly. They thought his dishonesty should 
be expected as ‘a matter of course’ when a 
Vietnamese was in partnership with a wealthy 
foreigner.  
 
The case studies suggest the influence of another 
custom that is probably rooted in centuries of 
believing that there was ‘not enough to go around’. 
Ordinary Vietnamese appear to have been hiding 
what little surplus or wealth they have for fear of it 
being taken from them. Everyone from private 
tradesmen through to professionals hid their wealth 
from the state. Private subcontractors hid their tools 
of trade. Even doctors who are sick seem not to have 
stayed at more expensive hospitals for fear jealous 
bureaucrats might stymie their career if they reveal 
their wealth. These and other strategies are examined 
in the next chapter, and are considered with reference 
to some theoretical observations on the ‘culture of 
poverty’ - the historical legacy in Vietnam of wealth 
and power being centralised, first in the royal court, 
and then in the Communist party.    
 
The theme, however, which emerges most 
consistently in our case studies is ‘the family’. The 
centrality of the family in the Vietnamese psyche 
comes through clearly. The family is the most 
important ‘survival strategy’ by which Vietnamese 
guard against want. In most of the case studies new 
Vietnamese businesses were established with start-up 
capital provided by the entrepreneurs’ families. In 
most cases families also helped to run the businesses. 
As we shall see, one of the reasons for the 
prominence of families in business in Vietnam is that 
families formed a private, ‘black market’ economy 
long before doi moi legalised such dealings. This pre-
eminence of families in business, however, would 
seem to be far more than just a pragmatic ‘survival 
strategy’. The family is the main organising principle 
in most Vietnamese lives.  
 
For many Vietnamese, their families have defined 
who they are and what they do. We saw entrepreneurs 
in the Vietnamese case studies who inherited their 
families’ traditional occupations – although they then 
expanded the hereditary occupation in keeping with 
the newly capitalistic Vietnam of the late twentieth 
century. Mr A’s father, for example, was a tailor - an 
occupation Mr A expanded into a garment factory. 
Similarly Madam D expanded her family’s traditional 
potting craft into a ceramics manufacturing and 
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export business. But their families have not just 
helped their businesses. For most Vietnamese it has 
been the other way around. Their businesses exist to 
help their families. The majority of the one hundred 
Vietnamese we surveyed said they became first 
involved in business because they thought it was 
good for their families.  
 
The case studies also reveal the strong sentiment 
Vietnamese have felt towards the idea of the family. 
The idea of the family in many ways is just as 
important as the reality of blood relationship.  
Vietnamese can be ideationally related. Examples 
from the case studies show that general low levels of 
trust in Vietnam are mitigated by extending the idea 
of family outwards to cover even those you are not 
related to, but with whom you work or have business 
dealings.  
 
An idealised concept of the Vietnamese family 
emerges from the case studies as autocratic, 
hierarchical and respectful. The family hierarchy is 
Confucian with the oldest male at its top and 
youngest female at its bottom. The next chapter will 
consider how this respect for those above you in the 
hierarchy has been inculcated in Vietnamese children 
and also mitigated by Vietnam’s other religious 
inheritance - Buddhism. 
 
The relationship between Confucian attitudes to 
business and women arose in the two case studies 
which featured Vietnamese women who established 
and ran their own companies. One of these women 
was a vice-director along with her husband. During 
the interview she talked frankly about how she 
balanced her supposed ‘subordination’ to her husband 
within the Confucian family, with her equality with 
him as a fellow vice-director of the company.  
 
A further feature encountered in many of the case 
studies is the rituals that are followed in Vietnam to 
strengthen family bonds within the ‘family’ of the 
workplace as well as families that are related by 
blood. Eating and drinking, particularly dining out, 
arose in the case studies as indispensable to doing 
business in Vietnam. Foreign companies tapped into 
this when they made appeals to family loyalty by 
treating their staff in restaurants or flying them to 
holiday resorts.  
 
As well as the family, the state is also prominent in 
all the case studies. The central government, it is 
clear, has controlled many sectors of the economy - 
including lending by banks.  From the evidence of 
our case studies, the Vietnamese state wanted the 
increase in the gross national product and rising 
living standards that capitalism brings, but it did not 
want the loss of its own power. Many government 
officials in our case studies did not seem to want to 
decentralise power into other institutions, including 
impersonal laws and procedures. They still relied on 
personal relationships. That is, business people had to 
get to know their local cadre in order to do business. 
Often these personal relationships with Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP) officials became familial. As 
we saw, the Singaporean Mr G (in the GG Textile 
Group case study) said he and the Vietnamese foreign 
minister became ‘like brothers’. 
 
The two strongest threads running through our case 
studies, the family and the state, cross and overlap so 
many times that often they become entangled. In 
different places, in different case studies the 
Vietnamese state gives the impression of working to 
replace the family, replicating it or strengthening it. 
The state protects Vietnamese workers through laws 
obligating employers to insure them and pay them 
even when the factory is shut. However this 
paternalism was not universally heralded by the 
Vietnamese in the case studies. We will see that one 
Vietnamese employer, Mr B wanted the paternalism 
extended to bosses as well. Another, Mr A, said that 
private companies like his were like an ‘adopted 
child’. Vietnamese business people, it emerges, 
recognise the state as the Confucian father but 
perhaps not in the idealised form the state would like. 
 
More than half of our case studies explore the theme 
of how the Vietnamese state treats foreigners. 
Singapore businessmen, judging by the few in the 
case studies, are more ready to accept personal 
relationships with government officials and state 
surveillance. But from the point of view of many 
foreigners working in Vietnam, the state’s 
paternalism towards its own translates into 
xenophobia towards outsiders.  
 
From the evidence of our case studies the Vietnamese 
state appears to have been caught in a dilemma, 
wanting some aspects of foreign investment and not 
others.  It has appeared at times to be suspicious of 
foreigners, never quite trusting them. For example, 
the director of HH Steel was under surveillance, 
including the tapping of his telephone. As we saw in 
the NN Mining case study, that an Australian-
Vietnamese joint venture could be plagued by 
difficulties culminating in the bureaucratic 
harassment and arrest of some of its Australian staff. 
Perhaps those difficulties arose, in part, because of 
government bodies and officials trying to maintain 
the power differential between themselves and 
foreigners.  For many of the foreigners in our case 
studies the actions of the Vietnamese state were 
disconcerting and disorientating. These foreigners 
tended to find Vietnamese culture as a whole 
puzzling and confronting. It is an aim of this 
monograph to lessen some of that puzzlement and 
discomfort by exploring the contexts of business 
approaches in Vietnam, examining in particular 
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Vietnamese understandings of their own business 
culture.  
 
Caveats  
Before we begin an exploration of cultural contexts, 
however, a number of caveats must be brought to the 
reader’s attention. Firstly, while all these case study 
contain ethical lessons in retrospect, of course not 
every aspect of their success or failure can be 
attributed purely to issues of business ethics or 
cultures. There may also be practical reasons why an 
enterprise succeeded or failed, such as market 
demand or the Asian economic crisis, which began in 
mid 1997 and continued to affect the Vietnamese 
economy until 2000.  The practical details of each 
separate case study are not our primary concern here.  
The next chapter will not consider each case study 
separately but rather interrogate them for what they 
tell us about Vietnamese business culture and 
business ethics.  What matters most of all is how the 
details help to summon up the ethical framework 
through which individuals moved and interacted. 
 
The term ‘ethical frameworks’ is not meant to suggest 
unchanging, monolithic sets of instructions for 
behaviour that people follow rigorously. Our brief 
outline of the case study has already hinted that, like 
most people, the business people surveyed exhibited a 
variety of heterogeneous, disparate behaviours and 
beliefs. One of the most influential moral 
philosophers in the late twentieth century, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, has argued that people today possess only 
“disordered” fragmentary remains of the unified, 
shared schemes of morality that ruled in ancient 
Greece, Rome and medieval Europe (1987). While 
his argument is Eurocentric, his observation that most 
people’s moral ‘frameworks’ are ramshackle and 
undergoing constant renovation could apply to many 
of the people in the case study. Indeed it could be 
argued that today only religious fundamentalists 
subscribe to completely consistent, unchanging moral 
frameworks. Having said this, however, we will see 
that broad ‘family’ resemblances can be discerned 
between the responses that many Vietnamese in the 
case studies have to an ethical conundrum - compared 
to, for instance, the responses common to Australians 
or shared by Singaporeans in the case studies.   
 
These different ethical frameworks are necessarily 
drawn in broad brush-strokes in the next chapter. 
Many of the more subtle, myriad differences between 
the ethics of each individual person or say, the 
business cultures of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, 
have also been left out. Such nuances have been 
sacrificed for the sake of clarity and brevity in the 
next chapter. References to Singaporean business 
ethics, for example, will not detail contrasts in the 
business cultures, histories and attitudes of the 
different ethnic groups of Singapore. Similarly 
Australian business ethics will be sometimes glossed 
as ‘Western’, meaning the broad cultural features 
shared by Western Europe and America, even though 
many Australians are of non-Western descent or 
background and even ‘Anglo-Australians’ have 
developed local styles and characteristics that contrast 
with those encountered today in the United Kingdom 
or the United States. Sometimes in the next chapter, 
the umbrella term ‘Western’ will even be used 
interchangeably (and to some extent inaccurately) 
with a more over arching term, ‘globalisation’. This 
‘global’ culture which has a style inspired by the 
consumption of the most affluent, mainly Western 
countries seems to have its business culture dictated 
by the long reach of stock markets, international 
banks and institutions such as the World Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. Global fashions and 
standards in everything from hairstyles to accounting 
give another (pan-cultural) dimension to the cross-
cultural exchanges that can take place in international 
business.   
 
The next chapter attempts a deeper understanding of 
the themes raised in these case studies. We will see 
what values and assumptions emerge from the 
experiences of Mr A, Mr B, Mrs C, Madam D, Mr E, 
Mr F, Mr G, the executives of HH Steel, Mr Y and 
his family, Dr L and his hospital staff, NN Mining’s 
Mr N, and a whole host of other business people who 
come and go in these case studies. As previously 
mentioned their experiences will be supplemented by 
our survey of one hundred Vietnamese carried out 
with the assistance of the Vietnamese Ministry of 
Trade.   
 
When this survey was conducted in 1998 it revealed 
that Vietnamese business managers perceived they 
were living in a period of enormous change. A 
substantial 93% of the Vietnamese business managers 
surveyed agreed that the way of doing business in 
their country had changed in the five to ten years 
before the survey. Business in Vietnam was changing 
from being largely rural, small-scale and government-
controlled, to being carried out in the cities, between 
individuals and private companies.  Yet despite the 
perception of massive changes in the late 1990s 
which was recorded in the survey and also the case 
studies, it was accompanied by a thirst for more. Of 
the business managers surveyed, 85% said that the 
way of doing business in Vietnam still needed further 
reform. 
 
As well as indicating tremendous change, however, 
the survey reveals that some Vietnamese attitudes 
stayed the same.  Certain responses would strike 
Australian or Singaporean business people as hang-
overs from the pre-doi moi, centrally-planned 
economy. For example, when asked “what was the 
best kind of market for Vietnamese conditions”, 42% 
of the Vietnamese business respondents still preferred 
“a combination of open and centrally planned”. Also 
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striking are the responses when asked if “the role of 
government is more or less important than the role of 
the individual in the market”. The vast majority of the 
Vietnamese business managers surveyed (77%) 
agreed the government’s role was “more important”, 
while only 20% said it was “less important”.  The rest 
didn’t know.  As the next chapter will explain, such 
attitudes are more than a simple legacy of a centrally-
planned socialist economy. Very often Vietnamese 
business ethics and values also arise from the 
educational, political and religious contexts of wider 
Vietnamese society. 
 
TOWARD A DEEPER 
UNDERSTANDING 
 
Perhaps the first and most obvious context for 
understanding Vietnamese business behaviour is the 
long standing significance of poverty in Vietnamese 
society. The lasting influence of poverty is one factor 
that arises in the case study information relating to 
seemingly corrupt business practices. One of the most 
confronting things for many of the non-Vietnamese in 
our case studies was the expectation that they pay 
‘commissions’ (considered as ‘bribes’ by some 
Western business people) or falsify receipts. The 
issue arose with YY Roofing’s very first order in 
Vietnam. A representative of a construction company 
in Hai Phong purchased USD1,000 worth of material 
but asked for a receipt for USD2,000. Mr Y’s 
response to this request is indicated in his diary, 
where an entry reads: “A very good meeting with 
directors and staff and put to rest any ideas of 
commissions and sales. Very interesting!! YY 
Roofing will be an honest company”. YY Roofing 
agreed to provide only a genuine receipt for the 
USD1,000 worth of material that was actually 
purchased.   
 
From the case studies it is apparent that what many 
would call bribery appears in many guises and at 
many points in Vietnamese business.  For example, 
on the outer ring of YY Roofing’s activities were the 
fifteen agents the company had in Hanoi and the 
provinces by 1996 . Particularly in the case of a big 
government contract these YY Roofing agents would 
sometimes on-sell roofing material at a price above 
that stipulated in the contract. The YY Roofing agent 
and the government’s agent would then split the 
difference. Even within YY Roofing’s office it was 
found that a person was selling ‘open receipts’ so that 
purchasers for big firms or government could present 
their bosses with a ‘YY Roofing’ receipt (which was 
known to be expensive) while buying a cheaper 
inferior product and keeping the money saved for 
themselves. Mr Y, when he discovered this had the 
Vietnamese ‘economic police’ put a stop to it, 
although the outcome was complicated in ways which 
we shall explore later. 
 
In our case studies there were different reactions to 
the issue of bribes.  Some managed to accommodate 
it. For example, the LL Hospital in its early 
construction phase paid commissions to official 
consultants that reached tens of thousands of dollars. 
Later they found cheaper assistance from government 
officials who doubled as private consultants. The lack 
of regulation meant that the Australians involved with 
the hospital thought of payments to such consultants 
as ‘under the table’. However, the Australians also 
made some attempt to appreciate that in a 
bureaucratic setting where officials are paid unlivable 
wages it must be hard for Vietnamese administrators 
to resist the lure of lucrative payments from foreign 
companies. As one hospital administrator put it, the 
officials who demand these sums do so “more from 
need than greed”. 
 
Poverty 
As this hospital administrator understood, the larger 
context for these commissions is the very real poverty 
in Vietnam.  This poverty affects business ethics in 
ways that might be unimaginable to Australian and 
young Singaporean business people until they 
experience it first hand. An example which bought it 
home to Mr Y was the common method of purchasing 
YY Roofing’s higrip screws. These screws, which 
were used to fix the roofing material, were sold in 
boxes of 1,000. Vietnamese customers commonly 
poured the screws onto the factory floor and counted 
them one by one to see if they were all there. 
Sometimes, after fixing a roof, a customer would also 
bring one or two screws back to the factory seeking 
credit. As well as indicating an internalised sense of 
uncertainty and suspicion, such actions are clearly set 
in a culture that is deeply conditioned by poverty and 
the minute specification of concrete things. 
 
The Australian manager at the LL Hospital also found 
that little things that people would not probably even 
bother picking up off the footpath in Australia or 
Singapore would go missing in Vietnam. Rubber 
tubes and cotton wool would be taken, not for 
personal use but so that they could be resold. Of 
course pilfering exists in any large organisation 
anywhere. But in the view of one of the hospital’s 
general directors, it was exacerbated in Vietnam by 
the fact that almost anything there is saleable. This 
pilfering of hospital stores amounted to a significant 
incidental cost, especially since larger items such as 
chrome fittings, basins, instruments, cups, saucers 
and cutlery were also taken and resold. The partner 
hospital in the joint venture, Hanoi’s MM Hospital, 
wanted to share equipment and ambulances with the 
new LL Hospital, in part because its own equipment 
had depreciated because of thefts. The ‘ambulances’ 
used by MM Hospital had been received through a 
Japanese aid program. By the time the LL Hospital 
was setting up its operations, they had been stripped 
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of their equipment and reduced to empty delivery 
vans with red crosses. 
 
The poverty of most Vietnamese raises questions 
about the ethics of making certain demands which it 
may be difficult for Vietnamese staff to meet. One of 
the LL Hospital’s senior Vietnamese doctors, for 
example, lived in the 1990s in a house with no taps, 
no flushing toilet and no fans. Most of the other 
Vietnamese hospital staff lived in far more cramped 
conditions than he did, sometimes among three 
families living in a single room no more than ten 
square metres. But still, in his relatively privileged 
home, the senior doctor could only obtain water by 
lining up with his empty cans at a pump in his 
precinct at 10.30 pm - because this was the time the 
electrical power was running. If the power was off he 
could not get water that night. Such conditions made 
him tired for work next day (and, when the water did 
not run, unable to meet expected standards of 
cleanliness and presentation). For the Australians a 
significant but unexpected aspect of staff 
development was not only teaching people to come to 
work each day but also teaching them to stay awake 
at work. Especially in the fierce summer heat, many 
people were tired during the day because they found 
it difficult to sleep in their overcrowded living spaces 
at night. Patients’ confidence could be shaken by 
doctors who were not presentable. In Australia an 
unkempt doctor who falls asleep on the job might 
offer reasonable grounds for dismissal. In Vietnam 
such a course of action would be unethical. Rather the 
Hospital assumed the task of teaching doctors how to 
maintain presentable standards. 
 
One of the LL Hospital’s general directors, was also 
struck by the difference poverty made to expectations 
when she taught hospital administration there. She 
would sometimes teach one and half hour courses in 
hospital administration to people who came from the 
countryside. The gulf in resources between the LL 
Hospital and whatever they had in their villages was 
obvious in the way they regarded running water as a 
novelty: 
 
“They look at the running water and then look 
up the taps. When nurses come here from other 
hospitals for training they go back full of 
enthusiasm. But they soon get worn down. But 
then, one day I was asked by one of those 
hospitals where they could get cleaning 
materials - so something seems to have changed 
a little.” 
 
Poverty then made Vietnamese unable to meet basic 
standards that a similar Australian hospital or other 
business might reasonably demand.  
 
An HH Steel company official described how his 
company overcame the lack of resources of many of 
the subcontractors they hired. Poverty meant that the 
subcontractors might not have the tools or even the 
training to do the job. If a prospective subcontractor 
said he could make a part, the HH Steel officer would 
check his education in technical school and see if he 
knew how to use a certain software package for 
mechanical engineers. He would then look at the 
man’s small machines and presses and say: 
 
“‘I’ll give you a better machine, you do the job 
and I’ll pay you’…We help with money for a 
mould or press and we give them a contract. We 
advance 30% of the money – and the prospective 
subcontractor has to put in some of the money he 
has hidden away. After a year they don’t need 
money anymore. They were at first worried we 
wouldn’t pay. It took about a year to get over 
that.”   
 
The concern that they would not be paid, not only 
points to the likelihood that such a thing had already 
happened to them, but also the serious consequences 
if they were not paid. Employees in Vietnam need 
wages not to keep up mortgage repayments or school 
fees as in Australia but “to eat”, as one informant said 
when discussing the YY Roofing case above. In 
thinking about business culture, however, we must 
take into account not only the fact of poverty but also 
what might be termed an inherited ‘culture of 
poverty’.  
 
The ‘culture of poverty’ 
It is notable that many officials in the case studies 
seemed to ask for bribes or extra fees to be paid ‘as a 
matter of course’.  A practice which might have 
arisen from real need, seems to have led to an 
entrenched culture of extra fees and commissions 
being routinely asked for and given.  Survival 
strategies developed over centuries of deprivation 
have resulted in social practices and attitudes that are 
maintained by professionals, officials and other 
classes in Vietnam who are no longer directly 
threatened by starvation.  
 
In an essay on historical factors that work against 
economic growth in Vietnam, Greg Lockhart suggests 
the condition of ‘common poverty’ has existed 
throughout most of Vietnamese society, except for 
the very top echelon where wealth and power are 
concentrated. Members of this elite, he explains, have 
‘institutionalised wealth differentials’ between 
themselves and those they rule. Furthermore, he 
claims:  
 
“...it is the nature of peasant society to adjust to 
this and through important phenomena including 
cults of poverty, mutual help organisations, 
black markets, a ‘culture of poverty’… 
perpetuate what I call the common poverty. Put 
another way, in such societies it is the nature of 
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state power to ‘force’ people to take social-
economic alternatives that will always remain 
small-scale in relation to it and offer no potential 
for structural change (1991).”  
 
This ‘culture of poverty’, as Lockhart calls it, is 
perpetuated by two main agents. It is perpetuated by a 
self-interested elite which wants to keep those below 
it in poverty so they do not amass enough resources 
to threaten their power. And it is perpetuated by a 
‘peasant society’, which is an unwitting accomplice 
in its own oppression - by its adoption of cults of 
poverty, mutual help organisations, black markets and 
so on. All of these small-scale economic survival 
strategies adapt so successfully to the status quo that 
they actually entrench it rather than challenge it. We 
have seen for example the assistance families offer 
their members in setting up businesses. This has 
alleviated the pressure on the Vietnamese banks to 
free up their capital in loans. 
 
Another ‘survival strategy’ that was been adopted 
over time is the hiding of any assets or wealth from 
the state.  Apparent poverty has in fact not always 
indicated a shortage of cash in Vietnam. The need to 
maintain the appearance of common poverty is so 
deeply internalised in Vietnamese thinking that 
wealth will sometimes be hidden. As the Australian, 
Mr Y found: 
 
“the experience of YY Roofing indicates that 
there is more money in Vietnam than is generally 
believed. Do not be misled by appearances.” 
 
There is a tradition in Vietnam of people hiding their 
wealth from the elite – in our case studies hiding it 
rather than placing it in bank accounts. The reluctance 
of ordinary Vietnamese to use banks meant that for 
YY Roofing cash was overwhelmingly the means of 
transaction unless they were dealing with the 
government. Since they came cash in hand, YY 
Roofing’s customers almost never asked for credit. 
Equally no order went to the factory without prior 
payment.  
 
HH Steel found that supposedly poorer 
subcontractors often hid their assets. In 1999 HH 
Steel had to subcontract tasks to private tradesmen. If 
the tradesman’s papers had a round red stamp 
imprinted on them, it meant that he was somehow 
related to the government in a state owned enterprise 
or Joint venture. But a black stamp on a private 
tradesman’s paper indicated he had the lowest legal 
standing with a District or Local Committee (at Ward 
level) and a minimum legal capacity of 40 million 
dong (about USD2,000 US). Yet HH Steel found 
these ‘black stamp’ people were the ones who made 
the best sub-contractors for two reasons. They almost 
always had far greater capital resources (better tools 
and small machines) than they declared to the 
authorities – some even owned cars. Second, they 
were keen to work and provide a good service. HH 
Steel characterised all of their six or seven ‘black 
stamp’ subcontractors in these ways. 
 
Foreign business people in Vietnam – as related in 
our case studies - also found that in a society where 
most people had very little, jealousy was rife. This in 
turn led to a stress on keeping ‘down with the 
Joneses’. Rich or slightly better-off people in 
Vietnam wanted to appear to be equal with their 
neighbours and colleagues who might get jealous if 
the disparity in wealth was known.  
 
The LL Hospital found this tendency to hide one’s 
wealth militated against the admission of Vietnamese 
patients. Most wealthy Vietnamese did not want 
anyone to know that they were rich enough to be able 
to afford to stay in an expensive private hospital. In 
particular they did not want the state to know. The 
main disincentive to the admission of rich 
Vietnamese seems to have been the requirement for 
official registration of patients. This official 
requirement was rigorously enforced. Just as those 
checking into hotels in Vietnam had details of their 
identity and duration of stay sent to the local police 
station, hospital patients had to register with the local 
police in the same way. It brought to the surface the 
jealousy referred to above. As one interviewee from 
Hanoi said: 
 
“Vietnamese are often reluctant to come to the 
hospital, because people will find out how much 
money they have. When the authorities find out 
who is in the hospital, they want to know where 
they got the money from.” 
 
There was a story circulating in the hospital of a well 
known Vietnamese doctor who, rather than be 
admitted to the LL Hospital, chose to be treated at a 
very inferior local hospital because he feared the 
effect on his career if people in the Ministry of Health 
found out. As well as dampening local interest in the 
hospital, such official interest may also have 
contributed to the fact that those Vietnamese who 
were admitted were usually ones whose condition – 
mostly pregnancy – only required that they stay a few 
days. 
 
The widespread nature of this attitude in Vietnam can 
also be seen in the replies to our survey. When 
respondents were asked the open question: “what are 
the main elements of a good business strategy?” 
many stressed human resources and the importance of 
quality products at reasonable prices. Only four of the 
one hundred Vietnamese business managers surveyed 
were explicit about the need for long as well as short 
term planning and goals. The general manager of the 
Singaporean company HH Steel felt the need to 
educate his subcontractors in long-term business 
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planning. Part of this involved explaining the mutual 
benefit to both parties in a business deal. The short-
term view seemed to arise in part from the fear of 
being taken advantage of – if there was no mutual 
benefit then there seemed to be an assumption that 
both parties could just take as much as possible 
before cutting and running: 
 
“It took us a long time and a lot of effort to 
explain the need for long-term planning and 
commitments to my suppliers and 
subcontractors. After a year or two they 
eventually began to understand the advantage 
both for them and us of not going for the short-
term gains.” 
 
This short-term attitude also explains the Vietnamese 
acceptance of the way Mr Y’s Vietnamese partner Mr 
J tried to take advantage of the YY Roofing company. 
Mr J had a small office at the entrance to the factory 
compound. When the factory first started up, the staff 
at YY Roofing never saw a customer, as all orders 
were relayed into the compound by Mr J’s staff. It 
was discovered that customers were being intercepted 
and their orders filled by the partner himself. The 
partner, who received a 10% discount from YY 
Roofing, would sell the roofing at an inflated price 
and a handsome profit would go to him alone, rather 
than YY Roofing. A direct appeal to the State 
Commission for Co-operation and Investment (SCCI) 
stopped Mr J doing this. Yet the SCCI took no formal 
action against the Vietnamese partner. It seems that 
no matter how unethical the partner’s behaviour 
might have appeared to an outsider, it did not 
necessarily look that way in Vietnam.  
 
In the old economy of windfall gains where joint 
ventures were novel and where the Vietnamese 
partner had all the local knowledge, Mr J’s attempt to 
both position YY Roofing as his supplier and benefit 
from its brand name appears to have been tolerated. 
In capitalist terms, however, such an approach was 
short-sighted. Without some change in Vietnamese 
practices YY Roofing would have gone out of 
business. The government’s plan to waterproof 
Vietnamese houses and modernise the economy 
would have been diminished. SCCI thus did come to 
the conclusion that the Vietnamese partner’s conduct 
was counter-productive - but although the 
Commission stopped him engaging in the illegal 
activity, it did not punish him. Rather than seeing his 
behaviour as venal conduct, the SCCI simply 
acknowledged the need for change. 
 
The family 
In the context of a culture of poverty the family is the 
most important ‘survival strategy’ by which 
Vietnamese guard against deprivation. In our case 
studies it becomes apparent that Vietnamese tend to 
depend on their families far more than do Westerners. 
An example of this is the way Vietnamese families do 
much of the care which would be done by 
professionals in wealthier countries. The state itself 
utilises families as a stop-gap measure in public 
programs such as health.  
 
The MM Hospital, which was the partner hospital in 
the joint venture with the LL Hospital, was 
considered to be one of Vietnam’s premier hospitals. 
Despite this, when the case study was conducted, 
relatives of MM Hospital patients still took the 
responsibility of providing them with food and 
bedclothes. Dr L, the Perth surgeon, who was the 
driving force behind the establishment of the LL 
Hospital joint venture in Hanoi, wanted his new 
hospital to take the place of the family in the 
Vietnamese health system.  Dr L felt that, rather than 
act like a big multi-national company seeking to 
establish a bridgehead in Vietnam, his hospital wisely 
presented itself as having a sense of social as well as 
commercial responsibility.  Partly as a result of his 
experience in China, and partly because of the 
similarities he saw between conditions in Vietnam 
and China, he thought of the LL Hospital as being a 
model for change in Vietnamese thinking about 
public health.   
 
As already mentioned, it would involve the transfer of 
modern management, technical, and training skills to 
the Vietnamese, and it would be based on what in 
Vietnam were relatively new notions of public care.  
In his assessments of the Vietnamese health system, 
Dr L associated its run down and often far from 
sterile medical facilities, with an absence of any 
strong sense of personalised care in the public 
domain. In fact, in Vietnam, and China, where the 
family is usually thought to be the repository of moral 
order and communal wellbeing, notions of care are 
located in the family rather than in a more general 
sense of neighbourly or civic responsibility.  Dr L’s 
sense of how the hospital would work with the duty 
of care taken from the family and implanted in the 
public arena, largely failed to work in the Vietnamese 
setting. 
 
Families also take the place of banks for many would-
be Vietnamese entrepreneurs. The four Vietnamese 
business people on whom we did in-depth case 
studies all got their start-up capital from their 
families. For example, Mr A got USD20,000 for his 
garment-making factory, a considerable sum in 
Vietnamese terms. Most of them also set up their 
businesses with members of their families: Mrs C 
began and still runs her embroidery export business 
with her mother and husband. Madam D first 
established her ceramics business as a ‘family trust’ 
in 1989 and now runs it with her husband and 
children. 
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In the survey conducted for this monograph, one 
hundred Vietnamese business people were asked if 
they would expect their families to provide financial 
or practical support if they were in private enterprise.   
The vast majority of Vietnamese business people 
surveyed - 88% - expected their families to contribute 
at least something to their enterprise. Half of them 
(exactly 50%) expected their families to contribute a 
great deal or at least ‘to a significant extent’, 38% 
expected their families to contribute at least a little 
and only 12% expected them to contribute nothing.  
 
As well as the start-up capital, there are many other 
ways in which the ‘family economy’ operates in 
Vietnam. The family can be relied upon to unite in an 
effort to better the business, partly to assure the 
family’s good name. Mrs C for example when asked 
how her embroidery business conforms to 
international standards for export said: “This is a 
family business. Therefore we have to ensure the 
quality of production ourselves”. Mrs D’s son also 
explained the success of DD Ceramics in similar 
terms:  
 
“I think we are successful because the whole 
family is involved…The whole family has one 
aim: perfecting our trade and building a long-
term investment.” 
 
Three of the entrepreneurs in our four Vietnamese 
case studies also inherited their families’ traditional 
occupations – although they then expanded their 
inherited profession in keeping with the modern 
Vietnamese economy. Mr A’s father, for example, 
was a tailor. Mr A expanded his father’s tailoring into 
a whole factory to make clothes. Mrs C set up shop in 
a street in Hanoi that for centuries has been home to 
embroiderers who come from a region of 
embroiderers. From there her business grew to 
become an embroidering factory exporting all over 
the world. Similarly Madam D was descended from a 
long line of potters in a village that traditionally 
produced such families. The Vietnamese Economic 
Times glowingly spoke of the way Madam D had 
brought honour to her village and her lineage by 
modernising and internationalising their traditional 
craft: 
 
“Among the nineteen family lines working in 
Ceramics at Bat Trang (Gia Lam, Hanoi), the D 
family is one of the most famous because of its 
capacity to produce many well-known master 
potters. Especially one woman in the D family 
with a pair of golden hands has made a big 
contribution to bringing the traditional products 
of Bat Trang to many international markets.” 
 
The idea of inherited occupations points to the 
importance of family in Vietnamese business.  While 
many Australians also feel their families are 
important, the concept of the extended family, which 
extends geographically throughout a village or region 
but may also extend through time is an aspect that 
many Westerners have trouble grasping.  Long dead 
forebears may still influence modern businesses in 
Vietnam – a notion easier to appreciate in a society 
where ancestor worship has been a cultural tradition. 
The Singaporean Mr E was perhaps drawing on this 
sense of living up to the expectations of one’s parents 
(and their parents and their parents’ parents and so 
on) when he dealt with a difficult staff member of the 
EE Hotel. A recalcitrant son of an ex-director of the 
joint venture was reported to be only able to improve 
his productivity after Mr E appealed to his sense of 
family pride.    
 
But more than just a way of handling staff, many 
Vietnamese have continued to believe there is 
inherent virtue in revering their ancestors. For 
example, the common advice in business guide books 
is to receive a business card from a Vietnamese with 
both hands and then study it before putting it on the 
table - rather than in one’s pocket: to show respect in 
this way may be seen by many foreigners as being 
almost equivalent to an injunction to admire the font 
on a fax (and Thai Ngoc Diep 2005). It makes sense, 
however, when one considers that that small card may 
be a carefully designed communication about one’s 
revered and deeply missed parent - as it was in Mr 
A’s case.  
 
The logo on Mr A’s business card combined filial 
piety with geomancy (feng shui) to reinforce 
individual as well as collective family success. A 
1999 Saigon publication, Geomancy for Business 
People, helps us explain the cao AA logo.  It gives 
the example of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in 
Hong Kong, which is located so that it is protected at 
its rear by Mount Victoria and has the favourable 
feature of the sea at its front.  A geomancer modified 
the plans of the bank building, to take greatest 
advantage of its environmental features, so it stood 
out and drew greater good fortune from its surrounds 
(Hai An, 1999, 7).   In Cao AA’s case, there is no 
mountain behind the Saigon office; the city is built on 
a flood plain.  But in a fusion of feng shui and filial 
piety two mountains appear on his business card 
because, as he explained in the interview, the 
“significance of the two mountains is that my father’s 
influence has been like a mountain in my soul”. The 
mountains on his business card illustrated the weight 
that a departed ancestor was assumed to have in 
fostering a Vietnamese business and buttressing its 
success. Business cards, it is clear, can be more than 
just a trivial tool of business in Vietnam. Rather they 
can be a condensed communication about one’s 
lineage and filial piety, and as such have an ethical 
aspect. 
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Not all influential family members in Vietnamese 
business, of course, are ancestors.  The living 
members of ones extended and nuclear families are 
often just as important.  The family hierarchy, for 
example, has been the main organising principle in 
most Vietnamese lives. When Vietnamese speak to 
each other everyone tends to be given an appellation 
which approximates to their position in a family. 
There is no word for ‘you’ in Vietnamese. Instead, 
people refer to each other as ‘little sister’ (if they are 
addressing a younger female with whom they are 
good friends) or ‘older brother’ if they are addressing 
an older, male friend; ‘aunt’ or ‘uncle’ are used to 
show respect to an older female or male, ‘grandchild’ 
if there is a large age difference between the speaker 
and a young child.  
 
For many Vietnamese their families define who they 
are and what they do. Far from feeling that their 
families exist to help their businesses, the Vietnamese 
in the case studies felt it is the other way around. 
Their businesses exist to help their families. Another 
question in the survey asked “what is the most 
important of the following reasons why people 
become involved in business?” The largest proportion 
of respondents, 46%, ticked “Because it is good for 
their families”.   
 
Mr Y fortuitously tapped into this Vietnamese 
reverence for the family. A large part of YY 
Roofing’s success lay in the fact that it was a family 
business: Mr Y’s wife and son worked with him in 
Vietnam. The fact that his son married a Vietnamese 
woman also helped to promote the family image of 
the company. For example, we saw that the cover 
story of Vietnam Economic News titled “A big 
commitment to Vietnam”) contained a wedding photo 
of his son and daughter-in-law. Other articles in the 
Vietnamese language press also discussed the 
‘family’ style of the YY Roofing venture in 
conjunction with its motivation and product.  
 
But it was not only the press which focused on the 
family aspect of YY roofing. Mr Y also focused on it. 
His ‘family’ came to be more than just his own 
immediate, biological family. He expanded the 
concept to include everyone who worked for or with 
him. Mr Y was proud to say: 
 
“that YY Roofing is a big family.  In this family 
there is no gap between Vietnamese and 
foreigner, there is no command and order and 
there is only cooperation. Apart from working 
hours, we usually spend leisure time with each 
other; going to picnics, to football games, 
organising parties.” 
 
He was perhaps thinking of his fellow Australians in 
the NN Mining company (which in 1996, the year 
this article came out, had its imported machinery 
confiscated, had exchanged allegations and counter-
allegations with the Vietnmaese government and 
finally shut down its operations) when he went onto 
say: 
  
“I know that recently there have been many 
disputes occurring in many foreign companies. 
And I think a business that wants to develop must 
have an internal solidarity.  I may say that one of 
the reasons that led to the growth of YY Roofing 
as it is today is because we are successful in 
doing this.”  
 
Money seemed to be no object when it came to 
strengthening the bonds between the YY Roofing 
staff. On one occasion, for example, the company 
took all ten people on the staff with their husbands or 
wives on a plane from Hanoi to Nha Trang and 
treated them to a long weekend at a beach resort.  
This was the first time most of them had been to the 
airport.   
 
Mr Y was displaying not only generosity but also 
business acumen in fostering family-like bonds 
within his business.  As our case studies suggest, 
Vietnamese families will often assume the economic 
role played by institutions in other societies (in 
banking, for instance). The family is also important in 
that, especially in the case of Madam D and Mr A, 
occupations are inherited. One does what one’s 
parents and perhaps grandparents did, and sometimes 
to public acclaim – for instance, the glowing media 
coverage of Madam D’s satisfaction of familial 
aspirations.  In a similar way, Mr Y was praised in 
Vietnamese newspapers for working with his whole 
family. The fact that a Vietnamese woman married 
into YY Roofing company may also have 
strengthened the perception of family bonds in 
Vietnamese eyes.  
 
Trust and the family 
One aspect of familial relationships which received 
emphasis in our case studies was ‘trust’. For example, 
Madam D’s business, DD Ceramics, subcontracted to 
about one hundred families in the area, and, the 
contracts were said to be made with the family unit.  
When asked why, Mr D answered: “It’s easier to trust 
the families”  ‘Trust’ seemed to be the attribute of the 
family unit that most Vietnamese wanted to emulate 
in their businesses.  It is the sort of village or regional 
family-based trust that Mr B could not assume would 
be naturally forthcoming in his bottled water plant. 
Mr B had to build up the same sort of loyalty through 
incentive schemes involving bonuses and retirement 
benefits. Trust was also missing in the failed PP Ltd 
joint venture. After it failed, the Vietnamese general 
director was quoted as saying that “loss of solidarity” 
between its Vietnamese and Australian partners was 
one of the main reasons for its demise.  
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A suggested reason why Vietnamese business people 
esteem the sort of trust found in families is that they 
might find it in short supply elsewhere. A 1999 
International Financial Corporation Survey of private 
enterprises in Vietnam found that the Vietnamese 
suffer from a general lack of trust in their business 
culture. According to the Survey, Vietnamese 
industrial capitalists were historically “squeezed by 
the Chinese, the French”, then “repeatedly and 
continuously periled” by the post-1945 revolution and 
changes that have privileged state enterprises in the 
post-1986 renovation period. The Vietnamese 
collective attachment to kin-like groupings could 
therefore be thought of as an effort to find a way out 
of post-war confusion. In the present-day economy, 
entrepreneurs tend to lack ‘mutual credibility’ – the 
firm cannot trust anybody, and not so many trust the 
firm (Webster and Taussig 1999: 89). A helpful 
historical perspective is offered by the suggestion that 
agricultural production and, to a large extent, 
handicraft production in pre-colonial northern 
Vietnam “were organised exclusively by independent 
families” (Malarney, 1998: 271, emphasis added).   
 
Francis Fukuyama, who has written extensively on 
‘trust’, would perhaps characterise Vietnam as a 
‘low-trust society’: that is, a society which is 
sustained by a system which promotes short-term 
gains and networks of clans and cliques (1995). Local 
non-government retailers and other Vietnamese 
business people compensate for this insecure attitude 
and a general low level of trust by appearing in 
person at each step of the transaction, adding time-
consuming, cautious moves to their purchase. Mr Y 
was struck by the importance of personal 
relationships persistent in Vietnam, seeing them as 
indications of a continuing adherence to the idea of a 
village economy. Despite the urban setting of most 
business transactions now, the trust built up through 
person-to-person contact is still sought. Mr Y noted 
that in an economy where bargaining plays a 
customary part in price fixing, people preferred 
personalised transactions. This usually involved 
making face-to-face orders. For example, rather than 
use the phone or fax, a provincial customer might 
drive 200 kilometres to have the quote authorised by 
superiors back in the province. He would travel the 
200 kilometres again to Hanoi to actually watch the 
order being made up before taking delivery of it, and 
then transporting it a final 200 kilometres back to the 
province. 
 
Familial sentiment may well compensate as well for 
the individual’s mistrust of state institutions, other 
enterprises and sense of uncertainty about the future. 
Individual uncertainty in the state can perhaps be 
sensed in Mr B’s rather wistful statement that  
 
“in the future if the government has good 
policies, private companies will have a more 
peaceful mind to work.” 
 
This sense of uncertainty helps to promote the short-
term thinking that we have already noted as a feature 
of Vietnamese business culture - and the family 
sometimes helps Vietnamese business people 
overcome this short-term thinking. Madam D’s son 
spoke about how unusual his family was with its 
investment in long-term strategies to sustain DD 
Ceramics well into the future. These strategies 
included the purchase of some new Korean kilns, 
impurity-extracting machines, his mother’s visits to 
Kiangxi in China to observe world-best practice in 
porcelain manufacture, the plan to send a son to 
China “to learn the language and then to Kiangxi to 
learn the trade” the arrival of experts from China to 
work with the company and the future establishment 
of a joint venture with Kiangxi in China. This was in 
contrast to most of the Vietnamese companies in Bat 
Trang which “have not succeeded because they did 
not have careful, long-term investment strategies”. 
They are, he said, only “interested in the short-term”. 
However he emphasised this was not due to simple 
short-sightedness but rather because they did not have 
“the strength and capacity to invest in the long term”. 
Even his own family firm could not invest as heavily 
in the future as bigger ceramics firms in China. He 
explained that because the Vietnamese market was 
not ‘ready’ to pay money for ‘expensive design 
items’ there was not enough money in the family firm 
to make the same investment in training people and 
equipment as in the Chinese ceramics industry.   
 
Thus, in the case of the DD Ceramics concern, the 
financial uncertainty that favoured small-sized family 
firms did not necessarily work against economic 
growth.  In this case profits were reinvested in long-
term business plans because trust in their own family 
enabled the D’s to trust in the future. As well as 
providing security for long-term planning, the D 
family also felt more secure in making contracts with 
other families. The trust necessary to all commercial 
relations was not to be found in the rule of law or 
regulatory systems that play a strong role in 
Singapore or Australia. Rather the institution of the 
family was seen as guaranteeing contractual 
arrangements. Furthermore, as already mentioned, all 
the Vietnamese case studies featured families which 
provided the start-up capital and (with the exception 
of Mr B) the director and other management 
personnel of these firms.  
 
It is no wonder then that even in the case studies 
relating to non-Vietnamese, the problem of how to 
trust people one is not related to was solved partly by 
extending the concept of ‘family’ – applying it to 
practically everyone involved. Mr E, the Singaporean 
general managing director of the EE Hotel at Ha 
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Long Bay, was very conscious of building up trust 
and loyalty in his workers by treating them as 
members of an extended family. He felt that in this 
way Vietnamese culture was very similar to Chinese 
culture. As we mentioned in the last chapter, he 
treated his staff like members of his family, taking 
them out to other luxury hotels’ restaurants where he 
would party and feast with them, organising an 
extravagant wedding reception when a female staff 
member (whom he considered to be like a daughter) 
got married, and paying generous travel allowances 
so staff went to Singapore regularly for training. His 
loyalty went beyond the professional boundaries of a 
good boss in Australia, when he dismissed anyone.  
His policy was to arrange ahead for such an employee 
to gain a position in another firm. Mindful of the 
scarcity of job opportunities, he chose this course of 
action believing it would prevent personal bitterness 
on the dismissed employee’s part.  On the other hand, 
his sense of family loyalty was offended when some 
other employees, having solicited and received help 
many times from him, ‘abused’ such favours by 
leaving the company for another job. 
 
Despite the Singaporean Mr E’s feeling that Chinese 
and Vietnamese business cultures were both 
organised around families, Madam D’s son felt that 
Chinese culture was now less family-centred than 
Vietnamese business culture. When asked what he 
saw as the differences between Vietnamese and 
Chinese ways of approaching business he said: 
“Vietnamese families like to keep the business within 
the control of the family. The Chinese have relations 
with more people”. When the interviewer pointed out 
that the D Ceramics company now subcontracts to 
‘one hundred families’ he replied: “This is not so 
many compared to the Chinese. They have very large 
business networks”. 
 
There are, it should be observed here, some very 
unsentimental, practical reasons why the family is so 
important to the business culture of renovation 
Vietnam. Well before doi moi in 1962 the Vietnamese 
government allowed the system of sub-contracting 
work out to families, much as the D family continued 
to do in the late 1990s. Despite the ubiquity of state 
cooperatives in 1963, this system of subcontracting 
almost immediately began to undermine the socialist 
economy, by giving impetus to the development of a 
private, black economy, in which families marketed 
much of what they produced themselves. So when the 
new private economy was introduced with doi moi in 
1986 the D family already had political and 
commercial networks that facilitated its supply of raw 
materials and labour. The family economy was in this 
sense a stepping stone between the old central and the 
new free economy.  
 
 
 
Respect and the family 
Obviously the Vietnamese and Singaporean 
businessmen (and Australian Mr Y) were not only 
thinking of real families when they espoused the 
‘family’ as the model on which they have conducted 
their businesses. Real families do not always get 
along harmoniously or have perfectly trusting 
relationships. Instead the business people in the case 
studies, especially the Vietnamese business people, 
seem to be thinking of an idealised Vietnamese 
family that is autocratic, hierarchical and always 
respectful. 
 
Respect, as recognition of status in Vietnam, has long 
been believed to guarantee cohesiveness and orderly 
social interaction first within the family and then 
within society in general (Marr 1981).   The respect 
that children in Vietnamese families have been 
expected to show their elders is inculcated at an early 
age.  ‘Civic lessons’, prepared by Petrus Truong Vinh 
Ky and published in the Indochina Journal Dong 
Duong Tap Chi in the 1920s, laid down practical 
instructions on how to behave in a Confucian society 
and was reproduced almost verbatim for decades in 
Vietnamese primary schools. As we have seen, the 
belief in hierarchical order (ton ti trat tu) is still 
strong enough in many situations in Vietnam today to 
perpetuate the practice of avoiding the use of proper 
names, and opting instead for kinship ranks or titles 
as terms of address (Luong, 1990).   Modernisation 
and revolution have not changed the practice in 
Vietnam to the same extent as in some other Asian 
societies. The individual is expected to defer strictly 
to those of higher status, by descent order of kinship 
as well as by gender and age.  
 
As is the case elsewhere in East Asia, ‘harmony’ is 
believed to be the reward for collective self-
effacement. Respect is seen as the necessary 
condition for positive social intercourse, enabling 
smooth exchanges of all kinds, including exchanges 
in the market place. The Confucian patriarch is at the 
top of this kin-based hierarchy. This increases the 
burden of responsibility on the head of any real or 
metaphorical ‘family’. Mr B of BB Water, for 
example, found that he was the sole disciplinarian 
because his staff would not take discipline from those 
lower in his factory’s hierarchy. They would only 
respect him as the Confucian in locus parentis: 
 
“I have to discipline people. If I delegate the 
responsibility for discipline, the employees will 
say: ‘you are an employee like me, why are you 
so harsh to me?’ They will react against anyone 
but the boss, the owner of the company.” 
 
This respect for the Confucian patriarch was perhaps 
one reason why the senior Western Australian 
politician was able to smooth troubled waters when 
he visited Vietnam in mid-1994, even though the 
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purpose of his visit had no direct connection with the 
mining Joint venture, PP Ltd. 
 
He had gone to Vietnam to have discussions with 
high-level Vietnamese officials and to visit West 
Australian companies then operating in Vietnam, 
including PP Ltd. The tone of the Western Australian 
political leader’s comments, given the problems PP 
Ltd had been having, are gracious in that they suggest 
that the blame lay more with the Australian company. 
In a speech, this politician diplomatically referred to 
“companies that are insensitive to Vietnamese 
aspirations or which ignore the regulations and 
accepted business practices of the country”, warning 
they “could be in for an expensive and frustrating 
time”. Furthermore, he advised Australian “business 
operators to come to terms with local business 
practice and networks”.  With these gracious words, 
along with the normal respect accorded to the 
patriarch, the Australian government leader seemed to 
be able to smooth troubled waters, and by November 
1994 there was even talk of an expansion of the 
floundering PP project as initially envisaged in the 
agreement. The Australian leader may have 
fortuitously tapped into the respect that tended to be 
accorded to a patriarchal leader – in this case, the 
leader of the ‘family’ of West Australian businesses 
operating in Vietnam at that stage. 
 
The actual words equating to ‘business ethics’ in the 
Vietnamese language connote a hierarchical order –
exhorting the leader to replicate Confucian order in 
the commercial world. ‘Dao duc’, the Han-Viet word 
for ethics, implies a universal Confucian way (Dao), 
as well as the natural workings of the cosmos and its 
power (duc) or virtue. Two related terms are: dao ly 
(principle of the Way) which denotes the universal 
principle for human conduct, and the more recent 
expression, lanh dao (leadership), which literally 
means ‘the undertaking to regulate the way’. The 
definition of ‘linh dao’ in the Vietnamese Universal 
Dictionary is perhaps closest to “business ethics” and 
is specifically aimed at business leaders; it conveys 
‘showing the way, guiding, leading the way’. It places 
the burden of responsibility on the business leader or 
manager. The business manager must lead in such a 
way that the natural order is adhered to. Individual 
responsibility, as Mr B of BB Water perceived, is not 
so important - except in the leader. Respect and 
obedience are important in those he leads. But while 
the leader is allowed individual initiative he must also 
follow the imperatives of the ‘natural order’ or the 
‘way’. 
 
In Vietnamese business ethics, these notions of a 
‘leader’ showing his subordinates the ‘natural’ order, 
way or virtue, come together in the idealised father of 
the Confucian family. In business, the ‘natural’ order 
or hierarchy of the family is emulated with the father 
or company director showing the way, not by brute 
force but by the respect that is shown to him by other 
members of the corporate ‘family’. As we will see, 
respect mitigated by trust and a degree of familiarity 
tend to be seen as the ideals. However, before we 
develop that point, we shall first consider cases in 
which the patriarch at the head of a Vietnamese 
company is a woman.  
 
Women and the family 
In the Vietnamese family hierarchy dominated by 
older males, subordination is more conspicuous in the 
status and roles prescribed for the young and women. 
The security of belonging, while it may give each 
individual the comfort of a clearly defined role, 
exacts a price as it creates anxiety in many young 
people - especially young women - about fulfilling 
their elders’ expectations. In some instances, 
globalised consumerism has been made an ally by 
individuals, especially females, in the search for 
identity and self-empowerment against patriarchal 
dictates. A Hanoi magazine reports the story of an 
exasperated Vietnamese father chastising his teenage 
daughter for dying her shortened hair in the Korean 
fashion.  He turned to his wife for support, only to 
find she too had dyed her hair in the Korean fashion.  
The patriarchal nature of the traditional Vietnamese 
family is why traditionally, commerce was seen as 
‘women’s work’ in Vietnam – but change is 
underway. Confucian disdain for artisans and 
merchants dated back to at least the fifteenth century 
if not earlier (Reid 1988: 63, 268-270). Commerce for 
the Vietnamese lettered elite was a zero-sum game.  
One person’s profit, it was believed, could only be 
made at the expense of another. This ‘zero-sum’ 
mentality still lingers. It can be seen for example in 
the responses to the survey of one hundred 
Vietnamese business managers undertaken for this 
monograph. When asked “what is the meaning of 
competition?” the majority of Vietnamese surveyed 
(54 %) identified competition as closest in meaning to 
‘struggle’ or ‘conflict’; while only 41% identified it 
with ‘efficiency’ . In part because of this perception 
of trade as cut-throat, it was disdained and relegated, 
as in many regions of Southeast Asia, to the female 
domain. While women supplemented the family 
income in local markets, the main path to wealth was 
education and bureaucratic power, which was of 
course the preserve of men. 
 
Women ran the barter and/or cash trade in local 
markets for centuries. They were largely excluded 
from the guilds into which artisans organised 
themselves, since only male patrilineal relations were 
admitted. An exception to this was the involvement of 
women in the Bat Trang ceramics industry - although 
even in this famous ceramics village, there was a 
gendered division of labour. While men coiled pots 
on the wheel, women potters almost exclusively 
produced bowls. Women still work around the small 
family kilns in the back alleys of Bat Trang, mixing 
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coal and water to produce fuel pats, carrying panniers 
full of burnt coal, saggars and finished wares on 
shoulder poles. They are also involved in the 
illustration and marketing of ceramics. Madam D 
conformed to this gendered division of labour when 
she took on the family craft. At the same time, her 
leadership role in one of Bat Trang’s most successful 
companies does not necessarily contradict the 
observation that Vietnamese men are taking over 
businesses and commerce as it gains in prestige. One 
scholar of the village has said that in 1996 “of the 
seventeen major raw materials, production and 
marketing firms only one was headed by a woman” . 
The woman referred to here was probably Madam D. 
By the late 1990s, it seems she was the exception that 
proved the rule. 
 
As business in Vietnam began increasingly to lead to 
power, men have not only entered business but are 
also taking over the running of more enterprises. This 
was reflected in the survey of Vietnamese business 
managers. Participants in the survey were not chosen 
on the basis of gender, but rather on the size of their 
enterprise, whether it was state or private, and what 
sector it represented - in order to get a cross-section 
of businesses that were representative of the whole 
Vietnamese economy. Of this broadly representative 
sample, only 24% of the one hundred business 
managers surveyed were women. So while women 
business leaders are still important in the Vietnamese 
economy, increasingly they represent a large but 
minority section (Malarney, 1997). The state, for 
instance, found it necessary to encourage them in 
2001 by recognising the contribution of young, 
entrepreneurial women. Among the ten Red Star 
Awards of the year 2000 for young business 
managers, two went to women, one of whom heads a 
7000-strong work force.   
 
While women in Vietnam are expected to be mothers 
first and foremost, their maternal role need not stop 
them from becoming involved in business. Mrs C, the 
vice director of CC Embroideries, in fact felt that 
women’s domestic responsibilities provided impetus 
for them to lead businesses and do so better than men:  
 
“Many women are directors because they are 
less of a risk to the company than men are.  
Women want to do well in business because they 
have to look after the family. Men gamble and 
have other interests.”  
 
However she went on to speak of CC Embroideries in 
ways that indicated tensions arising between the 
traditional Vietnamese family model and the demands 
of the modern market. In the traditional Vietnamese 
family women are subordinate to the male head of the 
household in most matters.  At work, however, Mrs C 
and her husband both had equal status as vice 
directors, while her mother was ‘above’ them as 
director. They resolved the contradiction between 
female power within the company, on the one hand, 
and its supposed absence in the Confucian family, on 
the other, by working in separate spheres within the 
Company: 
 
“In our company, my husband’s role and mine 
are clearly defined and not overlapping, so my 
husband and I do not confuse our family and 
working relationships. He can’t tell me to do 
something in my area of responsibility because 
he is my husband.” 
 
The couple reconciled Mrs C’s subordination to her 
husband in the family with their roughly equal roles 
in the company by avoiding direct clashes between 
the two. This is one small example of the way 
traditional roles both persist and are changed by the 
expanding market economy in Vietnam. But while 
this solution seemed to work, Mrs C also indicated in 
the interview that the compromise they had reached 
in balancing business and family roles was difficult to 
maintain. When speaking of plans to expand their 
business in the future it was clear that she perceived 
the demands of modern business were putting the 
traditional Vietnamese family model under stress. She 
worried about the effect expansion might have on her 
family: 
 
“…if people devote themselves to enrich the 
business the family breaks down and there are 
divorces in many families. It’s for this reason 
that I don’t want to expand the business too 
much.  I have to cook three times a week to keep 
the family happy. My husband has to take the 
children under his care. We share daily 
responsibilities.  But if the business gets too big, 
we wouldn’t be able to do this and the family 
would collapse.” 
 
The delicate balance of roles negotiated between Mrs 
C and her husband therefore placed limitations on CC 
Embroideries’ capacity to expand. While the family 
nature of many Vietnamese businesses might have 
been seen as a good thing, the reluctance to involve 
outsiders can result in pressure on relationships 
within the family – in this case between husband and 
wife. In comparison with Japan and China, it has been 
suggested that for many Vietnamese the family has 
continued to be valued above business. The business 
is often seen as a means of enhancing the family’s 
welfare. If the business ceases to serve the family, it 
is the business rather than the family, which has to 
adapt or concede.   
 
Familiarity  
The respect expected within hierarchical Vietnamese 
families often assumes unquestioning obedience on 
the part of children and women toward those higher 
in rank. Under these conditions the Confucian 
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patriarch could easily become a stern and distant 
authority if not for the softening effects of the 
Vietnamese ideal of familiarity. As well as being the 
wellspring of trust, the family is also where the 
Vietnamese ideals of familiarity and respect do not 
contradict each other, but instead coexist easily and 
naturally. In most families people are very familiar 
with those they grew up with, but within the 
Vietnamese family they are also very respectful of 
those same people. To those involved, the hierarchy 
within the Vietnamese family seems natural. It has 
the quality of a preordained order that seems not to 
spring from Confucian tradition but from nature 
itself. The respect that younger people owe older 
people, and women owe men, hardly has to be asked 
for. It can be taken for granted and assumed to exist 
in the cheek-by-jowl hubbub of most Vietnamese 
households. Thus we get in Vietnam two ideals - 
respect and familiarity – that might at first be thought 
to be contradictory, but really tend to complement 
each other.  
 
These two ideals of respect and familiarity perhaps 
might be usefully aligned with the two main religious 
traditions of Vietnam. As well as the Confucian 
tradition of respectful, hierarchical differences 
between people, there is also Vietnam’s other 
religious inheritance, Buddhism, which some see as 
moderating the Confucian influence. We have already 
noted the influence in Vietnam of the ‘common 
poverty’ ideal, but some scholars attribute the 
Vietnamese regard for ‘familiarity’ - or a ‘lack of 
social distancing’, as they also call it - to the 
particular legacy of Buddhism. They point to the fact 
that mendicant begging is widespread in mainland 
Southeast and East Asia as one example of a 
Buddhist-instituted practice that reduces social 
distance. Begging by monastic and wandering 
ascetics forms part of the Buddhist tradition – and 
entails going out among lay people. Monks (Bikkhu) 
become dependent on the secular world. As Trevor 
Ling points out: 
 
“The original meaning of the word Bikkhu is 
‘sharesman’, that is, one who receives a share of 
something. His begging is not just a means of 
subsistence but an outward token … of his 
renunciation of private or personal sources of 
livelihood or ownership of wealth, and his 
dependence instead on the ‘commonwealth’, the 
public resources of the society in which he lives 
(1973: 123).”  
 
In Vietnam, the beggar is sometimes referred to by 
the respectful term ‘Ong’ (Mister). In this case, the 
deference reflects a low degree of social distancing. 
The voluntarily destitute monk is esteemed for his 
poverty. The deferential ‘Ong’ flattens the social 
order making the destitute person equal or higher than 
those he relies on. A Singaporean manager we 
interviewed echoed such an attitude in his remark that 
there was virtually no discrimination between rich 
and poor in Vietnam – a situation unlike what he had 
observed first hand in countries such as England and 
Germany. This ideal of ‘low distancing’ can also be 
expressed as a preference for familiarity in general 
social relations. 
 
For foreigners in business in Vietnam, this preference 
for familiarity may seem to be an easy requirement 
for Australians in particular to conform to - given the 
stereotype of Australians as egalitarian and almost too 
familiar in their dealings with others. In a recent 
study a Vietnamese businessman who had worked 
with a variety of foreigners told his interviewer: 
  
“Singaporeans are a proud lot…Japanese think 
female staff are suitable only for administrative 
and secretary jobs. German colleagues are 
pleasant, except one or two who can be quite 
arrogant. Australians make better colleagues. 
They are friendly, laid-back and ready to help” 
(Ashwill and Thai Ngoc Diep 2005: 131).  
 
Contradicting the perception here of Singaporeans as 
‘proud’ were the Singaporeans in our case studies. 
They appeared to appreciate the lack of social 
distance in Vietnam.  Mr E, the hotel manager, 
treated his staff to restaurant meals which he joined in 
as ‘one of the revellers’. He was not proud, nor did he 
stay aloof as the party’s host, but rather joined in on 
the same level as his guests, blurring for a moment 
the distinction between his status and those of his 
Vietnamese employees.   
 
But before Singaporeans and Australians come to the 
view that all that is required in Vietnam is laidback 
friendliness, it needs also to be remembered that in 
Vietnam this familiarity is coupled with respect. The 
real ideal to aim for would appear to be the respectful 
familiarity that exists in the (idealised) Vietnamese 
household. The father is respected as the head of the 
household but he does not have to demand this 
respect, nor does he stand aloof from the rest of the 
family. Instead there is easy interaction between all 
members of the household as they unite together in a 
common goal. The father should wear his leadership 
role lightly and even playfully.  
 
The heavy burden of leadership placed on the senior 
male in Confucian societies should not cut the 
father/manager off from those under him. The 
revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh, for example, 
utilised this interplay between familiarity and respect 
in his role as “charismatic leader – the personification 
of Vietnam’s new independent national identity”.  
According to one authority, Ho Chi Minh’s projection 
of himself took on “both a mundane and 
transcendental character”. This could be seen in the 
way Vietnamese referred to him as ‘Uncle Ho’ (Bac 
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Ho) an indication of both familiarity and respect” 
(Marr 1981)  
 
This familiarity or lack of social distance can be seen 
on a smaller, less mytho-historical scale in the way 
Mr Y ran the YY roofing business. He commented 
that it was important to know 
 
“how to behave fairly, equally and in the most 
feeling way… YY Roofing is a big family.  In this 
family there is no gap between Vietnamese and 
foreigner, there is no command and order and 
there is only cooperation…”  
 
Mr Y perhaps inadvertently reduced the ‘social 
distance’ between himself and the Vietnamese public 
by his modest mode of living while the YY Roofing 
factory was being established. While the business was 
getting on its feet, and for some time afterwards, the 
business used bicycles. Bedside tables in the Y family 
household consisted of wooden boxes covered by tea 
towels. As one journalist observed in 1995, the YY 
Roofing establishment was  
 
“a world away from the restored French villas 
which serve as corporate headquarters to bigger 
investors. Across the road, a modest house 
doubles as the YY Roofing office and home for 
Mr Y, 58, his wife, son, 31 and daughter-in-
law.”  
 
In a family it is possible for the father to act in a 
familiar manner without anyone forgetting he is in 
charge. The hierarchy is natural and reminders are not 
needed. Mr E was free to join in the parties he hosted 
at restaurants as one of the revellers, because he knew 
it would not endanger his status as their employer and 
superior. This familiarity also assumes a lack of 
resentment on the part of those who are lower down 
the order. They do not resent the boss any more than 
they would resent the loving father. They are grateful 
for his guidance, benevolence and even discipline. 
Rather than begrudging him they enjoy his company, 
even in social settings. 
 
Familiarity tempers the respect that is demanded in 
the Vietnamese family, and by extension, the 
Vietnamese workplace. It turns the hierarchy into a 
two-way street with lack of distance enabling those at 
the top of the hierarchy to hear those at the bottom.  
In turn, respect flows downwards from the upper 
echelons, as well as up. It perhaps softens, a little, the 
discomfort, of being a young woman and therefore at 
the bottom of the Confucian hierarchy.  Mrs C, when 
speaking of the workers in her embroideries export 
business, seems to have been talking about this when 
she explained: 
 
“Most of my workers are women. When they get 
pregnant they don’t work as fast. I have to 
explain this to the factory managers and 
customers sometimes so that people will not be 
too hard on them. Also politeness helps to 
encourage them. Politeness does not cost 
anything.” 
 
The familiarity of knowing about others’ private lives 
(such as the fact that they might be pregnant) 
mitigated the harshness that otherwise might have 
been visited upon these women. Mrs C encouraged 
the notion that respect, at least in the form of 
politeness, ought to be shown to them by their 
superiors.  
 
Family bonding rituals – by foreigners  
In the case studies this family-like togetherness at 
work was strengthened by sharing many rituals that in 
many countries, including Australia, might be seen as 
family rituals. Feasts and banquets in particular 
featured in many of our case studies.  This indicates 
their central role in Vietnamese business culture. As 
the Vietnamese garment manufacturer Mr A 
explained: 
 
“For Vietnamese, eating and drinking are very 
important when they do business. If you take 
somebody to a good restaurant it shows you 
value him or her.” 
 
The Singaporean businessmen in the case studies 
seemed to share the Vietnamese regard for food in 
building business and social relationships. Mr E, who 
ran the EE Hotel, believed in treating his staff as 
‘members of his family’ and often did so in ways 
connected with feasting. He took them to upmarket 
restaurants where he would dine with them, he 
organised the wedding reception of a female staff 
member and he would personally show his hotel’s 
chefs new recipes from his own cookbooks.  
 
Apart from eating, the observance of traditions and 
special holidays also brought people closer together.  
Mr G, the Singaporean who set up the Hanoi GG 
Textile Group in Hanoi, placed great emphasis on 
such bonding rituals. Married to a Vietnamese, he 
immersed himself in the social side of his business 
life in Vietnam. When interviewed on his integration 
into Vietnamese family life he said he preferred 
Vietnamese cultural life to Singapore’s. In Vietnam 
he claimed there was no division between rich and 
poor people, unlike what he had seen in England and 
Germany. There were also convivial rituals such as 
visiting friends and relatives during the New Year 
holiday - a custom no longer practised in his home 
country. He found the warmth and geniality of 
Vietnamese culture “quite wonderful”.  
 
Mr Y sought to ensure the success of his roofing 
company by observing such time-honoured 
Vietnamese rituals as sitting down over a cup of tea.  
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Even when he was lecturing on Western business 
ethics to Vietnamese people in 1993 and 1994, Mr Y 
still observed the Vietnamese tradition of “tea time 
and talk” routine before honing in on the point of 
meetings. He told the Vietnam Trade Review that 
while he was “proud’ that “YY Roofing is a big 
family”, it took time and effort to build those bonds: 
“Apart from working hours we usually spend leisure 
time with each other; going to picnics, to football 
games, organising parties…”  
 
Building up bonds through feasting and observing 
celebratory customs, even seemingly mundane ones, 
incurred substantial cost. The LL Hospital found that 
an ‘incidental but necessary’ cost in the hospital 
budget was gifts. To ensure good will for the coming 
period, a list of people who were important to the 
joint venture was made each Tet (Lunar New Year) 
and National Day, and money and presents 
distributed accordingly. Such expenditures could 
amount to USD3,000. This observance of the family 
holiday of Tet by companies helped strengthen their 
identification with the families of their employees. 
YY Roofing also treated employees’ families 
generously. On the occasion when YY Roofing flew 
all ten people on the staff from Hanoi to Nha Trang 
for a long weekend at a beach resort, staff members 
were allowed to take their spouses - an expensive 
gesture. But however large the expenditure by these 
Australian companies on such bonding rituals was, it 
was nothing compared to the amount that Japanese 
companies in Vietnam spent on that Japanese bonding 
ritual par excellence, karaoke. According to one 
employee of the LL Hospital a bill of about 
USD1,000 a month was commonly paid by Japanese 
companies in Vietnam for karaoke alone.  
 
Vietnamese bonding rituals, the family 
and state 
The Vietnamese are used to spending huge amounts 
on rituals that strengthen the family, and companies 
will compete in demonstrating generosity. Excessive 
conspicuous consumption in festivals, and religious 
rituals and sacrifices, used to be forbidden by the 
atheist Communist Vietnamese state (except for the 
construction of war memorials and the idolisation of 
leaders and past heroes consistent with the state’s 
ideology) (Hue Tam Ho-Tai, 2001). Now, in the doi 
moi economy, the Party only puts forth suggestions 
for moderation rather than issuing decrees with direct 
restrictions. With this lifting of restrictions, 
Vietnamese festivals have gone to the other extreme. 
Even as far back as the 1998 lunar New Year period, 
an official newspaper observed that the “revival of 
festivals” was so great that it was “expanding craft 
villages’ economies and services… bringing stable 
income to many families….”. Although this 
development might be good for village economies, 
however, this official newspaper expressed the state’s 
ambiguity towards such festivals. The article went on 
to say that some “festivals of minor importance” were 
excessively “prolonged to two, three or even four 
days at some places. Their paltry contents do not 
justify the all-cumbersome formalities they carry…”   
 
This ambiguity towards such festivals perhaps 
reflected a more general ambiguity in the state’s 
attitude to the market forces it had unleashed. 
Although the state strongly promoted capitalism 
through doi moi in the 1990s, the contradiction 
between the aims of its founding ideology and the 
reality of the developing Vietnam was evident. The 
aim of communism was a centrally-controlled 
economy providing equal conditions for all. By the 
1990s, however, the Vietnamese state found itself 
presiding over a dynamic semi-capitalist economy in 
which it had to allow individual rewards – rewards 
that had to lead to greater inequality and greater 
power in the non-state private sector.  
 
The state’s ambiguity towards capitalism saw 
corresponding shifts in its stance towards the family. 
Eight decades beforehand the government had called 
on individuals to extract themselves from over-
identification with the family – to rally instead to a 
collective struggle for national independence that 
transcended both kin and clans. In the 1930s it 
condemned the family as feudal.  In the 1950s family-
based businesses were threatened by the socialist 
revolution’s attempts to eradicate capitalists. But in 
the 1960s family bartering with other families 
preceded and encouraged the switch to doi moi. The 
idea of the family became even more favoured by the 
state in the 1990s as the Party increasingly criticised 
the growth of “Western-inspired individualism” 
(Marr 2000). To halt its pernicious growth the 
government called for individual Vietnamese to 
reconnect with the blood-bonds of the village 
community as the keystone of Vietnamese social 
architecture. It wanted the family to protect 
Vietnamese from the worst ravages of capitalism and 
globalisation. 
 
 The state’s fear of capitalism seems to stem, in part, 
from a disdain for Western consumer goods - such as 
European fashions or Hollywood movies - leading to 
a loss of Vietnamese traditions, especially a loss of 
connection with the traditional Vietnamese family. 
This brings us back to festivals. For it seems that one 
of the reasons the state now allows and indeed 
selectively encourages some festivals is that it 
perceives that such festivities strengthen family, clan 
and village bonds. The Vietnamese state seems to 
believe family bonds can provide a bulwark against 
the dark side of capitalism. All of this is encapsulated 
in an article which appeared in the state-controlled 
national newspaper, the widely-read Nhan Dan 
(People’s Daily) on 24 September, 1999 – an article 
that extolls rituals which strengthen bonds within the 
family and village in the face of the onslaught of the 
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free market. The People’s Daily reflects official 
Communist Party ideology and is used as a vehicle 
for mass education, so it can be understood to be the 
voice of the state.  
 
Under the headline “The role of popular culture in 
contemporary life” - and beside a photo of a 
traditional village festival - the article begins: “Today 
the world is like an electronic global village”.  
However, the article then stresses that “development 
detached from tradition will lead to instability and 
destroy both the environment and society.” For over 
ten years, the article continues, “the dark side of the 
market system has seen egotism, worship of money, 
and abandoned behaviour threatening to destroy good 
morals and customs”. Salvation, it continues, lies in 
popular culture such as old songs, tunes and lullabies 
which ‘crystallise’ the ‘national essence’ and keep 
people attached to their families, both present and 
past (in the form of ancestors). Each time a village 
festival is organised, people participate in and affirm 
‘the precious inheritance of their fathers’. This 
reaffirmation of the family through bonding rituals in 
the face of ‘the demands of contemporary society’, so 
the article argues, will enable Vietnam to have 
‘national development” but also “an equal and 
civilised society’.  
 
Indeed, by the time of our case studies, the 
government was organising over-the-top rituals itself. 
For example, a bonding ritual that revolved around 
eating was certainly carried to excess in the 2002 
New Year celebrations, when a gigantic cake 
weighing 1800kg was offered at Quan Ganh village 
temple in Ha Tay province for the national patriarchs, 
the Hung kings. It was a ‘family’ feast shared 
between the mythical ancestors and the living when 
the gigantic cake was divided into one hundred 
portions to be shared among the organisations and 
groups which ‘booked ahead’ for them. The cake was 
divided into one hundred portions to represent the 
hundred children born to the ancestral Lac Long 
Quan and Au Co of the Hung dynasty. It was a ritual 
that indeed celebrated continuing family bonds with 
the nation’s very prolific ancestors. By coincidence 
perhaps, Mrs C when asked how she ensured good 
relations between the directors of her embroidery 
company and its workforce, used the analogy of a 
cake shared among many: 
 
“I explain to them that the whole company is like 
a cake. If the cake is well cooked, everyone has a 
share. If it is badly cooked then there’s nothing 
for anyone.” 
 
In 2001 a three-year study of several northern and 
southern Vietnamese villages was published (in 
Vietnamese) which showed that an extremely high 
portion of household expenditure, from 30% to 60%, 
was spent on banqueting and life-cycle rituals such as 
births, weddings, funerals, and death anniversaries. 
This truly ‘uneconomical’ and irrational consumption 
level was found to increase in direct proportion to the 
extent of a particular family’s network.   
 
These levels of expenditure show the importance of 
family occasions in Vietnam. The rituals marking 
these occasions strengthen bonds within families. 
They celebrate additions to the family by birth or 
marriage or they mourn losses such as funerals. They 
also celebrate the continuity of the family line and the 
interconnectedness of people by shared links to 
distant ancestors. Eating therefore, provides nutrients 
which strengthen family connections as well as 
physical bodies, but it also strengthens the body 
politic. The Communist Party of Vietnam in allowing 
these rituals has recognised their usefulness as well as 
the futility of trying to ban them. These seemingly 
excessive festivals and Vietnamese household 
expenditure on family occasions, it might be 
observed, are all the more striking in the face of 
Vietnam’s continuing areas of poverty.  
 
Mr B’s individualism 
We have been considering so far the continuing 
influence of traditional practices that have become 
entrenched in Vietnamese culture.  However, doi-moi 
has of course resulted in far-reaching changes in 
Vietnamese culture.  There was a hint of this in the 
previous section in the state’s ambiguity towards the 
changes being wrought in recent times in Vietnamese 
society. In our case studies Mr B embodied these 
changes and the resulting ambiguity on an individual 
level.  He embodied the transition from an old 
collective Vietnam to a more individualistic Vietnam.   
 
Mr B, who claimed he did everything alone in setting 
up the BB Water plant, including designing the 
buildings, moved between two worlds – one bounded 
by the family, and the other defined by him as an 
individual.  It is clear, however, that his individualism 
was only just emerging from family traditions. He 
started up his business with capital borrowed from 
members of his family. He was clearly proud of his 
family’s social status and seemed to see it as directly 
linked to the birth of his business. In answering the 
question “How did you become a businessman?” the 
first thing he said was “My family was one with 
traditional values (gia dinh le nghi) and my father 
was a high ranking military officer” before recounting 
how he borrowed seed capital from them. Despite this 
powerful concern about family, Mr A nevertheless 
alerts us to the environment of change in which he 
and other interviewees continued to invoke the 
family. Mr B seemed to want his employees to be 
more individualistic or at least take individual 
responsibility when he complained that “Vietnamese 
don’t think for themselves; they don’t take the 
initiative or accept responsibility and don’t feel 
responsible”. It should be noted that it was only when 
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Mr B took a trip overseas that he first realised this: “I 
did not realise the backwardness of Vietnam until I 
went to Japan, France and other countries in 
Southeast Asia”. He was proud when he recounted 
that because of the way he subsequently organised his 
workforce, people thought BB Water was a foreign 
company. 
 
Mr B’s complaints about his staff not taking 
individual responsibility are perhaps symptomatic of 
a society transforming from a village-based culture in 
which everyone knew each other and their place in 
the hierarchy to a more impersonal market culture. 
Even as he complained about his staff’s lack of 
individualism, he seemed to miss the kind of trust and 
loyalty that would be forthcoming from family 
members or people he would have known well in a 
village setting. He complained, for example, that 
when employing new workers “you can’t check if 
they have been dismissed from somewhere else for 
stealing. There is also no way of checking on their 
training or skills. The best one can do is judge on 
appearances….” His employees in turn, according to 
Mr B, showed little loyalty to him as their boss (and 
superior) outside the village or family setting. Mr B 
sought to keep his staff by training them and trying to 
make them feel that they had a stake in the 
company’s success. He gave them an annual bonus if 
profits had gone up that year. He also gave them a 
month’s salary on retirement for each year they had 
worked in his company.  
 
Part of the context Mr B was trying to address was 
the new problem of managing people away from the 
village. As Vietnam has developed into an industrial 
economy instead of an agricultural one, old social 
systems have been fracturing and new ones forming 
to take their place. At the time these case studies were 
being undertaken, considerable internal migration 
was beginning in Vietnam. Increasing numbers of 
Vietnamese were moving to the cities for 
employment in the manufacturing and service sectors. 
Urban anonymity was replacing previous close-knit 
village and clan structures.  These cultural changes 
were being reflected in the way people managed 
businesses. While in Vietnam family-run companies 
have continued to be prominent in business, studies of 
Vietnamese choice of business partners show this is 
changing. One forthcoming study by Adam Fforde 
has found the emergence of preference for association 
with non-kin. Another study has found that in recent 
times even countryside farming households have 
begun to form alliances which are not necessarily kin-
based.   
 
The emergence of the new problem of managing 
people, away from the village without the moral 
authority of the family as a back up, has seen a 
publishing boom in Vietnam since the early 1990s on 
the management of human resources. The 
Development of the Human element in Renovation 
Management and Economics, The Qualities Needed 
by Leaders and Managers and Business Psychology 
in the Private Economy are typical of the available 
titles. The opening paragraph of The Qualities 
Needed by Leaders and Managers seems to suggest 
that people are no longer to be disposed of merely 
according to the king’s (or other superior’s) whims - 
but rather valued as ‘human resources’, and treated 
ethically by the boss so as to harness most effectively 
their energy and expertise: 
  
“People in former times had a saying: ‘Use 
people as you use trees [in the forest].’ Today, 
managers say that this is the right idea as far as 
it goes. It is right in so far as one should use 
people for work that corresponds with their 
aspirations and potentials… But [the old saying] 
falls short in so far as people are different from 
machines.”  
 
While the metaphors might be mixed, it is clear here 
that as Vietnamese move out from the village or clan 
into a de-personalised urban environment, 
psychology and personnel management have emerged 
as important resources in the task of discerning the 
best way to handle strangers. It also indicates a 
changed relationship between the workers and their 
superiors. In pre-colonial Vietnam, the King and his 
officials would differentiate between peoples’ 
individual talents and skills, but they would drive 
them like machines. The old economy perhaps used 
to be ‘flatter’ than the present one. The new bubbling 
entrepreneurial economy of doi moi Vietnam has 
given rise to greater inequalities and differences than 
before. A growing sense of individual worth, like that 
which has long existed in the West, has to be catered 
for.  
 
Such enormous cultural changes are not only being 
dealt with by individuals but also of course by the 
state. It is the particular approach and role taken by 
the state to which we will now turn.   
 
 
THE STATE 
 
The Vietnamese state obviously sets the context in 
which our case studies took place.  All business done 
in our case studies at some stage involved the state.  
Despite all the economic change underway, with the 
shift from a socialist to a market economy, the state 
has maintained a significant dominance. This was 
reflected, for instance, in the survey of one hundred 
Vietnamese business managers, which found 77% 
still thought that “government was more important 
than the role of the individual in the market”.  
 
The state showed the same ambiguity towards the 
changes taking place as did Mr B. The Vietnamese 
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government wanted to turn Vietnam into a modern, 
capitalistic economy – however, it was also aware 
that capitalism brought mixed blessings. It wanted the 
increased living standards capitalism brings but not 
its downsides such as unemployment and inequality. 
We saw how the government turned to the institution 
and idea of the family to protect Vietnamese from the 
worst ravages of capitalism.  In presenting itself as a 
metaphorical family which provides protection to the 
Vietnamese people, however, the state has acted in 
ways that foreigners criticize as unfairly restricting 
their legitimate business activities. Such foreigners 
find the government’s treatment of them to be 
meddling, restrictive and even xenophobic.   
 
State and family 
The state is structured around families in Vietnam on 
both a real and a metaphorical level. For example, 
real families have long been necessary to Vietnamese 
government administration in villages, which are 
administered by village clans and kinship networks. 
At higher levels Communist Party positions are often 
taken by members of the same extended family. As 
one writer has observed: 
 
“Many Communist Party branches are still run 
by a family, a clan…government offices still have 
the husband as manager and his spouse in 
charge of Party affairs administration, their 
offspring in charge of accountancy…”  
 
There are family connections across three generations 
within the Vietnamese Communist Party. The 
existence and influence of such families can be found 
at all levels of the government administration.   
 
Even as the Vietnamese Communist Party asked the 
Vietnamese to put the nation above their families 
during the nationalist struggle against French 
colonialism, they also utilised those families. Ho Chi 
Minh insisted on cadres fitting into the families of 
local supporters, even if their presence among them 
lasted only for one or two days. As well as utilising 
real families, he also upheld the ideal of the family on 
a metaphorical level. He worked hard to develop a 
familial atmosphere among close comrades, and in 
1946 he used the notion of family bonds to appeal for 
Vietnamese of the three regions (North, Central and 
South) to act as three blood brothers, claiming, “Since 
no one can divide the members of one family, no one 
can divide our Vietnam” (Marr, 1981: 132-3).  
 
Even in recent years the power elite has considered 
the family ethos appropriate for a nation facing new 
global challenges with a tragic and divisive past still 
fresh in memory. The Vietnamese state has long 
extolled the family, sometimes above the economy. In 
1995 Premier Pham Van Dong stated that: 
 
“The needs that are thousands of times more 
urgent than economic demands include national 
independence, harmony in the family, a secure 
livelihood….dignity and family in our blood 
bond to the independent fatherland…” 
 
There are not many Western politicians who would 
see ‘harmony in the family’ as a ‘thousand times 
more urgent’ than economic demands. 
 
The Vietnamese state thus sees itself and is seen by 
others in familial terms. But whereas the Party during 
the struggle for independence and in the socialist 
revolution used to want to be ‘the family’ by 
replacing real families, it could now be argued that 
the state merely wants to emulate real families. The 
state has inverted the old Confucian saying ‘The 
father rules the family, like a king rules a country’. 
Now instead of fathers emulating kings or the state, 
the state will model itself on fathers. However the 
state will not just transform into any father, but rather 
it will be the idealised father described in previous 
sections - the ideal Confucian patriarch who 
commands respect, elicits trust and is warmly familiar 
rather than aloof. By presenting itself in this way, the 
state hopes to wrest back the control it has lost to 
regional and local elites during the change to a pro-
market economy (Vasavakul, 1996: 3).  
 
In some ways the state’s presentation of itself as 
family or father has worked. Ordinary Vietnamese do 
refer to it in familial terms. As well as companies in 
the case studies replicating a sense of family 
hierarchy within the company, they also replicate it 
externally in relation to the state. Mr A (the 
Vietnamese garment manufacturer), for example, 
characterised the relationship between himself and 
the government as familial. He began an interview by 
explaining that his company was “100% private” but 
added that, metaphorically, that put him low down in 
the state family hierarchy: “For the government 
‘Private’ is like an adopted child and the state 
companies are the real children”. Mr A implicitly 
recognised the state as a father figure and his 
relationship to it in familial terms - but it was not the 
idealised, warm, trust-filled family or respected 
father-figure the state hopes to project. Mr A knew 
that as a private company he was less dear to the 
state. The sometimes harsh pecking order of real 
families had perhaps been replicated rather than the 
idealised one.   
 
In the case studies we have reported foreign 
businessmen speaking of how relationships with 
bureaucrats and politicians were more important then 
formal papers and contracts. The Singaporean Mr G, 
when he was setting up the Hanoi GG Textile Group, 
met the then Foreign Minister Mr Nguyen Co Thach 
and developed a close friendship: “We became like 
brothers”, he said. In this way Mr G also thought of 
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the state in familial terms. His personal relationship 
with this particular minister was so close and trusting 
that he was able to feel connected to the larger 
‘family’ of the Vietnamese. 
 
The metaphor of the ‘family’ is therefore used by 
Vietnamese and foreigners like Mr G to describe their 
relationships with the state. Their relationships with 
representatives of the state in fact seemed, in some 
cases, to be so close as to resemble relationships 
within a family. Whereas in Australia or Singapore 
the relationship between business people and state 
officials might be distant and impersonal, in Vietnam 
relationships with officials are often as personal and 
close as they are in families.  There is an inevitable 
suggestion here of the importance of personal 
relationships and deference to seniority in the 
Confucian tradition.  
 
In the case studies the personal relationship with a 
Communist Party official often outweighed the 
importance of the formal documentation. Mr B, for 
example, after he had got the capital to start his 
bottled water factory, then had to find favour with the 
local government official: 
 
“When you’ve got the capital you then go to the 
government to obtain the necessary papers. 
Government cadres will not necessarily accept a 
project because it has a good business plan. You 
have to understand what the cadre wants and 
that’s an art.”  
 
Understanding what each individual cadre wants 
emphasises the importance of each distinct 
relationship with each official. Rather than just 
following published, official guidelines on what is an 
acceptable business plan, one also has to cultivate the 
‘art’ of second guessing the particular wants of 
different officials. Written rules which are 
independent from any particular individual exist, but 
it is also seen as vital to know and get along with the 
right official. 
 
In other case studies involving only Vietnamese 
business people, the entrepreneur’s personal 
connections with officialdom were helpful in 
establishing the business. Mrs C for example had 
previously worked for the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
where, she told the interviewer, she had made 
‘contacts’. Her embroidery and garment export 
Company received overseas orders passed onto her 
through state government and enjoyed company tax 
concessions. As she explained: “Because we import 
to export we do not pay import/export taxes”. She 
added that “when state companies get orders from 
overseas companies, the overseas companies often 
tell them to order from us”. When the interviewer 
then quite reasonably asked, if that was the case, why 
didn’t the foreign companies just order directly from 
CC Embroideries she replied “because they have pre-
existing relationships with the state companies” 
 
Similarly, the fact that Mr A’s father was a tailor to 
the Communist Party helped him. Mr A’s father’s 
relationship with the state was fundamental to the 
existence of the business after 1976. Furthermore Mr 
A’s factory was shared with the army. Even though 
Mr A’s company was private, its relations with the 
state would also seem to qualify its status as ‘private’ 
and independent of the state.  
 
It is these sorts of long-standing family and personal 
relationships with officials that foreigners have 
needed to ‘tap into’ when they do business in the 
country. Foreigners are outside the hierarchies and 
networks that Vietnamese have been building up 
since birth. Personal relations with Vietnamese 
officials connect foreigners to this dense web of 
relationships. In particular foreigner businessmen 
have needed local partners who are connected to the 
Communist Party. For this reason all of the joint 
ventures in the case studies had Vietnamese partners 
who were Communist Party Officials or at least had 
‘government connections’. Sometimes it was because 
the Vietnamese Communist Party ran the partner 
company in a joint venture. For example, the two 
Vietnamese directors on HH Steel’s board of 
directors were responsible to the Ho Chi Minh 
Peoples’ Committee, which ran the Vietnamese 
construction company in the joint venture.  
 
So important have Party connections been to doing 
business in Vietnam, that in some of the case studies 
the foreign firm deliberately sought out business 
partners who were well-connected with the Party. 
When the Singapore firm first proposed to build and 
operate the EE Hotel in Halong Bay it sought a 
Vietnamese partner with knowledge of the 
requirements of the Vietnamese government, as well 
as political and marketing contacts. The hotel duly 
appointed a Vietnamese vice-director who had family 
connections to the highest places in government. His 
connections were successfully used to limit the 
‘commissions’ the hotel had to pay to Vietnamese 
authorities.  
 
Another example of useful connections was the 
Vietnamese vice-chairman of the LL Hospital’s board 
of management, Professor M from MM Hospital. A 
hospital staff member described Professor M’s 
government connections as ‘invaluable’ when it came 
to obtaining the hospital’s operational certificate so it 
could commence operating. Separate negotiations had 
to be conducted with the Ministry of Health, the State 
Commission for Co-operation and Investment (SCCI) 
and the Hanoi’s People’s Committee. In each case the 
relevant authorities had to see what was in the deal 
for them. As our hospital informant put it, Professor 
M was needed ensure that the application went to the 
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‘right people’ in these various government agencies. 
Even with Professor M’s help some difficult 
negotiations with various government authorities and 
the payment of a commission were finally necessary 
to obtain the certificate. 
 
In our case studies foreigners needed to maintain 
good relations, not only with high-level Party 
officials but also those quite low down the Party 
hierarchy. The Singapore conglomerate HH Steel was 
aware that any connection to the Party was to be 
cultivated. We saw in the section on the ‘culture of 
poverty’ that HH Steel preferred ‘black stamp’ 
subcontractors - private tradesmen with apparently 
little capital who were not connected to the 
government. HH Steel actually found them to be the 
most willing workers. Despite this, however, HH 
Steel employed at least one ‘red stamp’ 
subcontractor. When the company’s internal auditors 
came from Singapore, they asked on inspection of the 
HH officer’s work why the red stamp subcontractor’s 
services were used when they were more expensive 
and inferior to the ‘black stamp’ subcontractors. HH 
Steel replied that it could not terminate the contract 
with the government. The ‘red stamp’ subcontractors 
were a part of the company’s management of its 
relationship with the government, which in Vietnam 
was just as important as its production management.  
 
The United States-born General Manager of HH Steel 
also saw his personal relationships with officials at 
the highest level down to the lowliest subcontractor 
as important to the success of his joint venture. In 
1999, after weathering the Asian economic crisis, and 
with HH Steel finally making a small profit, he said: 
 
“I think that what success we’ve had is largely 
due to my own capacity to deal with people in 
the government, customs department, employees, 
suppliers and sub-contractors.”  
 
He also felt that there had been some “small changes 
in the past decade” on the part of the government, 
because now at least the police did not trouble the 
company as they did before, and customs officials 
were easier to deal with.   
 
Joint ventures 
While high-level Communist Party members on the 
boards of joint ventures brought in the support of the 
Communist Party, some of the Australians and 
Singaporeans in our case studies expressed disquiet 
about their performance in the board room. We saw 
above that the Singaporean firm which set up the EE 
Hotel in Halong Bay deliberately sought out a 
Vietnamese vice-director with Party connections. 
However, the hotel’s general manager, Mr E, thought 
that his Vietnamese partner in the hotel should not 
have the power to dictate or intervene in financial 
matters. He observed that even with a much smaller 
percentage of shares, Vietnamese partners tended to 
demand disproportionate power to affect decisions 
with “less than creditable competence”. 
 
Some informants in the Australian and Singaporean 
case studies described Vietnamese joint partners as 
being “invariably high up members of the Communist 
Party who sit mutely at meetings”. They said their 
Vietnamese joint partners never did things which they 
regarded as customary for business managers such as 
investing money in the enterprise or selling their 
shares. In the case of YY Roofing the Australians 
thought that this may have been because initially the 
Vietnamese partner, Mr J, regarded YY as little more 
than a ‘cash cow’. Even later, when Mr J said he was 
impressed by YY Roofing’s modern business 
methods and had the ‘highest regard’ for Mr Y, the 
Vietnamese partner contributed little to board 
meetings. His Australian partners surmised that Mr 
J’s silence probably represented two things: his 
minority share (27%) of the profits and his lack of 
basic business knowledge. They believed he felt a 
sense of inferiority in the face of modern business 
methods because of his windfall mentality, and so 
opted to leave the running of the company to the Y 
family. We observed earlier that Mr J, particularly in 
his short time-scale approach to commerce, illustrated 
the continuing influence of the ‘culture of shared 
poverty’ in modern Vietnamese business. 
 
In the case of the LL Hospital there was also a sense 
that the Vietnamese joint venture partners were a 
necessary encumbrance. The Australian hospital 
managers felt that senior Vietnamese staff said little 
or read prepared statements at management meetings 
because they were government appointees who had 
no expertise to contribute. One Australian staff 
member said  
 
“The Vietnamese joint venture partner does not 
care about the running of the hospital. All MM 
[hospital] did was provide the land and a 
building. The Hospital runs smoothly along 
modern lines because the Vietnamese are not 
involved.” 
 
The Vietnamese director general manager of HH 
Steel was also considered by his Singaporean partners 
to lack knowledge of modern business methods. 
Despite his genuine interest in the business and the 
effort he took, such as going to night classes to learn 
about computers, they felt he was still deeply 
influenced by the culture of the state-owned 
enterprises in Vietnam. Also his Singaporean partners 
felt he sometimes put the Party before the business: 
“he more often than not acted in the Party’s interests 
rather than the company’s”. Mr Y put a similar 
sentiment even more strongly when he said “often the 
partner may seem the opposition.” Drawing on his 
experience with Mr J, Mr Y said that one’s 
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Vietnamese business partner “may also feel that he is 
in competition with you”. 
 
In these cases, one interpretation might be that these 
seemingly uninterested joint partners may have been 
appointed by the Vietnamese Communist Party. The 
Party may have posted them as a director or deputy 
director to a foreign joint venture to make sure the 
joint venture was being run in a manner which did not 
contradict Party principles and interests.  In this case 
the Vietnamese partners may well have been torn 
between their loyalty to the Communist Party and the 
joint venture. As vice-directors of a joint venture, 
such cadres would have received higher wages and 
have better than normal standards of living. But it 
would still be necessary for them to go to Party 
meetings and listen to political lectures at which they 
are told to have pride in their country and to take 
responsibility for its workers and the state’s 
enterprises. While the joint ventures were not state-
owned-enterprises, the government still felt 
responsible for allowing them to operate in the 
country. Through Party-appointed board members, 
the government worked to ensure that foreigners 
acted for what it perceived to be the benefit of 
Vietnam. Party-appointed board members thus knew 
they could be removed from a joint venture at any 
time, and their lucrative positions there were a favour 
from their superiors in the Party. At board meetings 
they were dependent on the Party, and ultimately, the 
Politburo, for directions. If an issue arose on which 
Party officials had no policy or did not know what to 
do, the Vietnamese partner in a joint venture would 
usually say nothing.  
 
From the perspective of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party, the economy was opened up in the late 1980s 
to gain foreign investment, skills and technology. In a 
joint venture the Party could achieve these gains with 
minimal contributions of land and disused buildings. 
It was typical in the case of the YY Roofing joint 
venture that the Vietnamese partner provided 27% of 
the capital in the form of land, buildings and 
infrastructure. The foreign partner, Mr Y, contributed 
73% in machinery equipment and cash. The 
Vietnamese Joint partner only received 27% of the 
profits in recognition of this, but his individual gain 
from the joint venture was less important than the 
investment of Australian capital, expertise and better 
roofing he had helped secure for his country. From 
the Party’s perspective his help in securing the 
foreign investment outweighed any further 
contribution he could make to ongoing management 
decisions connected with the business.  
 
But despite the control which officials in Vietnam 
exerted over the country’s commerce, in many case 
studies they seemed to be not conversant with the 
norms of commercial contracts and other commercial 
procedures such as approvals. Much of the Party’s 
business experience came from running state-owned-
enterprises where the state legitimately controlled all 
business and the Party’s interests dictated the 
direction of business. Many Party representatives 
continued to be steeped in the culture of a command 
economy. Their inexperience with a free market was 
starkly revealed when they joined forces with a 
foreign capitalist company in a joint venture.   
 
With respect to the way Australian-Vietnamese joint 
partner relations in the NN Mining venture appear to 
have been damaged by the inexperience of the 
Vietnamese, there were no precedents for dealing 
with a joint venture in mining on this scale. At the 
time of the case study the Vietnamese had only been 
used to dealing with large mining companies from the 
Soviet Union in pre doi moi days. The Vietnamese 
partners had unrealistic expectations, for instance, of 
the executive powers they wanted PP to exert over its 
Vietnamese offshoot, NN Mining. They had virtually 
no sense of the external pressures under which a large 
modern company like PP Ltd was operating - such as 
the shareholders, boards, legislative regimes and 
market forces back in their country of origin.   
 
Another example of the inexperience of the 
Vietnamese in the ways of capitalism occurred after 
Mr Y had chosen the Hanoi Building Materials 
Supply Company (HBMS) as the partner to the joint 
venture. HBMS’s director, Mr J, indicated he could 
arrange for an appropriate contract to be drafted. The 
document, however, proved inadequate and Mr Y 
finally drafted the contract himself, with some advice 
from an Australian solicitor in Singapore. A further 
example of such inexperience is the contract for the 
larger FF Complex project which was never built. In 
this case the Vietnamese government stipulated in the 
contract that the deadline for completion and final 
selling up of the property was ten years. They did not 
recognise that variable market conditions do not 
favour such time limits. Properties in a free market 
should ideally be sold when prices are right, not 
according to a decade old contract.   
 
In listing these examples of official inexperience with 
free market capitalism, however, it should be stressed 
again that the commercial culture in Vietnam is in 
flux. The necessity to have Vietnamese on boards of 
directors has now lessened. There have been 
increasing opportunities for foreigners to hold 100% 
equity in a business, and a new generation of 
Vietnamese directors has begun talking about 
investing more and selling shares. Many of the 
problems which arose in our case studies are 
indicative of an economy in transition.  In the next 
two sections the government’s relative lack of 
experience with an open and free banking system and 
commercial approvals will be looked at - and once 
again we encounter indications of problems of 
transition from a command economy.   
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Banks 
The government has maintained tight control over 
Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese businesses in the 
country through the banks. It has controlled most 
business credit through state banks.  Relationships 
with Communist Party government officials who 
authorise Vietnamese banks’ loans have long been 
essential to secure the money to establish a new 
business in Vietnam. In part this is because 
Vietnamese banks suffer from that lack of trust which 
we have already touched upon. As the Australian Mr 
Y said, “When we first started, the banks didn’t trust 
us; we had difficulty borrowing money”. Australian 
Embassy and other expatriate advice assured Mr Y 
that he would be unable to raise finance in Vietnam. 
However, through the building of personal 
relationships Mr Y was able to overcome this. 
Accompanied by his interpreter, he approached the 
Vietnamese Maritime Stock Bank in Hanoi in January 
1993. It turned out to be a ‘good meeting’. The next 
week, representatives from the bank visited YY 
Roofing and offered finance at 0.7% interest a month. 
Knowing how important and hard-won trust was in 
the Vietnamese business environment, YY Roofing 
continued to do business with Maritime Stock for 
about two years until its financial needs became too 
big for that bank’s resources.  
 
Influenced by the perception that capital and 
resources were stripped from the country by colonial 
powers, banking in Vietnam has been only cautiously 
opened to international capital. The Vietnamese State 
Bank had fixed the exchange rates and imposed strict 
limitations on the conversion of the Vietnamese dong 
to hard currency, permitting only some specially 
designated industries to convert dong reserves to US 
dollars. In 1993 when Mr Y’s YY Roofing first had 
enough profit (the dong equivalent of USD300,000) 
to send funds out of the country, the financial rules 
and conventions were still unclear in Hanoi – so that 
expatriate business, legal and diplomatic communities 
tended to view the transaction as a test case. In the 
end, the State Bank did convert Mr Y’s money to US 
dollars and let it out of the county.  
 
The LL Hospital also had problems with Vietnam’s 
underdeveloped banking system. It found that it 
suffered from not being able to borrow money against 
assets. In most countries it is possible to borrow 
capital against such assets as building and equipment. 
But because of the undeveloped Vietnamese legal and 
financial systems, the banks would not accept the 
hospital buildings and equipment as assets. There was 
also a continuing assumption that large assets such as 
buildings and land are almost always state-owned. 
Even though the LL Hospital consortium had paid for 
the materials and construction of the hospital 
buildings, it would appear that bank officials had 
difficulty thinking of the consortium as private 
owners of the buildings who could sell them (if they 
had to) to repay the loan. A further problem was that 
in the case of the LL Hospital’s equipment no one in 
the country had the money to buy such 
technologically sophisticated medical equipment, and 
Vietnamese law prevented the Hospital from re-
exporting it and selling it elsewhere. In this situation 
its high-tech equipment, like its buildings, was 
rendered worthless. This was not only a problem in 
establishing assets as security, but once equipment 
became redundant all the hospital could do was give 
it away. While this was bad from the Australian point 
of view, from the Vietnamese point of view it was 
perhaps ethical, because it kept assets such as 
expensive medical equipment in the country. It forced 
the comparatively rich Australians to ‘give it away’ to 
a poor Vietnamese health system. 
 
It is hard to give a single reason for why the 
Vietnamese banking system was like this in the 
1990s. The problems of any society undergoing such 
a major transition took on a particular hue in 1990s 
Vietnam because of a combination of factors. 
Banking in Vietnam may have been shaped by a 
culture of state owned enterprises and state-owned 
land and buildings, and the general lack of trust 
which pervades Vietnamese society. The continuing 
legacy of Confucian mercantilism may also have 
made the government both distrustful and disdainful 
of the banking system. These factors may have 
combined in such a way that when Vietnam did open 
its banks to international commerce in the 1990s it 
did so cautiously and haltingly. 
 
State approvals and taxes 
All businesses in Australia, Singapore and Vietnam 
are subject to taxes.  How does the Vietnamese 
government tax foreign joint ventures? In contrast to 
many other countries, the Vietnamese government 
taxes foreign businesses or joint ventures at rates 
different from local rates. In some cases the tax is 
lighter on the joint venture as part of the ‘package’ 
which is negotiated at the outset to attract the foreign 
investor. For example, in the case of the Singaporean-
Vietnamese joint venture, the EE Hotel in Halong 
Bay, tax on profit was waived for the first five years. 
In most of our case studies, however, the tax on joint 
ventures was higher. The tax on foreign companies 
grew exponentially from the late 1990s. Thanks to the 
fact that the joint venture contract between Mr Y and 
Mr J was signed in 1992, YY Roofing had a relatively 
light 19% profit tax compared, for instance, with the 
30% tax that was levied on the profits of foreign 
companies in 2000.    
 
In Australia, in implementing an across-the-board tax 
rate, the Australian government takes the attitude that 
it cannot favour one sector over another in terms of 
tax, not even local businesses over foreign-owned 
businesses.  The Vietnamese government, however, 
takes the attitude that its first duty is to the 
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Vietnamese people and in the 1990s this meant it 
favoured Vietnamese-owned businesses through the 
tax system. As well as tending to tax foreigners at a 
higher rate, it also subjected them to greater security. 
 
The Vietnamese government, in Mr Y’s experience, 
was also very particular when it came to taxing his 
company. On one occasion three tax officials spent a 
week going through YY Roofing’s books in search of 
an unaccounted USD319 – which turned out to be the 
value of samples given to buyers. Mr Y found that the 
only way to deal with the acute attention of a well-
known company such as his was: 
 
“...to make sure everything is squeaky clean. You 
have to dot every ‘i’ and cross every ‘t’. 
Everything has to be signed by both sides”.   
  
Furthermore it was necessary to keep all receipts for 
years, because of the frequent need to prove the cost 
of certain items. Vietnam tax and other officials 
frequently failed to understand that the price of goods 
and machinery purchased outside Vietnam was many 
times more expensive than similar items made in 
Vietnam, and that the superior quality of foreign 
goods justified their price. Mr Y gave the example in 
the roofing business of a de-coiling machine that cost 
one tenth of its US price in Vietnam (USD2000 
compared to USD200). The scrutiny became more 
intense as Mr Y’s company grew.  As he wrote:  
 
“The more successful we became the more 
problems there were. As we moved into profit 
everyone seemed to want a share of it.”  
 
A report which Mr Y wrote about how much tax the 
company paid was a cause for official happiness and 
the Vietnamese partner, Mr J, was congratulated on 
his achievements in a special meeting with the 
Vietnamese Communist Party’s First Secretary Do 
Muoi - a high honour indeed.  Mr J had done his duty 
to his country. Rather than extracting profits from the 
country and giving only a few jobs (by Vietnamese 
standards) in return, the whole nation had benefited 
from the success of YY Roofing company through its 
taxes.   
 
This appeased some government officials who may 
have worried that Mr Y as a foreigner would simply 
take profits from the country without putting anything 
back. This fear was based on the remnants of a 
Confucian suspicion of business as a ‘zero-sum’ 
game, and a fear that foreign multinationals will 
plunder the country as colonial powers were 
perceived to have done. Or it may have been based on 
the perception that foreigners, especially 
multinational companies, have far more money than 
their Vietnamese counterparts and can afford to pay 
more in tax.  It was taxation in keeping with the 
Marxist doctrine: “From each according to their 
ability, to each according to their need”.  
 
The wooing of foreign companies through 
tariffs and other means 
The fact that government policy at times favoured 
foreigners needs to be underlined. It conflicts with 
some expatriate perceptions, and was of course a 
result of government desire to attract foreigners 
businesses to Vietnam - wanting their money, their 
expertise and technology to modernise the 
Vietnamese economy and contribute to a higher 
standard of living for all.  
 
In some cases the Vietnamese government in fact 
appears to deal more generously with foreign 
businesses than with its own indigenous businesses. 
A HH Steel informant claimed a Vietnamese 
company would have been surprised if it had been 
able to fulfil a contract with the government. He felt 
the government was more likely to honour contracts 
with foreign companies, because it knew it had to do 
so if it wanted to retain their investments. 
 
As part of attracting foreign business the Vietnamese 
government has sometimes been willing to admit to 
faults. After the slump in FDI (foreign direct 
investment) in 1996-7, the Vietnamese government 
was forced to deal with the existence of corruption in 
order to try and attract foreign capital. One person 
interviewed in our case study research found a new 
candour not just in the Vietnamese government but 
also among ordinary non-official Vietnamese. Some 
of HH Steel’s Singaporean staff who had previously 
worked in Malaysia felt that this made business 
conditions more hospitable in Vietnam.  
 
“In Malaysia there is a lot of corruption, but it is 
not openly admitted – as in Vietnam. Vietnamese 
admit corruption more easily and the 
atmosphere is easier. There is a feeling of 
dishonesty in Malaysia that begins with the 
fiction that the UNMO [Malaysia’s ruling 
political party] is perfect. Malays are too proud 
to admit corruption.” 
. 
In a similar vein, the Vietnamese also publicly 
criticised themselves for the collapse of the NN 
Mining joint venture. In September 1999 the Vietnam 
Investment Report quoted the Vietnamese Mr P as 
saying that “A big gap in the Vietnamese laws, 
incompetent Vietnamese managers and a loss of 
solidarity were the main reasons for the failure of the 
joint venture”. Moreover, after explaining the post-
joint venture success of the ilmenite mining project, 
the report added that  
 
“Mr P was quick to admit that the Vietnamese 
management teams learned a lot during their 
time with the Australian partner. Advanced 
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technology, management, communicating and 
marketing skills were all acquired by the 
Vietnamese managers.”  
 
This self-criticism shows that like many Vietnamese 
in our case studies, Mr P realised he was on a steep 
learning curve. Vietnam had only recently begun to 
move from a largely rural-based centralised economy 
to a more urban, open one. Mr P acknowledged that 
the Vietnamese partners made mistakes and still had 
much to learn.  
 
Another way the Vietnamese government tried to 
woo foreign entrepreneurs in some of the case studies 
was by promising favourable tariffs for joint ventures 
in its contracts with the foreign party, including 
placing high tariffs on competing goods from outside 
Vietnam. In some cases it lowered the tariff on 
imports of building materials, machinery or other 
inputs which the joint venture needed to establish its 
business. In this way the government made it cheaper 
for foreign companies to establish themselves in 
Vietnam. In the case of the Singaporean-Vietnamese 
joint venture, the EE Hotel in Halong Bay, the capital 
imports for the project were granted exemption from 
duties in the founding agreement with the 
government. 
 
It has not been the case that the Vietnamese 
government takes one view only on tariffs in 
Vietnam. As in other areas, the Vietnamese 
government is not monolithic. When so much 
depends on personal relationships with different 
officials rather than an absolute set of rules, officials 
can differ. A decision by one part of the bureaucracy 
may be contradicted by action from another part. Mr 
Y, for example, had a problem with tariffs in Vietnam 
because of overlapping jurisdictions between 
different ministries. For instance, around August 
1993 the import duty on steel suddenly rose from 5% 
to 15%. YY Roofing wrote to the Ministry of Finance 
pointing out that the new import duty exceeded the 
5% stipulated in the Joint venture contract. The 
Ministry of Finance sent an officially signed and 
stamped reply saying that the new tax did not apply to 
YY Roofing, which would continue to pay 5%. So for 
the next three shipments YY Roofing continued to 
pay 5%. Suddenly, however, the Department of 
Customs refused to release a shipment of USD20,000 
worth of steel. When YY Roofing appealed to the 
Ministry of Finance, this Ministry wiped its hands of 
the matter saying that the stamped official letter was 
not a tax exemption but a guide. By this time a year 
had passed and YY Roofing received a USD30,000 
fine from the Department of Customs for USD20,000 
non-payment of tax. The matter was finally resolved 
when YY Roofing agreed to pay ‘the fine’ but 
‘negotiated’ its reduction from USD50,000 to 
USD20,000. Face was saved in the ministries. 
 
One of the lengthiest examples from the case studies 
of a foreign company lobbying the Vietnamese 
government on tariffs is that of HH Steel. The 
Vietnamese government had promised HH Steel tariff 
protection but in 1996 the market was flooded by 
cheaper Thai products because of an oversight. The 
Vietnamese government had a twenty to thirty 
percent import tax on such items as steel and paint, 
which were necessary to make steel tanks. However, 
it placed virtually no import tax on manufactured 
tanks, which meant that HH Steel suddenly found that 
it could not compete with imports from large Thai 
companies. The HH Steel Saigon factory was 
eventually successful in its tariff negotiations with the 
government after about 18 months of petitioning the 
government.  
 
HH Steel began lobbying the government in 1997, 
sending copies of its documents to the Ministries that 
initially authorised the joint venture, the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment and the Ministry of Trade, 
as well as to the Tax Department and the Ho Chi 
Minh People’s Committee. This approach was 
ineffective because approaching multiple offices in 
the Vietnamese bureaucracy only caused confusion. It 
was passed from one department to another, from one 
office to the next, with no one prepared to make an 
overall assessment of the situation let alone decide on 
reforms.  
 
HH Steel was successful only when it after it changed 
its tactics and began to send staff in to personally visit 
and revisit government departments in Hanoi with the 
simple message to raise tariffs on imported tanks. 
After eighteen months the matter came to the notice 
of a senior official in a powerful ministry “who had 
considerable experience of the outside world” and 
who finally said: “We’ll give you some protection by 
increasing tax on completed cylinders”. In 1999 the 
Vietnamese import tariff on completed steel tanks 
was raised to 20% and the Prime Minister’s office 
even launched a television advertisement 
recommending that people buy local steel tanks. By 
mid 1999 all relevant companies – both private and 
state – in Vietnam were placing their orders for tanks 
with HH Steel. The senior official who finally took 
the decision to increase taxes on imports of 
completed gas cylinders did so, he said, to benefit the 
entire economy. He explained: 
 
“…it was disappointing to see a new Vietnamese 
industry being placed at a disadvantage because 
of weaknesses in procedures. These must be 
rectified so that the Vietnam market economy 
can develop and become part of the ASEAN free 
trade area.” 
 
Ironically, to become part of a ‘free trade area’ it 
seemed that this small to medium sized joint venture 
needed to be protected by the antithesis of free trade, 
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tariffs. The tariffs can perhaps be likened to the 
protection a parent provides so that one day his child 
can go out into the world as an independent adult. It 
might be observed that, in this case, the 
implementation of tariffs reflects the continuing 
influence on Vietnamese government of the 
traditional role of Confucian patriarch and ‘protector’ 
of the Vietnamese nation-family.  
 
The Vietnamese State as protector  
The Vietnamese government’s reasons for attracting 
foreign companies to its shores include the increase in 
GDP and rising living standards that capitalism 
brings, the transfer of technology and business know-
how, and the goal of full participation in ASEAN 
regionalism. The government, in the 1990s was 
anxious, however, about the inequality that generally 
comes with capitalism, and showed a concern to 
protect Vietnamese workers from the worst aspects of 
capitalism. As Tran Khac Viet, a political scientist at 
the Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy in 
Hanoi has said, “We cannot sacrifice social justice for 
economic development” (The Canberra Times, 2 May 
2005). This cannot be dismissed as a cynical ploy to 
hang onto power, invoking the legacy of the moral 
injunctions against inequality in communist doctrine. 
The Head of the Asian Development Bank office in 
Vietnam, Bradford Philips, has also commented on 
the sincerity with which the communist ethic of 
equality is used to critique some of the changes 
brought about by doi moi: 
 
“The leaders are very much aware of the equity 
issue and they take it very much to heart. In just 
about every speech they address the gap, sort of 
implying that if they can’t solve it, they’ll lose 
their right to rule. I don’t think it’s just 
rhetoric”(The Canberra Times, 2 May 2005).  
 
The Vietnamese government has embraced capitalism 
cautiously and has been wary of letting it go 
completely unchecked.   
 
There is a contrast here with Australia, Singapore and 
much of the developed world, where for the last few 
decades government has been winding back its role in 
the economy, often claiming that market forces to be 
fairer and more efficient. In Australia, apart from 
safety and consumer protection laws, the government 
has been winding back its regulation of quality in 
various industries. For example, even in the case of 
Australian meat inspectors – who used to be 
government employees – there is privatisation. They 
are now the employees of private meat abattoirs, 
implementing each company’s internal quality 
control. The Australian government appears to 
assume that it does not have to regulate product 
quality because the market will do it more effectively. 
Businesses that produce defective goods will loose 
customers and cease to operate.  
In contrast, in Vietnam the regulation of quality by 
government has been very strong. In the case study of 
DD Ceramics for example, Mr D explained that the 
one hundred families that are subcontracted to 
produce pots have their work inspected by ‘technical 
cadres’ who ‘go around checking and correcting’ 
work in progress. In the case of DD Ceramics there is 
a particular patriotic impetus, in that the pots are 
exported all over the world. In the case of HH Steel, 
the Vietnamese government helped not only by 
raising tariffs on competing imports but also by  
issuing a TV advertisement which noted that the 
Prime Minister would have the Department of 
Science and Technology carry out an inspection of 
HH Steel’s products to certify their product.  
  
With respect to the protection of labour, the state 
continued to protect Vietnamese workers through 
laws that force benefits to be provided by their 
employers. These have included a basic Foreign 
Direct Investment Salary to be paid to the least 
qualified workers in joint ventures, and also the usual 
health and other benefits prescribed by the Labour 
Laws. Mrs C’s employees at CC Embroideries had 
compulsory social insurance, as well as 
superannuation and work cover. 
 
The Vietnamese government has in addition had a 
commitment to keeping employment high.  Since the 
neo-conservative economic approaches of Thatcher 
and Reagan swept the Western world, the ideal has 
been to let employment be largely determined by the 
market. Some unemployment is even considered 
necessary to provide a pool of employees who can be 
brought into production during times of high demand. 
Moreover, while in mature capitalist economies all 
able adults ideally earn their own keep, there is the 
sometimes countervailing belief that a streamlined 
company should employ exactly the number of 
workers it needs. High labour costs and advanced 
technology in Australia mean that if a company 
employs only the minimum number, its profits are 
increased, thus strengthening the business and giving 
greater returns to shareholders. There is also the 
implied virtue of thriftiness and avoidance of idle 
workers or laziness. From the point of view of 
Australian employers, a highly productive worker is 
the ideal. 
 
In Vietnam, by contrast, there has been an emphasis 
in thinking about employment on the necessity of 
people working in order to sustain themselves 
physically. Mr Y’s Vietnamese partner, Mr J ran his 
own construction company which employed more 
people than needed, by Australian standards. But in 
Vietnamese eyes he was helping his employees, as 
one discussant put it, ‘to eat’. In setting up the YY 
Roofing business, Mr Y found that he had very 
different ideas about employment compared with his 
Vietnamese business partner. After Mr Y had built 
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and equipped his factory and imported his first batch 
of steel, he and his partner were ready to gather their 
Vietnamese workforce. At first assuming intensive 
Vietnamese labour work practices, his partner, Mr J, 
wanted to employ some forty people. After 
negotiations, however, Mr Y chose a far smaller work 
force of five people. It was only as the business 
expanded that the number of staff later increased to 
nineteen. (By the time of the sale of the business in 
2000 it had risen to twenty-seven)  
 
Employment is considered to be so important that the 
Vietnamese government in some instances has 
insisted that workers must be given a salary even 
when their employer is not operating.  Mrs C took the 
Vietnamese approach when her embroidery export 
business experienced reduced orders during the Asian 
economic crisis. In 1998 at the height of the crisis she 
told the interviewer: “For four months we had no 
export orders”. However she did not mention the 
option of laying off staff, rather she explained they 
“used the time to reorganise the workshops and 
enhance the skills of the workers”. When (during the 
economic crisis) a flood of steel tanks from Thailand 
meant that HH Steel’s products could not compete, 
and the firm was forced to close down its Vietnamese 
factory for some months, HH Steel employees 
continued to receive 70% of their pay as required by 
law. 
 
The requirement to keep on workers, even when 
production has shut down, may be one reason why 
the PP Ltd sand mining company ran into problems 
with the Vietnamese. When NN Mining shut down its 
operations it did not pay employees - unlike HH, 
Steel which saw it as a legal requirement in Vietnam. 
PP Ltd did pay its Vietnamese employees - but 
belatedly, after high level negotiations between the 
Australian CEOs and the Vietnamese government. 
When the forty-two containers of new machinery 
were held up at Hai Phong Port, the President and 
executive manager of PP Ltd came from Australia to 
Vietnam to try to resolve differences with central and 
local government authorities. The talks were said to 
“have taken place in a spirit of reconciliation and NN 
Mining paid workers their salaries for May and June 
so they could recommence production” It might be 
conjectured that what the Australian partners saw as a 
generous gesture of reconciliation, was understood by 
the Vietnamese to be the tardy implementation of a 
basic duty. The duty was all the greater when the 
absence of social security or subsidy for the 
unemployed – benefits that would be hard to 
implement for a relatively poor government - meant a 
paid job may be all that stands between a Vietnamese 
worker and starvation. Vietnamese workers may be 
underemployed or have gone home while the factory 
is slow or shut down but at least if they are “earning” 
a wage, they can still eat.  
 
Some informants felt such government paternalism 
towards workers went too far. In the case of the 
Vietnamese entrepreneurs in the case studies, the 
solution they suggested was not to do away with 
government paternalism altogether. Some wanted the 
government to extend its paternalism so that it 
covered the employers as well as the people they 
employed. Mr B, for example, complained about 
workers in his bottled water factory leaving for other 
jobs after he had trained them: “the government does 
not have laws to defend the employer; if something 
happens the government is likely to defend the 
employees”. When the interviewer asked “But isn’t 
the ability to move around and sell one’s labour part 
of private enterprise and an open market, capitalism?” 
Mr B replied “Yes. But the government does not have 
any regulations protecting employers”. Mr B, it 
would seem, wanted the state to protect him as well 
as his workers against the disadvantages of 
capitalism. He wanted the state to regulate 
employment not only in the employees’ favour but in 
his favour as well. Even in private enterprise, there 
would appear to have been a continuing tendency to 
see relations between state officials and private 
entrepreneurs as reflecting the hierarchical nature of 
those between a father and a child.  
 
The State’s relations with foreigners 
The Vietnamese garment manufacturer Mr A, as we 
have seen, lamented that private Vietnamese 
companies like his were regarded by the patriarchal 
Vietnamese state “like an adopted child and the state 
companies are the real children”.  If we extend Mr 
A’s analogy to include joint ventures, then the foreign 
partner-companies are like visiting children from 
other families. In the eyes of the parental state, they 
would do well to remember that they can be sent 
home if they do not respect the house rules.  
 
As an example of this, the Singaporean General 
Manager of HH Steel reported that there was 
resentment on the part of Vietnamese officials toward 
foreigners who did not acknowledge the state’s 
superior position: 
 
“Vietnamese officials have power but can also 
suffer from inferiority complexes, so they can’t 
stand foreigners who talk aggressively. 
Investors, who are serious, have to persist 
modestly if they want to succeed. We 
[businessmen] are not equal [to government 
officials] and we have to learn how to make the 
system work.” 
 
Here the Singaporean interprets the officials’ 
defensiveness as springing from their ‘inferiority 
complexes’. From the Vietnamese point of view, 
however, there was perhaps little reason to put up 
with arrogant foreigners who expect to be able to 
‘talk aggressively’ as though they are in some sense 
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superior to the government of the country they are 
visiting. The Vietnamese officials concerned may 
well feel that they have been expected to ‘kow-tow’ 
to foreigners too often in their turbulent history. The 
Vietnamese government now sets the economic and 
legal context in which any joint venture operates in its 
country.  
 
We have discussed already the need for foreigners to 
establish personal relationships with officials, and to 
have VCP members on their boards of management, 
and whether those Vietnamese board members felt 
loyalty more to the Communist Party than to the joint 
venture.  At a more general, impersonal level the state 
feels responsible for the foreigners it has allowed to 
operate in its country. Expatriate organisations and 
individuals working in Vietnam have been allocated 
to an office in the Vietnamese government, 
depending on the nature of the business and the size 
of the project. The relevant office has obtained 
expatriate visas, signed off on permissions and 
sometimes acted as advocates for the project. There 
have also been specific agencies set up to facilitate 
foreigners doing business in Vietnam. The State 
Commission for Co-operation and Investment (SCCI) 
and the ‘Economic Police’ have both operated in 
recent years. A recent study has described these 
government offices responsible for expatriates as 
“similar to a Vietnamese older sibling, who takes care 
of and protects the younger” (Ashwill and Thai Ngoc 
Diep, 2005: 82).  
 
The expatriates in our case studies, however, have 
sometimes had a different perspective on the 
relationship – questioning, for instance, the extent to 
which these offices really protect and care for them. 
A more accurate analogy for the way such expatriates 
view their situation would be that they were younger 
‘siblings’ at the bottom of a real, rather than ideal, 
Confucian familial hierarchy. Certainly many 
expatriates in the case studies reported feeling that 
such government officers favoured the older 
Vietnamese ‘children’. For example, in setting up the 
EE Hotel, the twenty-five-year contract finally 
approved by the SCCI had provisions for training 
Vietnamese staff, for formal replacement of skilled 
foreign nationals with Vietnamese staff and for 
preference to be given to Vietnamese domestic 
producers in the procurement of outputs. 
 
Similarly, the Australian Mr Y’s Vietnamese partner 
Mr J appeared to have been favoured when he was 
caught selling the company’s products directly at 
inflated prices in order to keep the profits all to 
himself. Mr Y reported Mr J’s scam to the SCCI, 
hoping they would charge him. But while the SCCI 
stopped Mr J’s behaviour it did not punish him - even 
though it found his behaviour was harmful to the 
Vietnamese economy. The agency called the 
‘Economic Police’ also disappointed Mr Y in not 
policing business crime - refusing to act when one of 
Mr Y’s Vietnamese employees was found to be 
dishonestly ‘selling’ receipts so people could say they 
had bought YY Roofing when they had not. They 
were first alerted to this ruse when a complaint was 
received that YY Roofing material had rusted before 
it was even installed. The Vietnamese employee in 
charge of issuing receipts for phone orders was 
regularly handing out YY Roofing receipts in 
exchange for money. People would buy ‘open’ YY 
Roofing receipts, then buy low grade roofing 
material, claim it was an YY roof, fill out the YY 
Roofing receipt and charge the higher YY Roofing 
price. Mr Y promptly ordered that the seller of open 
receipts be sacked. Having then to leave Vietnam on 
a business trip, he told a subordinate to handle the 
matter by calling in the Economic Police. Before 
departing, however, he suddenly found he was the 
subject to allegations by his joint venture partner, Mr 
J, that he had ‘violated’ the labour code. It requested 
that he be prevented from leaving the country before 
the labour inspectors could visit the factory. The 
exact ‘violation’ was not specified, but it seemed Mr 
Y was being accused of precipitously sacking the 
seller of open receipts.  
 
From an expatriate perspective it is likely to be 
thought that Mr J stood to lose from the scam as well, 
so he should have joined Mr Y in punishing such 
dishonesty. Resistance to rust was YY Roofing’s big 
selling point. Roofs that were falsely labelled ‘YY 
Roofing’ and rusted would severely damage its name 
and affect sales. But from a Vietnamese perspective, 
it would appear that the ethical imperative was to 
protect jobs - even the job of someone who had taken 
advantage of the company and its good name. The 
outcome was ambiguous: Mr Y was not apprehended 
at the airport, but then the Economic Police were not 
approached about the company’s problems and the 
seller of open receipts was neither sacked nor 
apprehended.  
 
There may also have been other reasons why in both 
cases the state and its representatives did not act 
against Mr Y’s Vietnamese employee. Westerners 
usually attribute the unsatisfactory results of legal 
prosecution of anyone high up in the Party to the fact 
that the Vietnamese legal body defers to the 
Communist Party. But while the dominance of the 
Party might well lead to corruption, its patriotic ideals 
and ethics also cause it to favour Vietnamese over 
foreigners (Vasavakul, 1995). Behind the lack of 
concern for the rule of law there seems to lurk a 
chauvinistic attitude in dealing with foreign partners. 
Thus the State Commission for Co-operation and 
Investment (SCCI) and the ‘Economic Police’ might 
have refused to sack their fellow Vietnamese, not 
only because of corruption or even ethical concerns 
about unemployment, but also because of patriotism. 
As the Singaporean general manager of the FF 
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Complex, Mr F, observed Vietnamese staff tended to 
cover up mistakes for each other rather and accuse 
whistle blowers of being ‘unpatriotic’. Mr F, as a 
foreign executive found himself thrust into the role of 
sole disciplinarian, being the ‘bad guy’ in Vietnamese 
eyes. The inaction of the Economic Police and the 
SCCI may be instances of this sort of attitude on a 
larger, more official scale. 
 
Expatriates perceived many Vietnamese government 
intrusions as petty or irritating rather than 
debilitating. One example was when YY Roofing was 
told by the Department of Quality and Standards that 
they had ‘violated’ Vietnamese law by not having a 
tape-measure measured by the Department. In any 
country - including Australia and Singapore - one can 
of course find entrepreneurs with tales of petty 
bureaucracy, but one thing that foreigners are often 
not prepared for when they work in Vietnam is the 
intense scrutiny to which they are subject. Apart from 
the Vietnamese Communist Party monitoring joint 
ventures by appointing high level party cadres to the 
boards of directors, it also sometimes places foreign 
business people under direct surveillance. Getting 
used to this surveillance requires a certain amount of 
political-social acclimatization. As the Vietnamese-
American general manager of HH Steel explained: 
 
“When I arrived I was a free thinker. Then I 
began to worry about my conversations being 
taped. I began to select my words. I became 
more restrained. Then after a few years I’ve 
become more relaxed and accepting of the 
system. I’ve become used to working under 
surveillance…. A couple of times I’ve got 
information back about the company from the 
government that could only have come from 
inside. But it’s not such a big issue in this 
society.” 
 
As the quotation above indicates, this particular 
expatriate grew accustomed to and accepting of 
government surveillance after a few years. He might 
have been a particularly easy going person, or he may 
have been more ready to accept such monitoring 
because of his Vietnamese-American upbringing. 
Rather than seeing anything sinister in the 
government’s surveillance he may have taken it as a 
feature of ‘high-context societies’, as Vietnam and 
many other Asian societies have been described. 
Intercultural communication specialists define a high-
context society as ones which tend to be 
homogeneous and have extensive information 
networks among family, friends, colleagues and 
clients. People in high-context societies such as 
Vietnam “make a point of keeping themselves 
informed about everything that has to do with the 
important people in their lives” (Hall and Hall, cited 
in Ashwill and Thai Ngoc Diep, 2005: 82-83).  
Concepts such as personal or private matters which 
are ‘nobody else’s business’ except that of the 
individual concerned, do not have much meaning in 
such societies. The business equivalent of 
‘commercial-in-confidence’ is also almost non-
existent. The HH Steel general manager took a very 
negative perspective: “Everyone is inducted into the 
system of fear and paranoia… Vietnam is not a place 
to have a high profile. Just be like the masses and 
even though there’s surveillance, it will be OK at the 
end of the day”. 
 
The NN Mining episode  
An example of a serious clash between Vietnamese 
and non-Vietnamese attitudes towards government 
arose with the joint venture, NN Mining. Among 
other problems, the Australian partner company, PP 
Ltd, was going to import machinery into Vietnam that 
would cause unemployment.  In a region where 
mining was still done by wheelbarrows and spades, 
their planned upgrade of equipment would cause 
mass redundancies among the existing 1,500-strong 
local labour force. The Vietnamese partners wanted 
the employees to be re-assigned to other maintenance 
work, and stated that “they must be recognised 
permanent staff of NN Mining”.  
 
PP Ltd agreed to keep on existing employees and thus 
got the agreement of the Vietnamese joint partners, 
but this was not enough. Forty-two containers 
containing the new plant and machinery bound for 
NN Mining were held up at Hai Phong Port in May 
1995. Despite prior approval from the Ministry of 
Trade, PP Ltd was accused of bringing the goods into 
the country before all necessary procedures had been 
completed - procedures such as getting approval from 
the Minister of Trade, and getting the necessary 
shipment licence from the same Ministry, based on 
the approved annual import plan. The forty-two 
containers were branded ‘illegally imported goods’, 
impounded at Hai Phong port, then confiscated and 
advertised for sale, resulting in a complete shut down 
of NN Mining operations in June 1996.   
 
One study of developing economies in Asia saw the 
NN Mining case as just one of many where the 
Vietnamese government was opportunistic and 
dishonest in its dealings: 
 
“The central government also revealed a marked 
propensity to alter the rules of the game…Many 
industries were subject to a wide range of 
environment altering decrees and circulars. 
Overlaying the increasing ‘canniness’ of senior 
policy makers was a political ideology and 
rhetoric of continued xenophobia… State 
opportunism occurred at all levels of government 
that derived legitimacy from sovereignty” 
(Maitland, 1998: 325).  
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From the words of the Australian expatriates 
involved, however, it is clear that they were more 
shocked by the surveillance and harassment they 
experienced than state opportunism. This experience 
scared them: 
 
“…provincial officials imposed restrictions on 
the activities of the expatriate personnel in 
Vietnam and threatened to stop PP 
representatives from leaving the country (sic).  
Australian expatriates were arrested by the local 
People’s Committee for allegedly failing to have 
properly obtained visas” (Maitland, 1998: 325).  
  
In the face of this harassment and arrest of its staff 
and confiscation of its equipment, PP Ltd decided to 
pull out of Vietnam. NN Mining was broken up in 
May 1996. The Australian staff went back home and 
the Vietnamese joint venture partner, Mr P, took over 
the mine in Vietnam as expected. The Vietnam 
Investment Review reported in September 1999 that 
he had single-handedly turned the operation into ‘a 
good mine’. Not only were the 1,200 workers who 
were left in the wreckage of the old company re-
employed but their wages were up by 50%; health 
and social insurance policies were written into their 
contracts and productivity was up. If this report is 
correct PP Ltd might have been giving less than the 
wages expected of foreign companies, which may 
have been one cause of their problems. There is also 
the implication in the VIR report that PP Ltd had not 
given health and social insurance in their contracts 
with workers as was also expected of companies, 
Vietnamese as well as foreign.  
 
Along with the possibility that PP Ltd neglected the 
obligations of a foreign company towards its 
Vietnamese workers, there is also the possibility that 
the harassment of PP Ltd Australian personnel arose 
from an added cause - the suspicions that they were 
spies. The Vietnamese suspicion of foreigners has 
stemmed from their long history of colonialism, wars 
and invasions by foreigners.  From the point of view 
of the Vietnamese Communist Party it is perhaps 
understandable that they wanted to extend the 
centralised authority they have over Vietnamese 
citizens to include foreign business people operating 
in their country. It may have been hard for Australian 
staff of NN Mining working in Vietnam to believe 
they could be seen as a security threat, even a 
potential one, but they perhaps failed to appreciate the 
central place national security has occupied in the 
Vietnam psyche. Vietnam has been under siege from 
foreign powers for centuries. Assaults against its 
national sovereignty are still within living memory. 
All foreign business people must be regarded at least 
as a potential security risk, especially in areas of 
Vietnam near a border shared with another country.  
Such security anxieties are perhaps less difficult for 
Singaporeans to appreciate given their experience of 
invasion by the Japanese in World War II, their 
proximity to Malaysia, and their general security 
consciousness.   
 
PP Ltd may well have been the unwitting victim of 
geography in this regard. Outside the two major cities 
of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, especially in 
security-sensitive areas near borders, nearly everyone, 
in one way or another, including Vietnamese citizens, 
has been under surveillance. In these areas provincial 
governments have been particularly sensitive and 
have tended to see foreigners as a security risk. The 
port used by the joint venture, Hai Phong, is near 
maritime borders in the South China Sea. The 
Chinese island of Hainan is just over 200 kilometres 
away and several hundred kilometres beyond that lie 
the disputed Xisha Quindao Paracel islands which are 
claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan.  
 
Hai Phong port also happens to be in the North where 
the patriotic belief that one must extract benefits from 
foreigners has traditionally been stronger. Foreigners, 
it has been believed, will always be wealthy, and as 
the wealthier partner they have a Confucian duty to 
those less well-off. South Vietnam has tended to be 
more open to the outside world and more 
cosmopolitan in its approach. Ho Chi Minh City 
People’s Council, for example, has enjoyed an image 
as comparatively progressive – it has been seen as 
being better at stamping out corruption, for example.  
One final observation concerns divisions within the 
government itself. Local governments outside the 
major cities in Vietnam, like local governments 
everywhere, tend to be more parochial.  In Vietnam 
some of the deepest fissures have been between 
provincial and central government agencies and 
departments. There has been a lack of trust between 
many of them. Provincial governments have often 
hidden information from the central government, and 
insisted on control of their level of financial or 
commercial jurisdiction. There has been a division in 
commercial jurisdiction between the two levels of 
government, with the provincial government tending 
to look after small companies, and the central 
government looking after big ones. The central 
government has sometimes overruled local 
governments on matters of foreign investment  
 
As we have said earlier, like all governments, the 
Vietnamese government is not monolithic. On one 
occasion Hospital authorities did all they could to 
obtain an urgent passport for a Vietnamese Doctor so 
that he could travel to Singapore to complete a special 
in-service course on anaesthetic machines. But the 
passport was not forthcoming, seemingly because of 
jealousies between the Ministry of Health, which had 
jurisdiction over the doctor’s services, and the 
Interior Ministry which issues passports – and the 
Hospital had to send an expatriate doctor. In this case, 
the cost of bureaucratic obstruction was the loss of 
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skills to the Vietnamese health system that would 
have been transferred as a result of the course. 
 
Sometimes the Australian staff of the LL Hospital 
even observed officials from different departments 
unable to agree on what ‘commission’ they should be 
paid. On the day of the official handover of the 
Hospital’s operational certificate in 1997 twenty-three 
people, including representatives from the Ministry of 
Health, Hanoi Architects Department and the 
Hospital sat around the board table. Discussions went 
on for a couple of hours. Even though the Australians 
could not understand much of what was being said 
because their translator could not keep up, “the 
hostility between the Vietnamese parties was 
palpable”. It seems that the various ministries from 
the various levels of government could not decide on 
the amount of the ‘commission’ to be paid. The 
Hospital’s Vietnamese consulting company advised 
that a payment of USD2,000 would be the sum 
required. However the Hospital’s finance manager 
would not agree to this and a lesser amount was 
finally handed over in envelopes to some of the 
people present. 
 
In this chapter our case studies have pointed to social 
issues that have arisen as Vietnamese culture 
undergoes reorganisation in response to the global 
imperative of development. Vietnamese culture has 
adapted creatively in order both to develop and to 
preserve the national identity. The state, as we saw, 
has sometimes tried to deliberately guide this 
adaptation in certain directions. Social issues that 
came to the fore in the case studies of joint ventures 
included corruption, regional disparities in wealth, 
unemployment, and workplace and management 
relations. In each case the need to examine the 
context of market and business cultures is obvious. 
The State is often viewed with some suspicion by 
expatriate business operators – and we have noted 
many instances that helped to promote that 
perception. In the next chapter we try to provide not 
only cultural but also historical context that can help 
promote the understanding – if not quite a 
contentment – with different business ethics.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: RECONCILING 
FOREIGN AND VIETNAMESE 
INTERESTS 
 
The last two chapters have been concerned to situate 
concrete issues in business in a cultural and to some 
extent historical context. In our case studies, 
foreigners doing business in Vietnam often shared 
practices and attitudes with the Vietnamese but 
sometimes they differed in significant ways. In many 
cases these different ways of doing business were 
perceived as problems, but they also drew attention to 
the operation of different values and ethics systems, 
that may be of vital significance for the future.   
 
Among the concrete issues our Vietnamese subjects 
shared with Singaporeans and Australians – one was 
that of ‘commissions’. Vietnamese as well as 
foreigners complained about having to pay bribes or 
‘commissions’ to get business done in Vietnam. 
Sometimes they paid the commissions. In other cases, 
such as that of Mr Y of YY Roofing, they refused to 
pay commissions and yet managed to maintain a 
thriving business. 
 
Certain foreigners who paid commissions, like the 
Australian administrator in the LL Hospital, believed 
that officials who demanded these sums did so ‘more 
from need than greed’. Need was very real in a 
country with widespread poverty. Poverty led to 
many practices such as people counting boxes of 
1,000 screws to make sure none were missing or 
nurses marvelling at water running out of taps. 
Poverty, and the culture of poverty, in fact appear to 
have been the cause of many of the problems we 
observed. Doctors fell asleep on the job because they 
had been up the night before lining up to get water 
from the local pump. Practices such as the hiding of 
wealth from officialdom, affected the viability of the 
LL Hospital: it lacked Vietnamese patients because 
those who were rich enough to afford expensive 
private hospital fees did not want others to know. 
 
Another issue frustrating foreigners (again to some 
extent influenced by the culture of poverty) was the 
way Vietnamese business managers and 
subcontractors failed to plan for the long term. 
Responses to our survey showed that only a minority 
of Vietnamese business managers (25%) felt that a 
‘good business strategy’ should include long-term 
planning and goals. Madam D’s son spoke about how 
most Vietnamese firms lack the capital to reinvest 
profits back into firms and train and plan for growth 
of the business in coming years. This general short 
sightedness also saw some Vietnamese such as Mr J, 
Mr Y’s business partner, attempt to defraud his own 
company. Mr J’s actions could have hurt the company 
and thus his own long-term interests. Many 
Vietnamese business partners displayed the attitude 
which the Singaporean businessman Mr F 
summarised as ‘take what you can get now and not 
wait for what you really want to come through’.  
 
As well as lacking long-term planning, many 
foreigners saw their Vietnamese business partners as 
lacking knowledge of other modern business concepts 
such as cash flow, depreciation and expansion credit. 
In our case studies they expressed frustration with the 
Vietnamese on their executive boards for their lack of 
business sophistication. Vietnamese contracts and 
banking procedures were also often found to be 
wanting. 
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Ordinary Vietnamese, in fact, emerged in our case 
studies as wary of many business procedures. The 
traditional Confucian belief that commerce is a zero-
sum game seemed to linger. They would travel many 
kilometres for instance, to conduct a transaction in 
person. Cash was preferred to credit due to lack of 
trust in the banks. Government bodies were treated 
with suspicion. Officials were thought to put 
themselves above the rule of law. The trust necessary 
to all commercial transactions was not founded in the 
rule of law as it might be in Singapore or Australia 
but in the institution of the family. 
 
The Vietnamese family structure itself, however, 
occasionally presented problems. Heavily influenced 
by the cultural inheritance of Confucianism - which 
demands that respect be shown in recognition of 
status - the individual tends to be expected to defer to 
those of higher status, whether by age, gender or 
descent order of kinship. The Confucian father at the 
top of this hierarchy has respect conferred upon him 
but also a large burden of responsibility. For this 
reason executives such as Mr B found it difficult to 
delegate discipline. He also complained about the 
lack of personal responsibility taken by his staff, as 
they deferred to his leadership on even the most 
mundane tasks. Vietnamese female executives in 
addition had problems with the traditional family 
structure. Mrs C, for example, found this patriarchal 
hierarchy difficult to negotiate when her traditional 
submissive domestic role conflicted with her roles as 
an executive helping to run a company. Despite 
examples of this type, however, it is in general true 
that the family is used by Vietnamese to overcome 
many of the problems they encounter when doing 
business.  
 
The family remains the main organising principle in 
Vietnam despite a growing individualism that has 
emerged as Vietnam has shifted from a centralised, 
rural-based economy to a more open, urban one. This 
transformation was embodied largely in Mr B, the 
owner of the BB Water bottling plant. He mentioned 
his family less than the other Vietnamese participants 
and prided himself having set up the company all by 
himself and running it like a ‘foreign company’. But 
Mr B’s individualism was certainly not free of clan-
based village imperatives. He lamented the fact that it 
was difficult to know the background of potential 
employees in the absence of a clan-based village. He 
seemed also to have difficulty maintaining staff 
loyalty in the absence of traditional ties. In fact a sign 
that more and more Vietnamese managers must be 
having problems with managing individuals, outside 
their traditional familial roles, would seem to be the 
burgeoning genre of business management and 
psychology literature in Vietnam. 
 
Another problem often identified in our case studies 
is that the state has continued to interfere too much in 
business. Our survey encountered support for such 
interference: 77% of respondents still thought the 
government “more important than the role of the 
individual in the market”. We noted many types of 
interference: the state, for instance, setting the 
parameters for many businesses through its control of 
the banks, and a whole gamut of issues arising from 
the need to cultivate personal relationships with State 
officials. While Vietnamese business people seemed 
to have less trouble with this - Mrs C, for example, 
successfully used her pre-existing relationships with 
state companies to get export orders - even they 
implied that the process was often delicate, Mr B 
describing it as ‘an art’.  
 
Located largely outside these networks - which 
Vietnamese have with each other and with state 
officials - foreigners appear often to have surmounted 
the problem by getting a Vietnamese partner to help 
them ‘tap into’ these webs of personal relationships. 
In many of our case studies the foreign company 
actively sought out a well-connected Vietnamese 
business partner before establishing itself in the 
country. But this could bring its own problems. 
Expatriates were often dissatisfied with the 
performance of their Vietnamese partners in the board 
room. It was felt that the influence of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (VCP) meant that the first loyalty 
of some Vietnamese business partners was to the 
Party rather than the joint venture. Vietnamese 
executives were criticised for sitting mutely in board 
meetings, unless they were given specific directives 
by the Communist Party. Furthermore, it was often 
felt that the Party itself was inexperienced in the ways 
of capitalism. The Party, for example, seemed not to 
know how to deal with such a large mining operation 
as PP Ltd. 
 
The interests of the VCP representative on the board 
had interests might diverge from those of their 
foreign partners because the VCP was still engaged in 
opening up the economy – seeking to gain foreign 
investment, skills and technology. The profit margin 
of the joint venture might be seen by the Party as of 
secondary importance compared with its benefit to 
the nation or VCP. It is for this reason that the 
Vietnamese Mr J was congratulated for his 
achievements when Mr Y reported how much tax 
their company had paid.    
 
Issues also arose over the way the Vietnamese 
government was inclined to treat foreigners with 
suspicion: many expatriates were not used to being 
considered a security risk. In this regard the mining 
company, PP Ltd, perhaps suffered more than others. 
It may well have been because the company was 
viewed as a security risk that it suffered fines, 
confiscation of assets and close surveillance.  
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Contexts 
All these issues in business activity arose in four 
broad contexts - contexts that were often both the 
source of the problems and, in addition, the source of 
ways in which business people could ‘solve’ or at 
least adapt to these ‘problems’. The four contexts are: 
the changing material conditions of Vietnam, the 
family, the state and the continued influence of 
poverty. The first context concerns the way the 
material condition of Vietnam is undergoing great 
change as its poor, rural-based, centralised economy 
gives way to a wealthy, more urban, more open 
economy. The next context, the family, is seen by 
many Vietnamese, particularly government officials, 
as a bulwark against the social changes brought about 
by doi-moi. The third context, the state, tries to 
control or at least influence the changes that are 
happening and the rate at which they happen. As the 
last chapter showed, however, the State is not always 
in control. The one constant, linking all three of these 
contexts, is change. 
 
Regarding the fourth context, although the changing 
material conditions of Vietnam – with the growth of 
cities, industries and prosperity – need to be 
acknowledged, real poverty persists. There is as well 
the influence of the ‘culture of poverty’, and the 
imprint it leaves on people who are no longer directly 
threatened by starvation.  
 
Perhaps the most important context for most 
Vietnamese, so our research suggests, has been the 
family. The Vietnamese emphasise family not only in 
their business dealings but in practically all other 
aspects of life as well. It has continued to be a 
powerful organising principle. The family has to a 
certain extent mitigated the effects of poverty: it 
provided care, for instance, when the health system 
could not. A case could also be made that Vietnamese 
did not need to develop a thorough understanding of 
sophisticated business credit and other financial 
arrangements because these have long been provided 
by their families. Families, we saw, often take the 
place of banks in providing start-up capital for new 
Vietnamese businesses. 88% of Vietnamese 
respondents to our survey expected that their families 
would somehow support them in their enterprises. 
Many of our Vietnamese businesses were also family 
enterprises with mothers, husbands and children 
making up the executive staff.  
 
Three features of Vietnamese family life emerged as 
most important for business: trust, respect and 
familiarity. In situations where business relations 
were not in fact between family members, people 
sought to replicate the trust that is thought to exist 
within the family in the ‘low trust’ world of business. 
There is in fact no word for ‘you’ in Vietnamese, and 
Vietnamese tend to address each other using 
pronouns that position everyone within a notional 
family: younger female friends are addressed as ‘little 
sister’, older male friends ‘big brother’, and so forth. 
Such a constant reminder of one’s place in a family-
like hierarchy implicitly demands that a Vietnamese 
business person show due recognition of status at all 
times. Thus two Vietnamese people conducting a 
business transaction cannot be said to address each 
other as neutral economic actors, but rather know 
where they rank in relation to each other’s status. At 
the top of the business/family hierarchy is the owner 
of a business or factory – who has ideally the same 
authority over his employees as the Confucian 
patriarch has over his family. 
 
The Confucian patriarch could easily be a distant and 
stern authority were it not for the softening effects of 
‘familiarity’ – a  cultural trait that in part may have 
arisen from Vietnam’s cultural inheritance in 
Buddhism.. Mrs C in her factory was able to soften 
the effect of the Confucian hierarchy on young 
women – who might well be seen as located on the 
bottom rung - by explaining intimate facts such as 
pregnancies to her factory managers and encouraging 
them to be polite. It was also appreciated when 
Singaporean or Australian business partners were 
friendly and approachable rather than aloof. 
Familiarity, of course, was expected to be coupled 
with respect. The ideal is the Confucian father who is 
close to his family and trusted by them but his 
authority is respected, ‘natural’ and never questioned. 
Mr Y recognised this when he said that in Vietnam 
business managers must know how to ‘behave fairly, 
equally and in the most feeling way’. Seeing YY 
Roofing as an ideal ‘big family’, he considered ‘no 
command and order’ were needed because there “is 
only cooperation’. The Australian Y family would 
appear to have reduced the social distance between 
themselves and the Vietnamese (thus building trust 
and familiarity) by living modestly when they were 
first establishing their business in Vietnam.   
 
Many Vietnamese business people, and the most 
successful foreigners we have encountered, extended 
the family context to include the workplace. They 
fostered family-like bonds in their work places, 
treating members of their staff like close family - 
taking them to restaurants, paying for their wedding 
reception and so forth.  
 
Celebrations in general strengthened relationships - 
and Singaporean expatriates in particular delighted in 
rediscovering many traditions that had fallen into 
abeyance in their home state. Observing special 
festivals and traditions added a substantial cost - with 
expenditure on fireworks, feasts and other ritual 
offerings at temples. But they were an assertion of 
status – just as the level of family celebrations for a 
wedding, or in revering ancestors, maintained a 
family’s status.  
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While the Vietnamese communist state used to 
deplore excessive expenditure on festivals, by the 
1990s it had recognised the importance of festivals 
and traditions in maintaining family bonds. And the 
family had risen again in the Party’s estimation, being 
seen as a bulwark against globalised pop culture. The 
state enlisted the family to assist its efforts to keep at 
bay the bad side of capitalism – a development the 
Vietnamese state itself had ushered in with doi-moi, 
and now sought to modify. These efforts by the state 
formed the other major context looked at in this 
paper. 
 
On the one hand, the state has embraced and 
encouraged capitalism - keen to attract the increased 
foreign investment, living standards and 
technological know-how that capitalism can bring. 
The state has encouraged foreign companies to 
establish joint ventures in Vietnam by offering them 
such things as favourable tariffs on competing 
products or imported materials. The imported 
materials necessary for the establishment of the 
Singaporean-Vietnamese joint venture, the EE Hotel, 
for example were granted exemption from duties in 
their founding agreement with the government. 
 
On the other hand, however, in many of our case 
studies the state was yet to adapt fully to the new 
capitalist context. It had not made a full transition – 
and in some cases this seemed to have been quite 
deliberate. The government of course was attempting 
to do business in a free market when much of the 
business experience of Party officials was gained in 
running state-owned enterprises, where the state 
legitimately controlled all business in the interests of 
the Party. The Party also still seemed affected by its 
colonial past - fearing perhaps that capital and 
resources might be stripped from the country by 
multinationals as they once were by colonial powers.  
 
Anxious about the changes they have been ushering 
in, the Vietnamese elite has sought to temper the 
impact of market forces in their country – and our 
discussion of the cultural and historical background 
of the country suggests we cannot dismiss their 
efforts as merely cynical. In an effort to ease the 
transition, the state has turned in particular to the 
revered, powerful institution of the family. Ho Chi 
Minh, for example, declared Vietnam to be 
indivisible “since no one can divide the members of 
one family”, and in recent times both ordinary 
Vietnamese and the state have compared the 
government to the head of a family. In our case 
studies Mr A thought that his company being ‘100% 
private’ put him lower down the family hierarchy: 
“For the government private is like an adopted child 
and the state companies are the real children”.  
 
In keeping with its familial image, the state also has 
implemented legislation to protect Vietnamese 
workers from the worst ravages of capitalism, in 
particular the ravages of foreign capitalism. A 
lingering Confucian attitude towards commerce as a 
zero-sum game might be an influence here, but it is 
also the case that as recently as 1989 Vietnam was on 
a war footing, and this would almost inevitably 
encourage suspicion of foreigners. The VCP could be 
expected to attempt to ‘manage’ the country’s 
interaction with other foreigners, rather than leave it 
to the ‘free market’ - and there would appear to be a 
degree of public support for this understanding of 
governmental responsibility. The attitude of many 
Vietnamese seems to be that capitalism is here but 
they want still to adhere to communist ideals such as 
equality and respect for those at bottom of financial 
hierarchy. In many ways, Communism now provides 
more of a moral than an economic template for the 
country.  
 
It is here that our research takes on a wider 
significance. As market forces are unleashed in such 
countries as Vietnam, it is important to discern local 
perspectives that are likely to demand important 
modifications. In our case studies we encountered a 
series of practical issues arising in business activity in 
Vietnam – some causing particular frustration for 
foreign business engagement. Time and again, 
however, our survey of cultural and historical 
contexts has helped to promote understanding when 
dealing with apparent conflicts of perspective. This 
same local knowledge – appreciation, for instance, of 
the past role of the state, the family and the culture 
(and fact) of poverty – will be essential in current 
Vietnamese attempts to create an ethical code to 
guide the capitalistic endeavours of the future. This 
local knowledge concerns the ‘root stock’ upon which 
such a code might be grafted.  
 
We can expect that in one country after another 
across the Asian region and elsewhere there will be 
attempts to develop ethical structures – and in most 
cases the process will involve drawing on both long-
established perspectives and critical historical 
experience. The challenge in this will be to make 
explicit a range of tacit (and broadly accepted) 
assumptions about what one ought to do in general – 
and in the context of a market economy, in particular.  
Systems of values and principles constantly shape 
decisions – but usually without anyone consciously 
attending to them and the work they do. If the 
evolution of market economies is to avoid the 
destructive ‘wild west’ phase of laissez-faire 
capitalism (which is inimical to the operation of a free 
market), then it will require the identification, 
deployment and application of ‘indigenous’ ethical 
frameworks that underpin genuinely open markets. 
We have not heard the last of ‘the family, or of the 
Confucian responsibilities of the Vietnamese state – 
and this need not mean that Vietnam will develop less 
effectively than other countries. Constructing an 
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explicit ethical code may actually help to give 
Vietnam stability and to make it a model for other 
countries in the region that look toward the future 
with anxiety as well as excitement.  
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